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THE SUPREME COURT’S UN‑AMERICANISM PENDULUM
Nicholas L. Georgakopoulos*

ABSTRACT
Examining the Bill of Rights through the post-WWII Red Scare
opinions of the Supreme Court reveals an array of strategies of judging and
interplay between the judiciary, the legislature, and the electorate. The
transitions are more gradual than appointments of justices would suggest
and show judicial sensitivity to political undercurrents. Legislative action
that mostly failed to pass had full impact on the Court’s majority. The
choices of the liberal justices may have undermined their long-term
interests.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

During the Cold War, was Communism a threatening instrument of the
adversary Soviet Union or one more political idea deserving of First
Amendment protection? The Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on un-Americanism prosecutions reveals a vacillation, taking both sides repeatedly:
having the fear of Communism override the Bill of Rights, restoring the Bill
of Rights to primacy, and repeating. Despite that the transitions are mostly
related to specific events, the voting fits better the gradual transitions of a
pendulum than large instant changes driven by judicial appointments. Interestingly, one of the transitions is a reaction to a legislative backlash. A
closer look reveals that, whereas a minority of the Court disregarded the
backlash, the majority treated it as a revelation of information about the
national will rather than duress.
By un-Americanism prosecutions this Article refers to any action that
produces any negative consequence and has its origin in any body that seeks
to avert subversive influence. A prominent one was the House Un-American
Activities Committee (but the spotlight of history is on Wisconsin
Republican Senator Joseph McCarthy’s excesses during his chairmanship
of the Internal Security Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on
Government Operations in 1953 till his censure by the Senate in December
1954).1 State legislatures created similar committees, as did professional
organizations, such as bar associations that were in control of licensing their
members, but also bodies in industries that did not require licensing, notably
in the entertainment industry.2 The negative consequences they produced
ranged from revocation of security clearances,3 dismissal from
employment,4 requirement of loyalty oaths,5 denial of a license to practice a

1
See generally Joseph McCarthy, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA (Dec. 17, 2020),
https://www.britannica.com/biography/Joseph-McCarthy [perma.cc/4GT4-8RZ5]; THE OXFORD
COMPANION TO UNITED STATES HISTORY (Paul S. Boyer et al. eds., 2004), https://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/acref/9780195082098.001.0001/acref-9780195082098-e-0965
[perma.cc/9TNN-R5LA].
2
See, e.g., infra note 244 (discussing Wilson v. Loew’s, Inc., 355 U.S. 597 (1958)) (references
to notes 63 and later refer to notes in Appendix A).
3
See, e.g., infra note 284 and accompanying text (discussing Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474
(1959)).
4
See, e.g., infra note 67 and accompanying text (discussing United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S.
303 (1946)).
5
See, e.g., infra note 83 (discussing Garner v. Bd. of Pub. Works, 341 U.S. 716, 718 (1951)); see
infra note 88 (discussing Gerende v. Bd. of Supervisors of Elections, 341 U.S. 56, 56–57 (1951)); see
infra note 139 (discussing Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 185–86 (1952)).
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profession,6 deportation,7 and denaturalization,8 as well as criminal
conviction, either directly for membership in subversive organizations,9 or
indirectly, for refusing to answer questions or produce documents,10 or for
perjury.11
More specifically, besides resisting Congressional inquiries, four
additional categories of un-Americanism prosecutions are discernible. (1)
The Taft-Hartley Act of 1947 (enacted over Truman’s veto) imposed
criminal penalties on members of the Communist Party who took leadership
positions in labor unions. A set of cases regarded such prosecutions until, in
1965, US v. Brown held the prohibition unconstitutional.12 (2) By executive
order, Truman and Eisenhower prohibited the government employment of
communists.13 A set of cases regarded such dismissals which ceased in the
late 1950s. (3) The Alien Registration Act of 1940 (Smith Act),14 the
Internal Security Act of 1950,15 and the Communist Control Act of 195416
6

See, e.g., infra note 158 (discussing Barsky v. Bd. of Regents, 347 U.S. 442, 445 (1954))
(physician); infra note 205 (discussing Konigsberg v. State Bar of Cal. (Konigsberg I), 353 U.S. 252,
263 (1957)); infra note 310 (discussing Konigsberg v. State Bar of Cal. (Konigsberg II), 366 U.S. 36, 37
(1960)); infra note 312 (discussing In re Anastaplo, 366 U.S. 82, 86 (1960) (bar admissions)).
7
See, e.g., infra note 143 and accompanying text (discussing Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342
U.S. 580, 582 (1952)); infra note 150 (discussing United States v. Spector, 343 U.S. 169, 170 (1952));
infra note 166 (discussing Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 523 (1954)); infra note 212 (discussing Barton
v. Sentner, 353 U.S. 963, 963 (1957)); infra note 246 (discussing Rowoldt v. Perfetto, 355 U.S. 115, 116
(1956)); infra note 257 (discussing Bonetti v. Rogers, 356 U.S. 691, 693 (1958)); infra note 293
(discussing Niukkanen v. McAlexander, 362 U.S. 390, 390 (1960)); infra note 194 (discussing Kimm v.
Rosenberg, 363 U.S. 405, 405 (1960)).
8
See, e.g., infra note 155 and accompanying text (discussing Bridges v. United States, 346 U.S.
209, 234 (1953)); infra note 193 (discussing United States v. Zucca, 351 U.S. 91, 95 (1956)); infra note
249 (discussing Brown v. United States (Brown-1958), 356 U.S. 148, 149 (1957)); infra note 255
(discussing Nowak v. United States, 356 U.S. 660, 668 (1958), and Maisenberg v. United States, 356
U.S. 670, 671–72 (1958)); infra note 301 (discussing Polites v. United States, 364 U.S. 426, 433–34
(1960)).
9
See, e.g., infra note 118 and accompanying text (discussing Dennis v. United States (Dennis II),
341 U.S. 494, 496 (1950)); infra note 224 (discussing Yates v. United States (Yates I), 354 U.S. 298,
300 (1956)).
10
See, e.g., infra note 89 (discussing United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 329–30 (1949) and
United States v. Fleischman, 339 U.S. 349, 351 (1949)), and many more cases.
11
See, e.g., infra note 71 and accompanying text (discussing Christoffel v. United States, 338
U.S. 84, 91–92 (1949)).
12
See infra note 385 and accompanying text (discussing United States v. Brown (US v. Brown),
381 U.S. 437, 462 (1965).
13
Truman issued Executive Order 9835 in March 1947. Exec Order No. 9835, 13 C.F.R. Cum.
Supp. (1947). It was replaced by Eisenhower’s corresponding Executive Order 10450, of 1953, Exec
Order. No. 10450, 3 C.F.R (1953). Both were gradually invalidated and repealed. Eisenhower’s order
also prohibited the employment of loyal individuals who might be subject to extortion due to their
lifestyle, which included homosexuality.
14
Alien Registration Act, Pub. L. No. 76-670, 54 Stat. 670 (1940).
15
Internal Security Act of 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-831, 64 Stat. 987 (1950) (also enacted over the
veto of President Truman).
16
Communist Control Act of 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-637, 68 Stat. 775 (1954).
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outlawed the Communist Party, membership in it, and subversive activities.
A set of prosecutions sprung from their application until Yates in 1957
hindered prosecutions.17 (4) The Nationality Act of 1940 strengthened the
prohibition of the naturalization of communists and required their deportation.18 A set of cases regarded deportations and denaturalizations. The result
is one hundred seventeen opinions.19 Aggregation is necessary to see the
overall tendency.
Part II summarizes the attitudes of the justices that Appendix A
analyzes in detail. Part III performs the quantitative analysis, showing that
the gradual changes of the pendulum motion explain the justices’ voting
better than the large instant changes of a step process. Part IV shows that
the reaction to the backlash was a permanent change for five members of
the Court. Part V concludes, speculating on the long-term consequences of
different judicial strategies.
II. A QUOTE-HEAVY SUMMARY
The Supreme Court’s post-WWII decisions on un-Americanism
matters span from 1946 to 1967 and cover at least five legal subject
matters.20 The Court changed attitudes four times about their treatment. No
summarizing can do justice to this chapter of legal history. Indeed, a detailed
history of the cases exists in the form of a magisterial book of 265 pages, 90
of which are endnotes, with copious references to the justices’ own notes,
made available posthumously.21 To a large part, the point of this Article is
that only the visual and quantitative aggregations offered in Part III offer
fair overviews of this vast and varied landscape.
The goal of this Article is to show the big picture, akin to revealing the
shape of a forest or a coast. Understanding each opinion is akin to observing
each tree or pebble. Yet, the trees make the forest and the pebbles the
coastline. The texture of the opinions is revealing and Appendix A tries to
show that texture through the justices’ own words. Readers should not omit
that detailed recounting, but a summary shows the tensions.
17

See infra note 224 and accompanying text.
Nationality Act of 1940, Pub. L. No. 76-853, 54 Stat. 1137 (1940).
19
The list of primary un-Americanism opinions has a hundred and one, Appendix B. The omitted
opinions are sixteen, collected in notes 31–33. Not included in this enumeration is Shelton v. Tucker,
364 U.S. 479 (1960). See infra note 292.
20
See supra notes 1–18 and accompanying text.
21
ROBERT M. LICHTMAN, THE SUPREME COURT AND MCCARTHY-ERA REPRESSION: ONE
HUNDRED DECISIONS (2012). Although this article also produces a database of about one hundred
opinions (Appendix B lists them with the vote of each justice), the overlap is imperfect. The primary
differences are due to the present database starting earlier, ending later, and excluding espionage, bail,
and private dispute opinions. For a listing of the opinions that do not join the database of primary unAmericanism opinions, see infra notes 31–33 and accompanying text.
18
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The Supreme Court entered the term that started in 1946 with the world
recovering from the maelstrom of WWII. The opposition of the United
States to Nazism had rendered Soviet Communists into temporary allies.
The end of WWII brought back the opposition and started the Cold War.
The Court’s composition was about to change. Four Truman appointees
brought with them the sense of opposition to Soviet Communism that may
not have been as pronounced for the rest of the Court, who were appointees
of F.D. Roosevelt. Two of Roosevelt’s appointees became pivotal, Jackson
and Frankfurter.
Jackson becomes the chief prosecutor of the Nazi war criminals in
Nuremberg and observes from close the Soviet expansion in Eastern
Europe. He brings that experience to his concurrence that favors the
prosecution in Dennis II:
Communist technique in the overturn of a free government
was disclosed by the coup d’etat in which they seized power
in Czechoslovakia. There the Communist Party during its
preparatory stage claimed and received protection for its
freedoms of speech, press, and assembly. Pretending to be but
another political party, it eventually was conceded participation in government, where it entrenched reliable members
chiefly in control of police and information services. When the
government faced a foreign and domestic crisis, the Communist Party had established a leverage strong enough to threaten
civil war. In a period of confusion the Communist plan
unfolded and the underground organization came to the
surface throughout the country in the form chiefly of labor
‘action committees.’ Communist officers of the unions took
over transportation and allowed only persons with party permits to travel. Communist printers took over the newspapers
and radio and put out only party-approved versions of events.
Possession was taken of telegraph and telephone systems and
communications were cut off wherever directed by party
heads. Communist unions took over the factories, and in the
cities a partisan distribution of food was managed by the
Communist organization. A virtually bloodless abdication by
the elected government admitted the Communists to power,
whereupon they instituted a reign of oppression and terror, and
ruthlessly denied to all others the freedoms which had
sheltered their conspiracy.22
In detail that is almost tedious, Jackson recounts how Communist
infiltration became an overthrow of the Czech government.
22

Dennis v. United States (Dennis II), 341 U.S. 494, 566 (1950) (footnote omitted).
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Jackson is a liberal justice who often joins the conservative ones in
placing the fear of Communism above the Bill of Rights.23 In a case outside
this setting, Jackson warns against the absolutist view of Black and Douglas,
who insist on the primacy of the Bill of Rights, turning the Bill of Rights
into a “suicide pact.”24 Elsewhere, Jackson writes for the Court while
embracing as his premise armed conflict “to stem the tide of Communism:”
[The Constitution] does not shield the citizen from conscription and the consequent calamity of being separated from
family, friends, home and business while he is transported to
foreign lands to stem the tide of Communism. If Communist
aggression creates such hardships for loyal citizens, it is hard
to find justification for holding that the Constitution requires
that its hardships must be spared the Communist alien.25
Jackson’s position reaches the substance and resolves it against the Bill
of Rights on consequentialist grounds, a war against Communism.26
Frankfurter’s judicial philosophy is one of restraint. Frankfurter often
argues that the Court should not reach the constitutional merits of a dispute
because the other branches of government have the authority to resolve the
issue. The role of the judiciary in Frankfurter’s analysis is much more
circumscribed. Where Jackson assists a war against Communism,
Frankfurter’s concurrence acknowledges that the legislature’s actions may
be odious, but the Court cannot override them. “[T]he place to resist unwise
or cruel legislation . . . is the Congress, not this Court.”27
The four Truman appointees (Burton, Vinson, Minton, and Clark), plus
Reed, who was the one Roosevelt appointee who voted just as much for the
prosecution, plus Jackson, and Frankfurter, were seven votes (against Black
and Douglas).28 Any five could make the prosecution victorious. And it
often was, until—after Vinson had been replaced by Warren in 1953—
23
The ranking of the justices by how often they voted for the prosecution is in Table 1, below.
The conservative justices are the four Truman appointees (Burton, Vinson, Clark, and Minton) and Reed,
an FDR appointee. Burton, however, votes less for the prosecution than Jackson does, 61 percent to
Jackson’s 73 percent. For one more quote vividly illustrating the concern about communist subversion,
see note 306. That comes from a 1961 majority opinion for the Court by Stewart, long after Jackson’s
departure.
24
See infra note 314 (discussing Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 37 (1949) (Jackson, J.,
dissenting). Frankfurter also wrote against Black and Douglas’s “dogmatic preference” for the Bill of
Rights, for example in Dennis II. See infra note 124 and accompanying text.
25
See infra note 144 and accompanying text (discussing Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S.
580, 591 (1952)).
26
Jackson’s concurrence in Am. Commc’ns Ass’n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950), upholding the
obligation of labor unions to provide affidavits that no officer is a member of the Communist Party, is
similarly framed in terms of that party’s unique and subversive nature. See infra note 102 and
accompanying text.
27
See infra note 147 and accompanying text (discussing Harisiades, 342 U.S. at 597–98).
28
See infra Table 1, Part III.
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Jackson passed away on October 9, 1954, to be replaced by Harlan on March
17, 1955. That began a brief period of idealism about the Bill of Rights,
when the Court would favor the individuals in un-Americanism
prosecutions. Those exonerations led to a legislative backlash in the summer
of 1957. The legislature reversed one decision and was poised to exclude
several issues from the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.29 After the
backlash, five of the justices, including Frankfurter, increased their voting
for the prosecution producing several 5–4 convictions.30 In September 1962,
Goldberg, who would never vote for the prosecution, replaced the retired
Frankfurter, who had come to often do. Thereafter, individuals win every
un-Americanism case, albeit often 5–4 and this historical chapter closes.
As Part III shows, the result is four periods. The last Truman
appointment, of Minton in October 1949, initiates an era named for its
herald, Jackson. The Jackson Era ends when Harlan replaces Jackson in
March 1955. That begins the Premature Idealism Era till the legislative
backlash of July 1958. The Backlash Era lasts until Goldberg’s appointment
in September 1962, starting the Post-Frankfurter Era, which closes unAmericanism prosecutions. The more detailed recounting of Appendix A
focuses on reviewing all the cases and collecting quotes that reveal the texture of the thinking of each majority and dissent.
III. AGGREGATING AND VISUALIZING
The Court’s treatment of un-Americanism prosecutions was complex
and varied. The result is an opacity, which, however, is permeable through
an aggregation and visualization of the large number of cases and votes.
The quantitative analysis rests on the primary opinions about unAmericanism prosecutions. In the narrative of Appendix A the secondary
cases that are not counted are identified when described. Essentially they

29
See infra note 232 and accompanying text. The statute to overrule Jencks passed the House
351–17. Pub. L. No. 85-269, 71 Stat. 595 (1957). Appendix A Part C discusses the backlash. For the
justices’ voting changes, see infra Table 2 and accompanying text.
30
Whereas the text will use temporal language (here “after”) due to convention, causal language
(here “because of”) would be perfectly appropriate. Philosophy of science has many competing
understandings of causation, one of which is temporal sequence. Regardless of which theory of causation
one adopts, the legislative backlash caused the change in the voting of the five conservative justices.
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are the espionage cases,31 the single-justice and domestic cases about bail,32
and the private liability cases.33 Espionage cases are atypical because they
involve national security directly (rather than fear of communist infiltration
or subversion). Single-justice bail cases are atypical because they do not
involve the entire Court. Domestic bail cases differ because the
considerations for bail are different than those for conviction. Private
liability cases are atypical because the reaction to one private party’s effort
to impose liability on another is quite different than the response to a stateinitiated administrative or criminal prosecution. Generally speaking,
espionage cases tend to result in prosecution victories, bail cases in
defendant victories, and private liability cases in no liability, with little
apparent relation to the level of fear of communism. The predictability of
their outcomes justifies their exclusion. Including them would not alter
materially the analysis but would add noise. The other side of the same
phenomenon is the realization that, in the remaining cases, outcomes
fluctuated with no change in the law; the change was the level of fear of
communism.
The resulting sample consists of 100 opinions, from Lovett in 1946 to
Robel in 1967, listed in Appendix B. All nine justices cast votes in sixtyfour cases, eight in twenty-seven, seven in ten, and six in two. The revolving
composition of the Court included twenty justices, if we include Marshall,
although he did not participate in the one case during his tenure, Robel.
Table 1 orders them from the one voting the most in favor of the prosecution
(Vinson with 86.4 percent), to those voting the least (a six-way tie at zero

31

They are United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537 (1950); Rosenberg v.
United States, 346 U.S. 273, 277 (1953); and Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 423 (1956). The
government wins all. Two additional cases appear closer to national security than un-Americanism and
are also not included. Heikkila v. Barber, 345 U.S. 229 (1953) (deportation challenge); Shaughnessy v.
United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953) (indefinite detention for deportation of alien about
whom the attorney general will not say why the alien is not admissible even in camera). They are also
discussed below. See infra note 142 and accompanying text (discussing Shaughnessy). One more
deportation case, United States v. Witkovich, 353 U.S. 194 (1957), is similarly excluded. See infra note
213 and accompanying text.
32
See infra note 115 (discussing Williamson v. United States, 1950 WL 42366 (September 25,
1950) (single-justice bail)); see infra note 116 (discussing Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1 (1951) (domestic
bail)); infra note 169 (discussing Yanish v. Barber, 73 S. Ct. 1105 (1953) (single-justice foreign)); infra
note 189 (discussing Steinberg v. United States, 76 S. Ct. 822 (1956) (single-justice domestic)). The
individuals win all. The one foreign, entire-court case is included. See infra note 149 (discussing Carlson
v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524 (1952) (the government wins due to fear of the defendants’ spreading
communism, which suggests that this government victory may have been influenced by the red scare
and, therefore, is properly in the database)).
33
See infra note 137 (discussing Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951)); infra note 138
(discussing Collins v. Hardyman, 341 U.S. 651, 656 (1951)); infra note 195 (discussing Black v. Cutter
Labs, 351 U.S. 292 (1956)); infra note 202 (discussing Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen
v. NLRB, 352 U.S. 153 (1956)); infra note 244 (discussing Wilson v. Loew’s, Inc., 355 U.S. 597 (1958));
infra note 372 (discussing Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647 (1963)). They all result in no liability,
which appears as favoring un-Americanism prosecutions in the first three and Wilson.
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that includes the pre-Truman Murphy and Rutledge, as well as the postTruman Democrats Goldberg, Fortas, Marshall, and Brennan, who, albeit
Republican-appointed, was a Democrat).
The first and fourth columns hold the last name of each Justice. The
second and fifth columns hold the dates that they were active on the Court,
from the month and year of their appointment to the month and year of their
departure. The third and sixth columns hold the voting record of each justice
in terms of percentage of votes cast against the individual (and in favor of
the prosecution, government, or state) rounded to one decimal point.

Table 1: Justices’ Voting Record
Justice
Vinson
Minton
Reed
Clark
Jackson
Whittaker
White
Harlan
Burton
Stewart

Active
6/46–9/53
10/49–10/56
1/38–2/57
8/49–6/67
7/41–10/54
3/57–3/62
4/62–6/93
3/55–9/71
9/45–10/58
10/58–7/81

Vtg R
86.4%
84.4%
84.2%
80.2%
72.7%
70.5%
70.0%
60.8%
59.3%
57.9%

Justice
Frankfurter
Warren
Douglas
Black
Murphy
Rutledge
Brennan
Goldberg
Fortas
Marshall

Active
1/39–8/62
10/53–6/69
4/39–11/75
8/37–9/71
2/40–7/49
2/43–9/49
10/56–7/90
9/62–7/65
10/65–5/69
8/67–10/91

Vtg R
39.1%
2.7%
2.1%
1.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%

This ranking of the Justices makes some interesting revelations.
(1) Jackson, the example of a jurist who subordinates the Bill of Rights to
the fear of Communism, is fifth. Vinson, Minton, Reed, and Clark have
more anti-Communist voting records than Jackson. (2) Warren, Douglas,
and Black, the persistent votes for the individual, do not have perfect
records, having cast some votes against individuals in the Jackson Era.
Warren cast two before his change of heart. Douglas cast two, and Black
cast one, in Gerende. (3) Frankfurter, who is seen as having defected from
the pro-individual coalition after the legislative backlash of the summer of
1957, still has the next most liberal voting record. (4) Stewart and Harlan,
who are seen as conservatives and were appointees of Republican President
Eisenhower, vote for the prosecution quite a bit less than White or Jackson,
both appointees of Democratic Presidents, respectively, Kennedy and
Roosevelt.
A. A Summary View: The Pendulum
Visualize the Court’s treatment of un-Americanism prosecutions on a
graph where each opinion is placed depending on the date of its issuance
along the horizontal axis and the fraction of votes for the prosecution on the
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vertical axis. The result, Figure 1, shows the ebb and flow of the fraction of
votes in favor of the prosecution.34 The horizontal axis holds time, the date
of each opinion. The vertical axis holds the fraction of the votes cast that
were in favor of the prosecution, the government, or the state. Unanimity
for the individual corresponds to zero and unanimity for the prosecution,
which only occurs once, corresponds to one. Two horizontal lines mark the
tight splits, 4/9ths and 5/9ths. Because the fraction is the result of dividing
by the actual votes cast, not all values are in ninths. For example, four even
splits appear.35
Each diamond is one opinion. Diamonds that would be superimposed
(because an opinion with the same voting fraction was issued on the same
day) appear as a white center. Three superimposed decisions do not occur.
The unanimous-against-the-prosecution four decisions of the early summer
1961 are too close in time to be distinguishable; their separation in time is
increased for the purpose of the figure.36
Vertical lines indicate the appointment of new justices and the
legislative backlash against the Court in the summer of 1957. The former
are dotted; the latter is solid. Of the several legislative actions of that
summer,37 the solid line corresponds to the introduction of the Jenner bill.
The Jenner bill was the most sweeping legislative reaction and eventually
failed; a different one was enacted. Each line that corresponds to the
appointment of a justice also identifies the justice who was replaced. This
text that identifies the replaced justice has in some instances a left or right
arrow in a parenthesis. A right arrow identifies appointments that replace a
justice who does not tend to vote for the prosecution with one who does and
vice versa for a left arrow. Thus, for example, the line marked “Brennan for
Minton (←)” corresponds to the date of the appointment of Brennan, who
replaced Minton, and who would vote significantly less for the prosecution
than Minton had.

34

A dynamic version of the figure, where pop-ups with case names, citation, and the voting
appear when hovering over each point, appears at my website under the entry corresponding to this
article. Also reachable at Nicholas L. Georgakopoulos, The Supreme Court’s Un-Americanism
Pendulum, IND. U. MCKINNEY SCH. L., tinyurl.com/uapend (last visited Feb. 8, 2021) [perma.cc/7D288LNL].
35
For the equal splits see infra note 106 (discussing Bailey), note 133 (discussing Isserman I),
note 136 (discussing Isserman II), and note 283 (discussing Raley).
36
The four are discussed below in note 315 (discussing Slagle v. Ohio, 366 U.S. 259 (1961)),
note 316 (discussing La. ex rel. Gremillion v. NAACP, 366 U.S. 293 (1961)), note 322 (discussing Noto
v. United States, 367 U.S. 290 (1961)), and note 323 (discussing Communist Party v. Catherwood, 367
U.S. 389 (1961)). The dates of the first and last are moved forward and back, respectively, by fifteen
days; the dates of the middle two are similarly moved by four days. This only influences the figure. The
analysis uses the actual dates.
37
See infra notes 232–237 and accompanying text.
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Figure 1: The fraction of votes for the prosecution in the primary un-Americanism decisions.
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Order comes from two aggregation efforts. The first is the step-like dotdashing line, which is the result of a regression using dummy variables that
correspond to the eras of different un-Americanism attitudes on the Court.
The second is a solid wave-like line, which is the result of trying to fit a
pendulum equation to the data. Its ebb and flow match the eras. Both show
the increased siding with the prosecution of the Jackson and Backlash Eras,
and the opposite stance of the first two un-Americanism cases, the
Premature Idealism, and Post-Frankfurter Eras.
B. Four Eras
From a statistical perspective, the proposition that these four eras
produce different average voting fractions on the Supreme Court is testable
by the linear regression that uses dummy variables corresponding to the
eras, the step-like dash-dotted line on Figure 1. Dummy variables identify
the periods: that before the appointment of Clark and Minton which only
holds two cases; the Jackson Era; the Premature Idealism Era (which is set
as the regression’s constant); the Backlash Era; and the Post-Frankfurter
Era. The fraction of votes for the government is higher in the Jackson Era
and the Backlash Era than in the Premature Idealism Era with statistical
confidence of 99.99 percent and 98 percent, respectively. However, this
regression is not particularly powerful in describing the data. The regression
only explains 20 percent to 24 percent of the variation of the voting (R2 is
.236 and adjusted R2 is .204).
Much more explanatory power lies in the non-linear regression that
rests on the equation that describes the motion of the pendulum, a product
of time, a trigonometric sine of time, and Euler’s constant raised to a power
that is a function of time. This produces the solid fluctuating line of Figure
1. This regression explains 80 percent to 81 percent of the variation in the
voting (R2 is .806, adjusted R2 is .796). This leads to the conclusion that
voting on un-Americanism prosecutions is more accurately described as
having followed that pendulum motion than the steps of the dummy
regression. The full statistics of these two regressions are in Appendix C,
Tables C1 and C2.
The difference between the two concepts⎯the sharp steps juxtaposed
to the pendulum’s gradual transitions⎯ is that the changes of the voting are
not as sharp as suggested by the time markers used to separate the periods.
Consider, for example, the transition from the Jackson Era to the Premature
Idealism Era, which starts with the appointment of Harlan. After the
appointment of Warren and before the appointment of Harlan, a period of
over a year from 1953 to 1955, the Court decided only two un-Americanism
cases, rather than continuing the pace of the earlier years when voting for
the prosecution reached its peak. In part, this slowdown is due to the gap
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between the death of Jackson on October 9, 1954, and Harlan’s appointment
on March 17, 1955, a period during which the Court issued only one unAmericanism opinion, Isserman II, splitting 3–3 without Jackson, Clark, or
Warren.38 The close look at the Court’s activity reveals that in this
transitional period the Court also avoided deciding a case, ordering the
reargument of Emspak at the end of the 1953 term.39
Similarly, the transition is softened in the start of the Backlash Era,
where the voting is quite mixed, a little less in favor of the prosecution than
after the appointment of Stewart. The next transition also is softened by the
Court’s voting in favor of the individual in a few cases before the end of this
era, before the appointment of Goldberg.
1. The Jackson Era
The first era, the Jackson Era, starts with the appointment of Clark and
Minton in August and September 1949. Jackson died on October 9, 1954.
Harlan was appointed in March 1955 to replace him. The latter date is the
border. Jackson’s express primacy of protection against Communist infiltration over the Bill of Rights defines this era and it is the only era when unAmericanism prosecutions garner seven or more votes. The Court during
this period has several justices who see Soviet Communism as a significant
threat, a threat that justifies the subordination of the Bill of Rights, the
position exemplified by Jackson. Five of the justices with the voting records
most in favor of the prosecution were on this composition of the Court:
Vinson, Minton, Reed, Clark, and Jackson, with voting rates, respectively,
of 86 percent, 84 percent, 84 percent, 80 percent, and 73 percent in favor of
the prosecution. Burton is only a little behind with 59 percent.
The Court decided twenty-four un-Americanism cases during the
Jackson Era. The prosecution was victorious in sixteen or 67 percent. The
average fraction of justices voting for the prosecution was 57 percent. This
era includes the only unanimous outcome in favor of the government:
Gerende.40

38

See infra note 136 and accompanying text.
Emspak v. United States, 347 U.S. 1006 (June 7, 1954) (per curiam) (ordering reargument);
LICHTMAN, supra note 21, at 68. The reargument changed the outcome. After the initial hearing on
Emspak, the Court was poised to rule for the prosecution 6–3, with Warren and Jackson in the majority
for the government. The draft opinion would have ruled broadly in favor of the government. This made
Black move for reargument, a motion which carried. In the interim, Jackson died, and Warren changed
attitudes about un-Americanism prosecutions. Jackson’s replacement, Harlan, sided with the
government, so the death of Jackson may have less importance than it appears to have. Nevertheless,
Black, Douglas, Warren, Frankfurter, Clark, and Burton, opposed the prosecution. See infra note 171
and accompanying text.
40
See infra note 88 and accompanying text (noting that the opinion is per curiam).
39
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Calculating the rate of the Court’s output over time is complicated by
the fact that the Court tends to operate in terms that start every October (and
are named for that October’s year), issuing a disproportionate number of
decisions near the end of each term. The Jackson Era lasted a little over six
terms. Only one decision was issued early in the 1954 term, Isserman II,
after Jackson’s death. The remaining twenty-three decisions over six terms
indicate a rate of slightly under four un-Americanism decisions per term.
2. The Premature Idealism Era
The Premature Idealism Era lasts from the replacement of Jackson by
Harlan in March 1955 until the legislative backlash of the summer of 1957.
Among the several legislative reactions, a good contender for the most
significant is the submission of the Jenner bill on July 26, 1957, in the
Senate, which would have stripped jurisdiction over five types of unAmericanism disputes from the Supreme Court.41 This era is defined by the
primacy that Warren, Black, and Douglas give to the Bill of Rights (as does
Brennan, who joins the Court only at the end of this era). The replacement
of Jackson by Harlan has a pronounced effect because in this era Harlan
votes for the individuals. That changes in the next era.
The Court decides twenty cases during this era. The prosecution is
victorious in none.42 The average fraction of justices voting for the
prosecution is 26 percent. The era comprises three terms, making the Court’s
rate of output just under seven un-Americanism decisions per term.
3. The Backlash Era
The Backlash Era starts in the summer of 1957 and lasts until the appointment of Justice Goldberg on September 28, 1962, by President Kennedy. The Backlash Era sees a pronounced shift of the Court to favoring the
government in un-Americanism prosecutions. However, Warren, Black,
Douglas, and Brennan never vote against any individual accused of unAmericanism. The Court produces wins for the government with five votes
against those four.43
41
A different bill passed but the Jenner bill would have been the most sweeping. See infra note
235 and accompanying text.
42
Note, however, that Black v. Cutter Labs, see infra note 195—which was excluded for being
between private parties, where the Court would uniformly refuse to interfere—can be considered a case
in which the individual accused of communist sympathies loses, slightly weakening the pro-individual
nature of the Premature Idealism Era.
43
The result is a clustering of opinions at the 5/9ths line of Figure 1. The one case which seems
to correspond to a majority greater than five out of nine is Nelson-LA, in which Warren does not
participate. See infra note 288 and accompanying text. The five-to-three vote produces the slightly larger
fraction.
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The Court decides forty-four cases during the Backlash Era. The prosecution is victorious in twenty or 45 percent. The average fraction of justices
voting for the prosecution is 39 percent. Treating this era as comprising five
terms, the Court’s output would be slightly over 8.5 un-Americanism
decisions per term, the greatest rate of output compared to other eras.
One may counter that the voting might have changed later, upon the
appointment of Stewart rather than upon the backlash. This is untenable for
several reasons. The explanatory power of the dummy regression would
drop.44 The voting of the period before Stewart’s appointment is closer to
that after it, rather than to that before the backlash.45 The applicable
statistical test differentiates both the latter periods from the Premature
Idealism Era.46 Stewart actually voted less for the government than his
predecessor, Burton, had come to vote after the backlash.47 Moreover, the
period between the backlash and Stewart’s appointment has convictions that
would be foreign to the Premature Idealism Era. The several exonerations
that it also has are not inconsistent with the period after Stewart’s
appointment. Their slightly greater frequency before Stewart’s appointment
is part of the gradual nature of the transitions that make the pendulum
motion have greater explanatory power than the step process.
4. The Post-Frankfurter Era
In the final era, the Post-Frankfurter Era, the Kennedy and Johnson
appointees (after White; i.e., Goldberg, replaced by Fortas, and Marshall
who replaced Clark) turn the Court against prosecutions and the historical
chapter of un-Americanism prosecutions closes.
The Court decides eleven cases during this era. The prosecution wins
none. The average fraction of justices voting for the prosecution is 30
percent.

44
If the appointment of Stewart is set as the dividing line, then the explanatory power of the
dummy-variable regression drops to 18.7 percent and 21.9 percent (adjusted R-squared and R-squared)
from the 20.4 percent to 23.6 percent.
45
Compare the rate of voting for the government in three periods, the Premature Idealism Era,
the transitional period until the appointment of Stewart, and the remainder of the Backlash Era (starting
from the appointment of Stewart). The first is 26 percent, the second 37 percent, and the third 41 percent.
Granted, Stewart’s appointment slightly increases the rate of voting for the government, but by a mere 4
percent. The larger leap follows the backlash, which leads to a change of 11 percent (from 26 percent to
37 percent), a change almost triple what Stewart brings. One of these three periods is unlike the others:
The Premature Idealism Era. The other two belong together as the Backlash Era.
46
The t-test against the Premature Idealism Era gives statistical confidence that the transitional
period is different of 96 percent and that the period after Stewart is of 99 percent. The two latter periods
are indistinguishable from the perspective of the t-test.
47
See infra Table 2. Burton, after the backlash, voted 71 percent for the government. During the
Backlash Era Stewart voted 61 percent for the government.
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The Court’s rate of output is unclear. Because this is the final era, its
ending is poorly specified. At the earliest, it is the last un-Americanism case
in this database, but much later dates are plausible. Perhaps its end is the
end of the Cold War, perhaps the final collapse of the Soviet Union or some
earlier date, such as a date when the Cold War is seen to reach a stalemate.
Therefore, establishing the rate of output of the Court cannot be precise.
Based on the last case in this sequence, one might treat this era as having a
duration of six terms, as a minimum. Then the Court’s output appears to be
at a maximum a little short of two decisions per term, quite a bit less than
any prior era, suggesting that the end of un-Americanism prosecutions was
at least also a result of the lower courts not producing cases that the Supreme
Court would review.
C. Gradual Transitions
The gradual nature of the transitions is a novel phenomenon that
deserves further research and explanation. The 1955 decision to reargue
Emspak is a good example of our lack of understanding of the corresponding
dynamics. It could well be an accident—a majority draft opinion with
excessive breadth which led to a loss of votes and a switch of the outcome.48
Yet, would this have happened two years earlier? Perhaps two years earlier,
at the peak of the Jackson Era, the forces of the environment in favor of unAmericanism convictions would have made the draft opinion not seem
overbroad or would have countered any efforts at additional deliberation
that the minority would have made, such as Black’s motion for reargument,
which perhaps only carried because the fervor against un-Americanism was
ebbing.
Even the beginning of un-Americanism prosecutions holds expressions
of gradualism. Consider Clark, a Truman appointee and one who strongly
favored the government. Clark’s impact on un-Americanism decisions is
subdued by the fact that, likely due to the conflict of having served as
Truman’s Attorney General, he does not participate in eighteen cases, most
of them early in his tenure. Whittaker presents a similar phenomenon, not
participating in several cases early in his tenure, although he did not have a
position in the Eisenhower administration.
The role of the two hot wars in this evolution also needs to be
understood better. The Korean War—June 25, 1950, to July 27, 1953—
partially overlaps with the peak of the pro-government attitude of the
Jackson Era. It seems intuitive that the war may have contributed to the progovernment sentiment. However, the ramping up of convictions occurred
before the war and the ebbing occurs before the war ends. Therefore, more

48

See infra note 168 and 171 and accompanying text.
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plausible is that both the war and the stance of the Supreme Court stem from
the same forces, rather than that the war influenced the Court. Then, looking
at the early ebbing of convictions, the question arises whether the war
dissipated social pressures and a politically sensitive set of justices reacted
accordingly. The Vietnam War’s gradual escalation might frustrate efforts
to understand why its impact may differ.
Puzzling is also the gradual change surrounding the replacement of
Burton with Stewart. Their voting records are virtually identical. Yet,
Stewart’s appointment ends a transitional period where the Court was not
voting quite as much for the government and ushers in the period of peak
convictions of that era. The study of the votes, partitioned by era in Table 2,
shows that Burton voted more for the prosecution during the Backlash Era
than he had previously. Actually, Burton exceeds Stewart, voting 71 percent
for the prosecution during the Backlash Era compared to Stewart’s 61
percent, which means that, all else equal, the replacement of Burton by
Stewart should not have increased voting for the government. Nevertheless,
before the appointment of Stewart the Court produces a slightly more mixed
set of outcomes. During Stewart’s confirmation, the Senate expressed some
un-Americanism sentiment.49 Might that atmosphere have influenced some
other justices to vote slightly more for the prosecution after Stewart’s
appointment? It is consistent with the notion that some of the justices were
sensitive to the shifting political sentiment that the Backlash period and the
gradual transitions between eras demonstrate.
Similarly puzzling is the softening of the transition into the PostFrankfurter Era before it begins with the appointment of Goldberg. Nothing
explains the few exonerations that seem to produce this softening, the
unanimous siding with the individual in Cramp, and the 5–2 votes for the
individuals in Russell and Silber.50 Yet, Black’s dissent in Killian (arguing

49
The minority report of the Senate Judiciary Committee was opposed “because it is evident
from the hearings that Justice Stewart thinks the Supreme Court has the power to legislate and to amend
the Constitution of the United States.” ROY M. JACOBSTEIN & J. MYRON, Nomination of Potter Stewart,
Minority Views, in SUPREME COURT OF THE U.S. HEARINGS AND REPORTS ON SUCCESSFUL AND
UNSUCCESSFUL NOMINATIONS OF SUPREME COURT JUSTICES BY THE SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE
10 (1977). During the hearing several of the Court’s decisions during the Premature Idealism Era came
under attack. Nomination of Potter Stewart to Be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United
States: Hearing Before S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 86th Cong. Vol. 2, 71–146 (1959) (Senator Ervin at
p. 83 refers to Nelson; at p. 84 to Yates; p. 85 to Koenigsberg; at p. 86 to Watkins; at p. 88 to Slochower;
at p. 90 to Sweezy; Senator Ervin’s stressing of original intent and opposition to judicial activism spans
from page 75 to page 130, taking up most of that day of the hearings). Despite that these attacks were
phrased as anti-communist ones, the true motivation likely was an anti-integration one because only
Southern senators voted against confirmation. See GovTrack, Nomination of Potter Stewart as Assoc.
Justice of Supreme Court, https://www.govtrack.us/congress/votes/86-1959/s58 (last visited Apr. 22,
2021) [perma.cc/WJ4M-8EKA]).
50
See infra note 348 and accompanying text (discussing Cramp); infra note 356 and
accompanying text (discussing Russell); infra note 361 and accompanying text (discussing Silber).
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the impropriety of requiring labor union affidavits that deny communist
views) foretells the reversal of Douds.51
Despite this gradual prelude, the end of un-Americanism prosecutions
is not gradual. The end does not come from the conservatives gradually
voting any less for convictions but from the abrupt replacement of
Frankfurter by Goldberg. One more uncompromising liberal joins Warren,
Black, Douglas, and Brennan. The resulting unshakable majority of five
closes this historical chapter. The judicial sensitivity to political
undercurrents that drove prior transitions is irrelevant at this final step, not
coincidentally upon the departure of Frankfurter with his judicial modesty
and political sensitivity.
IV. BACKLASH: DURESS OR LAW?
A closer look at the voting of individual justices around the Backlash
Era reveals additional texture about their conduct and the interaction
between Congress and the Court.
Table 2 collects the voting of each justice who served on the Court
during the Backlash Era as well as either before or after it. The ten justices
who meet this criterion are arranged by appointment date at the rows of the
table. The columns of the table come in three groups, corresponding to the
three periods of time, before, during, and after the Backlash Era. Each group
has three columns. The left column headed “For Gov’t” gives the number
of votes each justice cast for the government in un-Americanism
prosecutions over that period of time. The middle column headed “For
Indiv.” gives the number of votes cast by each justice for the individuals
accused of un-Americanism during that period. The last column headed
“Rate” gives the rate of voting for the government of the corresponding
justice in the corresponding period as a percentage, rounded.52

Table 2: Voting Around the Backlash Era
Pre-Backlash
Backlash
For
For
For
For
Gov’t Indiv. Rate Gov’t Indiv.
Black
1
45
2%
0
44
Frankfurter 8
38
17%
26
15
Douglas
2
40
5%
0
44
Burton
25
20
55%
10
4
Clark
18
9
67%
39
5
51

Rate
0%
63%
0%
71%
89%

Post-Backlash
For
For
Gov’t Indiv. Rate
0
10
0%
Not on Court
0
11
0%
Not on Court
8
2
80%

See infra note 351. Douds was reversed by US v. Brown. See infra note 385 and accompanying

text.
52

Both Figure 1 and Table 2 offer a percentage of voting for the government, with an important
difference, however. In the case of Figure 1, the percentage is of the justices voting in each case. In Table
2, it is the percentage of votes that each justice cast.
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Warren
2
20
9%
0
41
0%
0
11
0%
Harlan
6
13
32
30
14
68%
9
2
82%
Brennan
0
9
0%
0
44
0%
0
11
0%
Whittaker
0
2
0%
31
11
74%
Not on Court
Stewart
Not on Court
17
11
61%
5
5
50%
Compare, first, the rates of voting for the government before the
Backlash Era to those during it. Notice how, other than Warren, Black,
Douglas, and Brennan, the rate of voting for the government increases.
Whittaker’s goes from 0 to 74 percent.53 Frankfurter’s goes from 17 percent
to 63 percent—more than tripling. Harlan’s goes from 32 percent to 68
percent, more than doubling. Even the two justices who were already
frequent dissenters in favor of the government, Clark and Burton, have their
rates of voting for the government increase: Clark from 67 percent to 89
percent (a 33 percent increase) and Burton from 56 percent to 71 percent (a
28 percent increase). For five members of the Court, the legislative backlash
led to increased voting for the government. Frankfurter’s change was by far
the most pronounced.54
Second, compare the rate of voting for the government during the
Backlash Era to the post-Backlash Era. Clark and Stewart slightly reduce
their rate of voting for the government, Clark from 89 percent to 80 percent
and Stewart from 61 percent to 50 percent. Harlan, however, increases the
rate of voting for the government from 68 percent to 82 percent. Not
included in Table 2 is the first JFK appointee, White, whose rate of voting
for the government is 70 percent over ten cases. White replaced Whittaker,
meaning that the voting rate for that seat hardly changed from Whittaker’s
74 percent to White’s 70 percent. Nor is included in the table JFK’s second
appointee, Goldberg, who never voted for the government in the six votes
that he cast. Goldberg replaced Frankfurter, whose rate of voting for the
government during the Backlash Era was 63 percent. The conservative
voting of the seats of Clark, Harlan, Stewart, and White continues
Granted, Whittaker’s zero is less meaningful than the other justices’ pre-Backlash rates
because it is an expression of only two votes: that in the unanimous Service and that in the per curiam,
7–2 Sentner. See infra note 222 and accompanying text (discussing Service) and note 212 and
accompanying text (discussing Senter). The dissenters in Sentner were Clark and Burton. Using a
locational concept of the arrangement of the justices, this voting record suggests that Whittaker must
have been to the left of Burton who voted for the government 59 percent before the backlash. The fact
that Whittaker votes 74 percent for the government during the Backlash Era whereas Burton votes for
the government 71 percent allows us to infer that Whittaker not only did change significantly but also
moved so far as to position himself likely to the right of Burton even after accounting for Burton’s
increased voting for the government.
54
Frankfurter’s change in voting is also the one that produces the greatest statistical confidence
in the change when subjected to the chi-squared test, over 99.9 percent confidence. The other changes
have small samples (as does Whittaker) and smaller changes (as do Harlan, Clark, and Burton) so that
each individual judge’s voting appears to possibly be the result of chance. But not of all five changing
at the same time. When the chi-squared test is applied to all five justices, then it becomes clear that the
voting of these justices did change with 99.9 percent statistical significance.
53
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unchanged, as does the liberal voting of Black, Douglas, Warren, and
Brennan. The outcomes of the cases changed because Goldberg replaced
Frankfurter, rather than because any justices changed voting patterns (unlike
the reaction to the backlash). For the four conservative members of the
Court, the end of the Backlash Era does not come with any reduction of the
subordinating the Bill of Rights to the fear of Communism, as their dissents
emphasize.55
Related to voting more for the government is the rate of output of unAmericanism cases by the Court during the Backlash Era. The output of 8.5
cases per term is the greatest ever seen. Granted, this rate of output is only
marginally higher than that of the immediately preceding era, when the
Court issued slightly under seven un-Americanism opinions per term. If the
Court wanted to act against the legislative backlash, the Court could have
easily slowed down the processing of cases. Neither the rate of output nor
the actual handling of the cases suggests an effort to delay. Rather, the
backlash persuaded most justices to vote differently, akin to it being binding
legislation.
In evaluating the Court’s reaction to the backlash of the summer of
1957, turn next to the Senate elections of 1958. The Democratic Party
gained the largest swing in the history of the Senate.56 Senator Jenner, the
author and namesake of the most significant bill in the legislative backlash,
retired and was replaced by moderate Democrat Vance Hartke.57 This
leftward shift of the Senate explains why the postponed legislation faded.58
However, it also reduced the threat under which the Court operated in unAmericanism prosecutions. If the Court’s move to favor the government in
See, e.g., infra notes 367 and 371 (discussing Justice Harlan and White’s separate dissents in
Gibson v. Fla. Legis. Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539, 581–85 (1963), stressing the fear of communist
infiltration of the NAACP); infra note 377 (discussing Justice White’s dissent in Yellin v. United States,
374 U.S. 109, 126–27 (1963), discussing in detail the methods of infiltration of unions by educated
youth); infra note 380 (discussing Justice Clark’s support for the revocation of the communists’ passports
in Aptheker v. Sec’y of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964)); infra note 395 (showing Justice Clark’s frustration
at the undermining of the nation’s self-preservation capacity in Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S.
589, 628–29 (1967)).
56
See, e.g., Mid-Term Revolution, U.S. SENATE, https://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/minute/Mid_term_Revolution.htm (last visited Mar. 2, 2020) [perma.cc/JN37-8GVL]; Democrats
Sweep
1958
Elections,
CONG.
Q.
ALMANAC
ONLINE,
https://library.cqpress.com/cqalmanac/document.php?id=cqal58-1340275 (last visited Mar. 2, 2020)
[perma.cc/EUP8-F83L]; 1958 United States Senate Elections, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1958_United_States_Senate_elections, (last visited Mar. 2, 2020) [perma.cc/5GE7-8QQU].
57
See, e.g., Notable Alumni: Rupert Vance Hartke, IND. U. MAURER SCH. L.,
https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/notablealumni/21/ (last visited Mar. 2, 2020) [perma.cc/4SCEXQLZ]; Vance Hartke, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vance_Hartke (last visited Mar. 2,
2020) [perma.cc/J4L3-MKTC].
58
See, e.g., LICHTMAN, supra note 21, at 174. But Lichtman concludes that Frankfurter failed to
recognize that the more liberal senate would have allowed Frankfurter to return to his pre-backlash
stance; this is in contrast to the conclusion here that Frankfurter’s side of the Court treated the 1957
backlash as a revelation of the national will, which permanently changed their interpretation.
55
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reaction to the backlash was under duress, then the new composition of the
Senate should mean that the threat had abated, and the Court could have
returned to its practice during the Premature Idealism period of not
subordinating the Bill of Rights to the fear of Communism.
That the Court’s output increases, that the Court does not return to
idealism after the 1958 Senate elections, along with the fact that four seats
continue to subordinate the Bill of Rights to the fear of Communism after
the end of the Backlash Era, suggests that the change due to the backlash
was not one under the duress of legislative reprisals. The change was
permanent, and the Court did not resist it.
The Court’s reaction better fits the theory that the Court’s majority
interpreted the backlash as an expression of the national will. When the
Justices were weighing the fear of Communism against the Bill of Rights
before the summer of 1957, the justices were aware that they were making
subjective evaluations. The backlash informed the Court that an overwhelming majority of the House and a majority of the Senate saw the Cold War
and Communism as a major threat that justified subordinating the Bill of
Rights to the fear of Communism.59 The message was that Communism was
not just one more ideology in the contest of ideas subject to the First
Amendment but an instrument of the Cold War adversary. Having received
this expression of the national will, the majority of the justices proceeded to
revise their positions as a matter of law, permanently. The majority that was
so shaped by this expression of the national will proceeded to take the
government’s side with greater frequency, a frequency that would not abate
even when the threat of legislative reprisals faded.
V.

CONCLUSION

In sum, the Court’s stance regarding un-Americanism cases fluctuated
with the level of fear of communism, with no real change in the text of the
law. Congress’s anti-Communism driven and largely failed backlash had an
effectively binding effect on the majority of the justices.
Two are the predominant issues that this discussion of the evolution of
un-Americanism prosecutions raises. First, the judiciary implements the
constitutionally mandated freedoms of the Bill of Rights in a profoundly
complex environment with far-reaching consequences. A corollary of this is
the evaluation of the refusal of the four most liberal justices to take the
nation’s will into account and the re-evaluation of Frankfurter. Then, seeing
this origin of today’s freedoms reveals how surprisingly path-dependent
they are.

59

For the voting see infra notes 238–239 and accompanying text.
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From the perspective that the backlash constituted an expression of the
national will, the position of Warren, Black, Douglas, and Brennan, who
never voted to affirm a conviction after 1954, rather than being celebrated,
may be questioned. While the nation was intent on fighting the Cold War,
their idealism undermined that desire on a practical level (however it may
have helped in the war of ideas by demonstrating the liberty values of the
United States). Their absolutism perhaps contributed to the deepening antiintellectual sentiment of the political right.60
This defiance of the popular will also appears in other courts. A notable
example is what is known as the Rose Bird incident of the California
Supreme Court. That court defied the popular will that favored the death
penalty. When the California electorate passed, by voter mandate, a statute
imposing the death penalty, the court held it unconstitutional. In reaction,
the electorate amended the Constitution by referendum. The court still
would not impose the death penalty. In 1986, in the unopposed retention
elections for the Supreme Court Justices, the voters removed justices who
were not imposing the death penalty.61 Warren, Black, Douglas, and
Brennan had life tenure, which protected them against such a removal. This
does not mean, however, that their defiance of the popular will had no
lasting consequence on the electorate which further research needs to
clarify.
Related is the reputation of Frankfurter as a justice. Today’s consensus
is that his judicial modesty is uninspiring.62 The championing of liberty by
Warren, Black, Douglas, and Brennan is seen as exemplifying good judging.
This conclusion has the benefit of hindsight. The United States survived the
Cold War and continues to produce a very free society and a very productive
economy. We cannot know how the balance of these three concerns would

60

Anti-intellectualism and in particular its anti-elitist branch has a long and intensifying history
associated with conservatism in the United States. See, e.g., Matthew Motta, The Dynamics and Political
Implications of Anti-Intellectualism in the United States, 46 AM. POL. RES. 465, 466, 469 (2018)
(“[R]ecent research (e.g., Gauchat, 2012) suggests that anti-intellectual attitude endorsement has been
growing in the mass public for decades, especially on the ideological right.”); id. at 469 (“‘[I]deological
conservatives’ levels of trust in the scientific community have decreased gradually since the early 1990s
. . . .”).
61
See Nicholas L. Georgakopoulos, Judicial Reaction to Change: The California Supreme Court
Around the 1986 Elections, 13 CORNELL J. L. PUB. POL’Y 405 (2004).
62
See, e.g., JAMES F. SIMON, EISENHOWER VS. WARREN: THE BATTLE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS AND
LIBERTIES 177 (2018) (on the expectation that Frankfurter would lead the liberal wing of the Court
whereas he practiced restraint); H.N. HIRSCH, THE ENIGMA OF FELIX FRANKFURTER 5 (1981) (“When
[Frankfurter] was appointed to the Court, many expected his long-time commitment to civil liberties to
translate into judicial philosophy; instead, Frankfurter demonstrated an austere commitment to judicial
self-restraint.”); NOAH FELDMAN, SCORPIONS 186 (2010) (“[T]he repudiation [of Frankfurter’s pro-flagsalute decision in Minersville School District v. Gobitis] would mark decisively Frankfurter’s fall from
grace as a liberal leader on the Court. . . . Black and Douglas learned the lesson that following Frankfurter
was no guarantee of liberal approbation. His constitutional subtlety had badly failed to anticipate actual
reaction on the ground—and that did not make for a winning political strategy.”).
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have unfolded if either Frankfurter had ignored the legislative backlash
(joining the other four liberals), or if he had turned even more strongly in
favor of prosecutions in un-Americanism matters, perhaps overruling the
hampering of prosecutions by Yates. The location of today’s American
society is a result of Frankfurter’s course.
A further issue regards the path-specific nature of the US-style
socioeconomic freedom. It comes from a past of anti-Communist labor
legislation, institutionalized loyalty oaths, and blacklisting. These origins
are influential in the power of labor and the texture of much socioeconomic
activity—especially learning and entertainment. A country which imitates
the freedoms of the United States expecting to also produce a similar
economic and social environment may get unexpected results. It may be no
surprise that some countries that copy the freedoms of the United States find
themselves with labor strife, sociopolitical disequilibria, or a more statist
political discourse. Was today’s flourishing won in the Cold War?
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THE SUPREME COURT’S UN‑AMERICANISM PENDULUM:
APPENDICES

APPENDIX A: A QUOTE-RICH HISTORY
Observe the unabated fear of Communism through the conservative
justices’ own words. Notice the uncompromising primacy that the liberal
justices place on the Bill of Rights. Despite those fixed landmarks, the ebb
and flow of judicial activity produces four eras with different results, one
remarkably spurred by legislative backlash.
A. Truman Appointees and Jackson’s Fear of Communism
The House Un-American Activities Committee was established in
1938 to counter both Nazi and Soviet infiltration concerns.63 The first
notable un-Americanism prosecution against alleged communist sympathizers came in 1943. On February 1st, Representative Martin Dies, a
Democrat from Texas and the chairman of the Committee, denounced 39
senior federal employees as communist sympathizers on the floor of the
House of Representatives.64 The House proceeded to investigate them and
crafted an appropriations bill that prohibited the continued payment of their
salaries.65 Despite the disagreement of the Senate and the opposition of
President Roosevelt, the bill was eventually signed into law.66 Three of the
employees challenged its validity, supported by the Solicitor General;
Congress appointed special counsel to take the opposing view. The
challenge reached the Supreme Court in 1946 in Lovett.67 The Court
unanimously invalidated the non-payment of the salaries. The six-member
63

United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 308 (1946) (citing H.R. 1282, 83d Cong. Rec. 7568–

87).
64

Id.
Id.
66
Id. at 312–13 (“The Senate Appropriation Committee eliminated Section 304 and its action
was sustained by the Senate. 89 Cong. Rec. 5024. After the first conference report which left the matter
still in disagreement the Senate voted 69 to 0 against the conference report which left Section 304 in the
bill. The House however insisted on the amendment and indicated that it would not approve any
appropriation bill without Section 304. Finally after the fifth conference report showed that the House
would not yield the Senate adopted Section 304. When the President signed the bill he stated: ‘The
Senate yielded, as I have been forced to yield, to avoid delaying our conduct of the war. But I cannot so
yield without placing on record my view that this provision is not only unwise and discriminatory, but
unconstitutional.’”)
67
Id. at 303.
65
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majority, in an opinion authored by Hugo Black, considered the
appropriations bill tantamount to a bill of attainder, prohibited by Article I.68
The concurring opinion of Felix Frankfurter, joined by Stanley F. Reed,
espoused constitutional avoidance. The majority treated the law as imposing
a penalty of firing the employees, which turned the law into a bill of
attainder. Frankfurter advocated restraint vociferously.69 The mere
prohibition of the payment of salary, read narrowly, was no punishment
triggering attainder because it did not preclude the payment of compensation
for the employees’ continued services (as unpaid contractual obligations of
the government, which the claimants had pursued below in the Court of
Claims).70
In 1949, in Christoffel, because a congressional committee did not have
quorum, the Court exonerated a defendant convicted of perjury before it.71
In contrast to Lovett’s unanimity, the Court split 5–4. Jackson’s dissent
argued that precedent allowed Congress to set its own rules explicitly or
68
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3 (“No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be passed”);
Lovett, 328 U.S. at 313–14 (“The [challenged provision]’s language as well as the circumstances of its
passage . . . show that no mere question of compensation procedure or of appropriations was involved,
but that it was designed to force the employing agencies to discharge respondents and to bar their being
hired by any other governmental agency. Any other interpretation of the Section would completely
frustrate the purpose of all who sponsored Section 304, which clearly was to ‘purge’ the then existing
and all future lists of Government employees of those whom Congress deemed guilty of ‘subversive
activities’ and therefore ‘unfit’ to hold a federal job. What was challenged therefore is a statute which,
because of what Congress thought to be their political beliefs, prohibited respondents from ever engaging
in any government work” [citations omitted]). Justice Jackson did not participate in the decision.
69
Lovett, 328 U.S. at 319–20 (“It is not for us to find unconstitutionality in what Congress
enacted although it may imply notions that are abhorrent to us as individuals or policies we deem harmful
to the country’s well-being. . . . And so ‘it must be remembered that legislatures are ultimate guardians
of the liberties and welfare of the people in quite as great a degree as the courts.’ This admonition was
uttered by Mr. Justice Holmes in one of his earliest opinions and it needs to be recalled whenever an
exceptionally offensive enactment tempts the Court beyond its strict confinements. Not to exercise by
indirection authority which the Constitution denied to this Court calls for the severest intellectual
detachment and the most alert self-restraint. The scrupulous observance, with some deviations, of the
professed limits of this Court’s power to strike down legislation has been, perhaps, the one quality the
great judges of the Court have had in common. Particularly when congressional legislation is under
scrutiny, every rational trail must be pursued to prevent collision between Congress and Court. For
Congress can readily mend its ways, or the people may express disapproval by choosing different
representatives. But a decree of unconstitutionality by this Court is fraught with consequences so
enduring and far-reaching as to be avoided unless no choice is left in reason. The inclusion of § 304 in
the Appropriation Bill undoubtedly raises serious constitutional questions. But the most fundamental
principle of constitutional adjudication is not to face constitutional questions but to avoid them, if at all
possible. . . . [These practices have] the support not only of the profoundest wisdom. They have been
vindicated, in conspicuous instances of disregard, by the most painful lessons of our constitutional
history.”).
70
Id. at 330 (“[I]t merely prevented the ordinary disbursal of money to pay respondents’ salaries.
It did not cut off the obligation of the Government to pay for services rendered and the respondents are,
therefore, entitled to recover the judgment which they obtained from the Court of Claims.”).
71
See Christoffel v. United States, 338 U.S. 84 (1949) (reversing a perjury conviction of a
communist who denied being one before the House of Representatives Committee on Education and
Labor). The court split 5–4, with a dissent by Jackson, joined by Chief Justice Vinson, Reed, and Burton.
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implicitly and Congress’s implicit rule was that, after quorum was
established by the presence of a majority of the members of a body, the body
could take evidence without a majority present, and that nothing about the
conviction was unfair.72
President Truman made four appointments to the Court. Before the first
case of the sample, Republican Burton was appointed in a bipartisanship
gesture in September 1945, placing him outside the sample period. Before
the second case, Christoffel, Treasury Secretary Vinson was appointed
Chief Justice, replacing Stone, in June 1946. In August 1949, Attorney
General Clark was appointed to replace Murphy. In October 1949, Minton
was appointed to replace Rutledge. All three replaced justices had only cast
votes for the individuals in un-Americanism cases, however small the
sample may be (one vote in Stone’s case, and two votes in the others).
Vinson, Clark, and Minton would turn out to be some of the justices voting
most often for the prosecution, respectively 86 percent, 81 percent, and 85
percent.73 Truman’s appointments likely moved the Court strongly in favor
of un-Americanism prosecutions. Yet, the transition was not entirely abrupt.
Already in Christoffel, the Court had moved from its unanimity of Lovett to
a 5–4 split.
The year 1950 brought several disputes about un-Americanism
prosecutions to the Supreme Court.74 Dennis I involved the trial of the
General Secretary of the Communist Party for not complying with a
Congressional subpoena.75 At trial in the District of Columbia, the defendant
attempted to exclude for cause from the jury all government employees and,
having been denied, challenged his conviction by a jury that included seven
government employees. The majority opinion, adhering to precedent that
only allowed government employees to be excused for cause if they had
actual bias, upheld the conviction.76 Both Black and Frankfurter dissented,
writing separately that the political atmosphere about disloyalty was so
intense that government employees should be excused as a class from such
Christoffel, 338 U.S. at 95 (Jackson, J., dissenting) (“We do not think we should devise a new
rule for this particular case to extend aid to one who did not raise his objection when it could be met and
who has been prejudiced by absence of a quorum only if we assume that, although he told a falsehood
to eleven Congressmen, he would have been honest if two more had been present.”).
73
See supra Table 1, Part III and accompanying text.
74
See Dennis v. United States (Dennis I), 339 U.S. 162 (1950); Morford v. United States, 339
U.S. 258 (1950); United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323 (1950); United States v. Fleischman, 339 U.S.
349 (1950).
75
Dennis I, 339 U.S. at 164.
76
Id. at 171 (“[P]etitioner’s contentions amount to this: Since he is a Communist, in view of all
the surrounding circumstances an exception must be carved out of the rule laid down in the statute, and
construed in Wood and Frazier, that there is no implied bias by reason of Government employment.
Thus, the rule would apply to any one[,] but a Communist tried for contempt of a congressional
committee, but not to a Communist. We think the rule in Wood and Frazier [requiring actual bias] should
be uniformly applied.”).
72
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trials. Frankfurter focused on the political atmosphere’s influence on jurors.77 Black made a broader attack on the political climate itself.78 Clark
and Douglas did not participate.
The logical implication of Dennis I was to permit defendants to
question jurors who were government employees to ascertain any actual
bias. That questioning was denied in Morford and the Court reversed with a
brief per curiam opinion unanimously without Clark’s participation.79
Morford is one of the opinions contributing to the gradual nature of the
transition into the coming era of a greater rate of convictions.
In Blau, Justice Black wrote for a unanimous Court, without Clark’s
participation.80 The opinion vindicated a Communist Party employee’s right
to remain silent in the face of a prosecution under the Smith Act for
advocating the overthrow of the government. In contrast to Blau, the next
year, in 1951, the Court, splitting 5–3, upheld the contempt conviction of
the treasurer of the Communist Party in Rogers.81 The Court distinguished
Blau. Blau involved a blanket assertion of the privilege against selfincrimination in favor of the defendant or others. However, in Rogers, the
defendant, after having admitted being the treasurer of the Communist
Party, asserted the privilege, expressly intending to prevent subjecting
others to questioning and prosecution. The majority held that the treasurer’s
initial answer was a waiver of the right. In dissent, Black, with Frankfurter
and Douglas, argued that answering the subsequent questions could subject
the treasurer to additional criminal consequences. Therefore, the privilege
should apply, and its waiver should not be interpreted broadly.

77
Id. at 182 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (“There is a pervasiveness of atmosphere in Washington
whereby forces are released in relation to jurors who may be deemed supporters of an accused under a
cloud of disloyalty that are emotionally different from those which come into play in relation to jurors
dealing with offenses which in their implications do not touch the security of the nation. . . . [I]t is asking
more of human nature in ordinary government employees than history warrants to ask them to exercise
that ‘uncommon portion of fortitude’ which the Founders of this nation thought judges could exercise
only if given a life tenure. . . . A government employee ought not to be asked whether he would feel free
to decide against the Government in cases that to the common understanding involve disloyalty to this
country.”).
78
Id. at 180 (Black, J., dissenting) (“Probably at no period of the nation’s history has the ‘loyalty’
of government employees been subjected to such constant scrutiny and investigation by so many
government agents and secret informers. And for the past few years press and radio have been crowded
with charges by responsible officials and others that the writings, friendships, or associations of some
government employee have branded him ‘disloyal.’ Government employees have good reason to fear
that an honest vote to acquit a Communist or any one else accused of ‘subversive’ beliefs, however
flimsy the prosecution’s evidence, might be considered a ‘disloyal’ act which could easily cost them
their job. That vote alone would in all probability evoke clamorous demands that he be publicly
investigated or discharged outright; at the very least it would result in whisperings, suspicions, and a
blemished reputation.”).
79
See Morford v. United States, 339 U.S. 258 (1950).
80
See Blau v. United States, 340 U.S. 159 (1950).
81
See Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367 (1951).
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The purge of communist sympathizers from municipal employment,
effectuated through loyalty oaths, reached the Court in 1951 in Garner.82
The California legislature amended the Charter of the City of Los Angeles
prohibiting the employment of individuals who advocated the violent
overthrow of the government or were members of organizations that did.
The city required oaths and affidavits from its employees. Some refused,
were dismissed, and their challenges reached the Court. The Court split 5–
4 in favor of the government. In an opinion by Clark, the majority found the
regulations reasonable,83 and not a bill of attainder.84 Frankfurter’s partial
concurrence agreed that the state has a right not to employ those who seek
to overthrow its government,85 but found the oath overbroad.86 Justice
Burton also concurred in part but found the oath inappropriate because it left
“no room for a change of heart.”87 The dissents of Douglas and Black stated
that the majority’s distinction of Lovett was false—losing employment was
punishment even if made through a general rule rather than the singling out
of individuals as in Lovett. All the opinions distinguished a per curiam
unanimous affirmance of loyalty oaths in Maryland: Gerende.88 The
Maryland statute was acceptable even to Black and Douglas because it was
limited to current belief and intent to overthrow the government. Albeit per
curiam, Gerende stands out as the only unanimous opinion of the Court in
favor of the state on un-Americanism matters.
The prosecution of one organization, the Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee
Committee, produced three opinions. Two were issued on the same day in
1950: Bryan and Fleischman.89 The third, Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee
Committee v. McGrath,90 was issued a year later, in 1951. The first two
regarded compliance with congressional subpoenas. McGrath was about the
82

See Garner v. Bd. of Pub. Works, 341 U.S. 716 (1951).
Id. at 720–21 (“[T]he Charter amendment is valid to the extent that it bars from the city’s
public service persons who, subsequent to its adoption in 1941, advise, advocate, or teach the violent
overthrow of the Government or who are or become affiliated with any group doing so. The provisions
operating thus prospectively were a reasonable regulation to protect the municipal service by establishing
an employment qualification of loyalty to the State and the United States.”).
84
Id. at 722 (“We are unable to conclude that punishment is imposed by a general regulation
which merely provides standards of qualification and eligibility for employment.”).
85
Id. at 725 (“No unit of government can be denied the right to keep out of its employ those who
seek to overthrow the government by force or violence, or are knowingly members of an organization
engaged in such endeavor.”).
86
Id. at 726 (“The vice in this oath is that it is not limited to affiliation with organizations known
at the time to have advocated overthrow of government.”).
87
Id. at 729 (Burton, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part).
88
See Gerende v. Bd. of Supervisors of Elections, 341 U.S. 56 (1951).
89
See United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323 (1950); see United States v. Fleischman, 339 U.S.
349 (1950). From the same group also sprung the later opinion in Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v.
McGrath, 341 U.S. 123 (1951). See infra note 90 and accompanying text. See also infra note 158 and
accompanying text (discussing Barsky).
90
See McGrath, 341 U.S. 123.
83
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propriety of being included by the Attorney General in a list of communist
organizations.
The organization sought to support fighters against Franco in Spain and
had received prominent support.91 Congress sought the list of members of
the organization and subpoenaed its entire executive board. Only the
organization’s secretary, Bryan, had actual possession of the list. Yet, all
members of the executive board were convicted for not complying with the
subpoena.
The Fleischman opinion applied to the members of the executive board
who did not have possession of the list. The opinion engaged two issues, the
defenses of lack of quorum and that only the secretary, who had actual
possession of the list, violated the subpoena. The remaining members of the
board could not unilaterally comply and produce the list.
The issue of lack of quorum was the primary issue in Bryan and applied
to the House Committee on Un-American Activities. When the defendants
appeared before the committee, and the committee demanded compliance
with the subpoena, not enough members of the committee were present for
it to have a quorum, raising again the issues of Christoffel. Nevertheless, the
Fleischman and Bryan opinions held that any related objection had been
waived because the defendants raised it for the first time during the trial.
The opinion distinguished Christoffel by interpreting that the text of the
statute about perjury, which required a “competent tribunal,” implied the
requirement of a quorum.92
Interestingly, Christoffel was a 5–4 decision.93 The majority was Black,
Clark, Douglas, Frankfurter, and Murphy, who authored the majority
opinion. Jackson’s dissent was joined by Chief Justice Vinson, Burton, and
Reed. Douglas and Clark, members of that tight majority, did not participate
91

See Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee, WIKIPEDIA (Mar. 2, 2020),
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Joint_Anti-Fascist_Refugee_Committee [perma.cc/4NX4-U4FU].
92
Bryan, 339 U.S. at 329 (“The Christoffel case is inapposite. For that decision, which involved
a prosecution for perjury before a congressional committee, rests in part upon the proposition that the
applicable perjury statute requires that a ‘competent tribunal’ be present when the false statement is
made. There is no such requirement in R.S. § 102. It does not contemplate some affirmative act which
is made punishable only if performed before a competent tribunal, but an intentional failure to testify or
produce papers, however the contumacy is manifested.”).
93
Jackson’s concurrence in Bryan, 339 U.S. at 344–45, analogizes the presence of only eight
justices at the announcement of Christoffel with the absence of a quorum in a congressional committee
(“It is ironic that this interference with legislative procedures was promulgated by exercise within the
Court of the very right of absentee participation denied to Congressmen. Examination of our journal on
the day Christoffel was handed down shows only eight Justices present and that four Justices dissented
in that case. . . . I want to make it clear that I am not . . . suggesting the slightest irregularity in what was
done. I have no doubt that authorization to include the absent Justice was given; and I know that to vote
and be counted in absentia has been sanctioned by practice and was without objection by anyone. It is
the fact that it is strictly regular and customary, according to our unwritten practice, to count as present
for purposes of Court action one physically absent that makes the denial of a comparable practice in
Congress so anomalous.”).
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in Bryan and Fleischman. Black and Frankfurter dissented in Fleischman
and Bryan and opposed the un-Americanism prosecutions. The new appointee, Minton, joined the majority in Fleischman and Bryan to be the fifth vote
in support of un-Americanism prosecutions. Un-Americanism prosecutions
produce a tight split of the Court, highly dependent on the Court’s
composition. Murphy appears as the swing vote between Christoffel and
Bryan/Fleischman. The two members who did not participate were almost
polar opposites on this matter. Douglas would very rarely vote in favor of
un-Americanism prosecutions whereas Clark would often side with the
prosecution, as Table 1 shows in Part III of the main text.
The Fleischman majority also rejected the idea that only the secretary
violated the order to produce the list. Quoting precedent about corporate
boards, the Court held that each had to use the powers of membership on
the board to comply: to vote to instruct the secretary to deliver the list or to
remove the secretary.94
Black and Frankfurter in Fleischman wrote parallel dissenting opinions
and Frankfurter also joined Black’s opinion. Black’s opinion looked closely
at the section under which Fleischman’s crime was charged. By its text, it
only criminalized the failure to answer or to produce documents. The failure
to cause action by a collective body to deliver documents, according to
Black, was something different. The Committee may have had the power to
issue orders to achieve that but did not.95 Frankfurter’s dissent underscores
the same fault.96 Similarly, in Bryan, Black, joined by Frankfurter, pointed
to the text of the criminal provision alleged to be violated. It only penalized
Fleischman, 339 U.S. at 356–57 (“When one accepts an office of joint responsibility, whether
on a board of directors of a corporation, the governing board of a municipality, or any other position in
which compliance with lawful orders requires joint action by a responsible body of which he is a
member, he necessarily assumes an individual responsibility to act, within the limits of his power to do
so, to bring about compliance with the order. It may be that the efforts of one member of the board will
avail nothing. If he does all he can, he will not be punished because of the recalcitrance of others. But to
hold that, because compliance with an order directed to the directors of a corporation or other
organization requires common action by several persons, no one of them is individually responsible for
the failure of the organization to comply, is effectually to remove such organizations beyond the reach
of legislative and judicial commands.”) (internal citations omitted).
95
Id. at 366 (Black, J., dissenting) (“A command to produce is not a command to get others to
produce or assist in producing. Of course Congress, like a court, has broad powers to supplement its
subpoena with other commands requiring the witness to take specific affirmative steps reasonably
calculated to remove obstacles to production. But even though disobedience of such supplementary
orders can be punished at the bar of Congress as contempt, Jurney v. MacCracken, 294 U.S. 125, it does
not come within the limited scope of R.S. § 102.”).
96
Id. at 381 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (“It may well be that the House committee should have
asked respondent to try to have convened a meeting of the executive board with a view to asking the
custodian of the records to produce them. Such a procedure is suggested by what was done in Wilson v.
United States, 221 U.S. 361, 370–371. Had respondent refused she would have subjected herself to a
contempt proceeding for disobedience of a command of the committee. But this is not such a proceeding.
As to the offense for which she was prosecuted, I agree with Judge Edgerton that an acquittal should
have been directed.”).
94
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perjury, not the non-production of documents. Moreover, the right not to
incriminate oneself, which the defendant had exercised, was firmly
established.97
In 1950, the Court in Douds also decided the constitutionality of requiring labor unions to provide annual affidavits that no officer was a member
of the Communist Party.98 Vinson wrote for the Court upholding the
requirement as justified to avert politically-motivated strikes and not
considering it a bill of attainder. Frankfurter’s concurrence notes the sharp
division of world opinion,99 recognizes the expansive powers of the legislature,100 and only slightly moves from the Court’s position.101 Jackson’s concurrence recognizes that requiring labor leaders to forswear allegiance to the
Democratic or the Republican Party would be improper but argues that the
Communist Party’s foreign allegiance and belief in the overthrow of the
government justify the different treatment.102 Black dissents alone. Douglas,
Clark, and Minton did not participate.
The subpoenaing of the executive board of the Joint Anti-Fascist
Refugee Committee was related to its being listed as a subversive
organization by the Attorney General pursuant to a more general effort to

97

Bryan, 339 U.S. at 345–46.
Am. Commc’ns Ass’n, C.I.O., v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950); see infra note 347 and
accompanying text (discussing a related issue arising in Killian). In 1965, Brown held that the prohibition
against Communists holding union officerships was unconstitutional. See infra note 385 and accompanying text.
99
Douds, 339 U.S. at 415 (“[T]he conflict of political ideas now dividing the world more
pervasively than any since this nation was founded . . . .”).
100
Id. at 416–17 (“The central problem presented by the enactment now challenged is the power
of Congress, as part of its comprehensive scheme for industrial peace, to keep Communists out of
controlling positions in labor unions as a condition to utilizing the opportunities afforded by the National
Labor Relations Act. . . . Wrapped up in this problem are two great concerns of our democratic society—
the right of association for economic and social betterment and the right of association for political
purposes. . . . It is one thing to forbid heretical political thought merely as heretical thought. It is quite a
different thing for Congress to restrict attempts to bring about another scheme of society, not through
appeal to reason and the use of the ballot as democracy has been pursued throughout our history, but
through an associated effort to disrupt industry.”).
101
Id. at 421–22 (“If I possibly could, to avoid questions of unconstitutionality I would construe
the requirements of § 9(h) to be restricted to disavowal of actual membership in the Communist Party. . .
But what Congress has written does not permit such a gloss nor deletion of what it has written. . . . I
cannot deem it within the rightful authority of Congress to probe into opinions that involve only an
argumentative demonstration of some coincidental parallelism of belief with some of the beliefs of those
who direct the policy of the Communist Party, though without any allegiance to it. To require oaths as
to matters that open up such possibilities invades the inner life of men whose compassionate thought or
doctrinaire hopes may be as far removed from any dangerous kinship with the Communist creed as were
those of the founders of the present orthodox political parties in this country.”).
102
Id. at 423 (“There are, however, contradictions between what meets the eye and what is
covertly done which, in my view of the issues, provide a rational basis upon which Congress reasonably
could have concluded that the Communist Party is something different, in fact, from any other substantial
party we have known, and hence may constitutionally be treated as something different in law.”) (internal
footnotes omitted).
98
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ensure that the rolls of public employees did not contain subversive
individuals, as an expression of the emerging red scare. Essentially, as the
administration of President Truman was being attacked from the political
right for having allowed the infiltration of communists in the ranks of the
civil service,103 it sought to defend itself by (a) identifying communists or
fascists and removing them from public employment; and (b) showing that
the administration had established that the remaining employees were not
subversive. Executive Order 9835 established a process to verify the loyalty
of all employees in the executive branch, where loyalty meant not being a
communist or fascist. If an employee’s loyalty raised doubts, the employee
received a hearing before a loyalty review board without various protections
that a full trial would have afforded (and which would prove fatal for the
scheme when the court would review its substance in Peters v. Hobby in
1955. See accompanying text in note 177). Because World War II
effectively defeated fascism, the predominant target became communism.
Also, the same Executive Order authorized the Attorney General to create a
list of organizations “designate[d] as totalitarian, fascist, communist or subversive . . . .”104
Two lines of litigation against this scheme reached the Supreme Court:
(a) three organizations challenged their designation as subversive in
McGrath;105 and (b) a terminated employee challenged the process of review
before the loyalty review boards in Bailey v. Richardson.106 The Supreme
Court issued both opinions on the same day, April 30, 1951.
Justice Clark, who had been Truman’s Attorney General and
presumably led the drafting of the Executive Order establishing loyalty
review boards, recused himself from all related cases. The rest of the Court
was sharply divided.
The Court split evenly in Bailey,107 resulting in a one-sentence
affirmance of the opinion below. The three-judge panel of the D.C. Circuit
Court of Appeals upheld the firing of the employee 2–1. The majority saw
employment in the executive branch as being an at-will relation at the
discretion of the President, treating disloyalty as any other lack of fitness
that would allow termination, to be determined at the discretion of the
President.108 The majority of the Circuit Court opinion distinguished Lovett
103

The speech of Congressman Dies that led to Lovett was an example. See supra note 64.
Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 125 (1951) (quoting Executive
Order 9835). The loyalty review boards were abolished by a superseding order of President Eisenhower
in 1953.
105
Id.
106
Bailey v. Richardson, 341 U.S. 918 (1951) (one-sentence affirmance by evenly split court).
107
Id.
108
Bailey v. Richardson, 182 F.2d 46, 51 (D.C. Cir. 1950) (“All such employees hold office at
the pleasure of the appointing authority. . .”); id. at 58 (“[E]xecutive offices are held at the will of the
appointing authority, not for life or for fixed terms.”).
104
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as prohibiting only permanent bars from public employment, rather than
dismissals, the at-will nature of which was supported by ample precedent
and established practices of dismissals for political affiliation.109 The
dissenting Circuit Court judge believed that, given that the employee’s
position was not sensitive, Lovett should apply. Therefore, the employee
should receive a trial and her dismissal violated the freedoms of speech and
assembly. Effectively, the split in the lower court mirrored the split in the
Supreme Court; the even split with the recusal of the likely author of the
Executive Order establishing Loyalty Boards, shows the attitudes of the
Justices about this issue.
The three organizations—which challenged their designation as
subversive—were the Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee, the National
Council of American-Soviet Friendship, Inc., and the International Workers
Order, Inc. The Attorney General responded by moving to dismiss for
failure to state a claim. The procedural posture of the motion to dismiss
(before a trial to determine the facts) meant that the non-moving party’s
allegations were taken as true, namely that the organizations were charitable
rather than subversive. That was dispositive for the narrowest plurality
opinion.110 The Court’s reaction was splintered, with five different opinions
against dismissal and one dissenting opinion joined by the three Justices
who favored dismissal. Jackson’s opinion describes the range of views:
It is unfortunate that this Court should flounder in wordy
disagreement . . . . The extravagance of some of the views
expressed and the intemperance of their statement may create
a suspicion that the decision of the case does not rise above the
political controversy that engendered it. . . . Mr. Justice
BLACK[’s concurrence] would have us hold that listing by the
Attorney General of organizations alleged to be subversive is
the equivalent of a bill of attainder for treason after the fashion
of those of the Stuart kings, while Mr. Justice REED[’s

109
Id. at 55–56 (“The Court [in Lovett] held permanent proscription from Government service to
be such ‘punishment’, but it did not, as we read the case, hold mere dismissal from Government service
to be punishment in that sense. It had held in the Myers case, and iterated in the Humphrey case, that the
dismissal of an executive official performing purely executive duties is an executive function.”) (citation
omitted); the opinion continues to discuss at length the precedent establishing the employment-at-will
nature of executive employees.
110
Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 125 (1951) (“For the reasons
hereinafter stated, we conclude that, if the allegations of the complaints are taken as true (as they must
be on the motions to dismiss), the Executive Order does not authorize the Attorney General to furnish
the Loyalty Review Board with a list containing such a designation as he gave to each of these organizations without other justification. Under such circumstances his own admissions render his
designations patently arbitrary because they are contrary to the alleged and uncontroverted facts
constituting the entire record before us.”).
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dissent] contends, in substance, that the designation is a mere
press release without legal consequences.111
Jackson’s description omits the concurrence of Frankfurter and that of
Douglas albeit perhaps justifiably as being within this range from treason to
press release. The designation of the organizations as communist without a
hearing violated their right of due process, agreed Frankfurter,112 Douglas
(who also proceeds to write about Bailey),113 and Jackson.114
Bail issues arose in 1950–51 in Williamson and Stack v. Boyle. In
Williamson,115 Justice Jackson does not terminate bail for some of the
defendants of Dennis II, allowing them to avoid jail while the petition for
certiorari and adjudication were pending. Because Williamson is a domestic
bail case, it is not included in the database of the primary un-Americanism
opinions.
In Stack,116 the prosecutions targeted officials and members of the
Communist Party in California. The defendants’ bail was set significantly
higher than bail for defendants charged with other offenses having similar
penalties.117 The defendants attacked their bail as an Eighth Amendment
violation and with habeas corpus petitions. The Court pointed out that the
correct procedural step was to appeal the denial of the reduction of bail.
Accordingly, the Court vacated the judgements below, and remanded for the
District Court to establish bail correctly. Dissenting, Jackson, joined by
Frankfurter, reviewed the complex web of rules surrounding review of bail
and concluded that the appropriate Circuit Justice, in this case Douglas, had
authority to set bail. Stack, being a domestic bail case, is also not included
in the database of the primary un-Americanism opinions.
The court engaged the conflict between the political freedom of the
First Amendment and the banning of the Communist Party in Dennis II,
111

Id. at 183 (Jackson, J., concurring).
Id. at 173–74 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (“The Attorney General is certainly not immune
from the historic requirements of fairness merely because he acts, however conscientiously, in the name
of security. Nor does he obtain immunity on the ground that designation is not an ‘adjudication’ or a
‘regulation’ in the conventional use of those terms. Due process is not confined in its scope. . . . Due
process is perhaps the most majestic concept in our whole constitutional system. . . . Therefore the
petitioners did set forth causes of action which the District Court should have entertained.”).
113
Id. at 182–83 (Douglas, J., concurring) (“Of course, no one has a constitutional right to a
government job. But every citizen has a right to a fair trial when his government seeks to deprive him of
the privileges of first-class citizenship.”).
114
Id. at 187 (Jackson, J., concurring) (“I would reverse the decisions for lack of due process in
denying a hearing at any stage.”).
115
Williamson v. United States, 1950 WL 42366 (September 25, 1950).
116
Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1 (1951).
117
Id. at 5 (“Upon final judgment of conviction, petitioners face imprisonment of not more than
five years and a fine of not more than $10,000. It is not denied that bail for each petitioner has been fixed
in a sum [actually $50,000] much higher than that usually imposed for offenses with like penalties and
yet there has been no factual showing to justify such action in this case.”).
112
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decided in 1951.118 Whereas Dennis I was about contempt of Congress
prosecuted in Washington, DC, Dennis II was about conspiring to overthrow
the government, a violation of the Smith Act, which led to convictions in
the Southern District of New York, affirmed by the Second Circuit in an
opinion by Learned Hand. The questions before the Supreme Court were the
validity of the statute under the First Amendment and the issue of its
potential vagueness.119 The Court produced three concurring opinions—
none commanding a majority—and two dissents. The plurality was by Chief
Justice Vinson joined by Reed, Burton, and Minton. Frankfurter and
Jackson wrote the other two concurring opinions. Black and Douglas wrote
dissents. Clark did not participate.
Vinson’s plurality opinion began by pointing out that the lower courts
established (in a voluminous record, with great detail) that “the general goal
of the Party, was, during the period in question, to achieve a successful
overthrow of the existing order by force and violence.”120 The opinion
proceeds to accept that the government may protect itself against revolution.
The issue was “whether the means which [the government] has employed
conflict with the First and Fifth Amendments to the Constitution.”121 Turning to the inviolability of freedom of speech, the plurality notes
that both the majority of the Court and the dissenters in
particular cases have recognized that [freedom of speech] is
not an unlimited, unqualified right, but that the societal value
of speech must, on occasion, be subordinated to other values
and considerations.122
The plurality clarified that the clear and present danger necessary for
limiting speech existed:
Chief Judge Learned Hand, writing for the majority below,
interpreted the phrase as follows: “In each case (courts) must
ask whether the gravity of the ‘evil,’ discounted by its
118

Dennis II, 341 U.S. 494 (1951). A year earlier, Jackson as circuit Justice continued bail for
some of the same defendants. Williamson, 184 F.2d at 280. The Court also issued an opinion on civil
liability of a state committee on un-American activities in Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951).
Frankfurter wrote for the majority that no liability attaches pursuant to an allegedly politically motivated
investigation. Black concurs to note that liability should arise more easily and Douglas dissents. Whether
to categorize Tenney as an un-Americanism prosecution is not clear but since it regards private liability
it does not belong in the set of primary un-Americanism opinions.
119
Dennis II, 341 U.S. at 495 (“We granted certiorari, 340 U.S. 863, limited to the following two
questions: (1) Whether either § 2 or § 3 of the Smith Act, inherently or as construed and applied in the
instant case, violates the First Amendment and other provisions of the Bill of Rights; (2) whether either
§ 2 or § 3 of the Act, inherently or as construed and applied in the instant case, violates the First and
Fifth Amendments because of indefiniteness.”).
120
Id. at 498.
121
Id. at 501.
122
Id. at 503.
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improbability, justifies such invasion of free speech as is
necessary to avoid the danger.” We adopt this statement of
the rule. As articulated by Chief Judge Hand, it is as succinct
and inclusive as any other we might devise at this time. It
takes into consideration those factors which we deem
relevant, and relates their significances.
Likewise, we are in accord with the court below, which
affirmed the trial court’s finding that the requisite danger
existed. . . . [T]here was a group that was ready to make the
attempt. The formation by petitioners of such a highly
organized conspiracy, with rigidly disciplined members
subject to call when the leaders, these petitioners, felt that the
time had come for action, coupled with the inflammable
nature of world conditions, similar uprisings in other
countries, and the touch-and-go nature of our relations with
countries with whom petitioners were in the very least ideologically attuned, convince us that their convictions were
justified on this score. And this analysis disposes of the
contention that a conspiracy to advocate, as distinguished
from the advocacy itself, cannot be constitutionally
restrained, because it comprises only the preparation. It is the
existence of the conspiracy which creates the danger.123
In other words, the foreign success of communist revolutions indicated that
the danger was sufficient to justify limitations on free speech. The rest of
the opinion disposed of the other possible defects of the convictions.
Frankfurter opposed Black and Douglas’s primacy of the Bill of Rights
and was not persuaded by this Hand formula:
This conflict of interests [between free speech and security]
cannot be resolved by a dogmatic preference for one or the
other, nor by a sonorous formula which is in fact only a
euphemistic disguise for an unresolved conflict.124
Rather than have the courts resolve the conflict between free speech
and security, Frankfurter presents an exhaustive review of precedent to
support his position that the balancing between free speech and security
belongs to the legislature:
Primary responsibility for adjusting the interests which
compete in the situation before us of necessity belongs to the
Congress. The nature of the power to be exercised by this
Court has been delineated in decisions not charged with the

123
124

Id. at 510–11 (internal citations omitted).
Id. at 519 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
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emotional appeal of situations such as that now before us. We
are to set aside the judgment of those whose duty it is to
legislate only if there is no reasonable basis for it.125
Essentially, Frankfurter limits the courts’ role to verifying that the
legislature has a rational basis for limiting speech.
Jackson’s concurrence recounted the international success of
communist subversions, with the description of the events in Czechoslovakia quoted in the main text.126 He proceeded to stress that conspiracy to
commit illegal acts can be prohibited validly with no regard to any
limitations this may impose on speech.127
Black’s dissent took the opposite view, that this conviction was for
speech alone.128 Douglas’s dissent similarly pointed out that this conspiracy
pursued not violent acts but political action.129 For Douglas, the jury should
have assessed whether the defendants’ activities constituted “clear and
present danger.”130 Moreover, Douglas thought the weakness of
communism in the United States was a result of the superior circumstances

125

Dennis II, 341 U.S. 494, 525 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
Id. at 566. See also supra note 22 and accompanying text.
127
Id. at 572 (“What really is under review here is a conviction of conspiracy, after a trial for
conspiracy, on an indictment charging conspiracy, brought under a statute outlawing conspiracy. With
due respect to my colleagues, they seem to me to discuss anything under the sun except the law of
conspiracy. One of the dissenting opinions even appears to chide me for ‘invoking the law of conspiracy.’
As that is the case before us, it may be more amazing that its reversal can be proposed without even
considering the law of conspiracy. The Constitution does not make conspiracy a civil right. The Court
has never before done so and I think it should not do so now. Conspiracies of labor unions, trade
associations, and news agencies have been condemned, although accomplished, evidenced and carried
out, like the conspiracy here, chiefly by letter-writing, meetings, speeches and organization.”).
128
Id. at 579 (Black, J., dissenting) (“These petitioners were not charged with an attempt to
overthrow the Government. They were not charged with overt acts of any kind designed to overthrow
the Government. They were not even charged with saying anything or writing anything designed to
overthrow the Government. The charge was that they agreed to assemble and to talk and publish certain
ideas at a later date: The indictment is that they conspired to organize the Communist Party and to use
speech or newspapers and other publications in the future to teach and advocate the forcible overthrow
of the Government. No matter how it is worded, this is a virulent form of prior censorship of speech and
press, which I believe the First Amendment forbids. I would hold § 3 of the Smith Act authorizing this
prior restraint unconstitutional on its face and as applied.”).
129
Id. at 581 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (“If this were a case where those who claimed protection
under the First Amendment were teaching the techniques of sabotage, the assassination of the President,
the filching of documents from public files, the planting of bombs, the art of street warfare, and the like,
I would have no doubts. The freedom to speak is not absolute; the teaching of methods of terror and
other seditious conduct should be beyond the pale along with obscenity and immorality. This case was
argued as if those were the facts. The argument imported much seditious conduct into the record. That
is easy and it has popular appeal, for the activities of Communists in plotting and scheming against the
free world are common knowledge. But the fact is that no such evidence was introduced at the trial.”).
130
Id. at 587 (“I had assumed that the question of the clear and present danger, being so critical
an issue in the case, would be a matter for submission to the jury.”).
126
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of the United States, including its economic success, literacy, and
established democratic traditions.131
The three directions that the members of the Court took in Dennis II
could have augured frequent victories for the prosecution, but victories
waned. The three directions were Jackson’s subordination of the Bill of
Rights to the fight against communism, Black and Douglas’s primacy of the
Bill of Rights, and Frankfurter’s acceptance of the legislature’s weighing,
which was consistently anti-communist. If this division persisted in other
cases, then the prosecution would win with some regularity. However, the
Court’s support for the prosecution would diminish from this high point.
The trial of the leaders of the Communist Party in New York also
produced contempt convictions of their lawyers. Reviewing the contempt
convictions, the Supreme Court also divided, with Black, Frankfurter, and
Douglas opposing the summary imposition of the penalty in Sacher I.132 One
of the lawyers was also disbarred, and the following year the Court also
disbarred him from the Supreme Court Bar, in Isserman I.133 The Court split
4–4, with Clark not participating, resulting in disbarment. Vinson wrote for
the Court, noting that Isserman had also not disclosed a conviction and
suspension from practice in his original application.134 Jackson, with Black,
Frankfurter, and Douglas, wrote that the Court did not ask about past
convictions and that Isserman’s incarceration produced sufficient

Id. at 588–89 (“If we are to take judicial notice of the threat of Communists within the nation,
it should not be difficult to conclude that as a political party they are of little consequence. Communists
in this country have never made a respectable or serious showing in any election. I would doubt that
there is a village, let alone a city or county or state, which the Communists could carry. Communism in
the world scene is no bogeyman; but Communism as a political faction or party in this country plainly
is. Communism has been so thoroughly exposed in this country that it has been crippled as a political
force. Free speech has destroyed it as an effective political party. It is inconceivable that those who went
up and down this country preaching the doctrine of revolution which petitioners espouse would have any
success. In days of trouble and confusion, when bread lines were long, when the unemployed walked the
streets, when people were starving, the advocates of a short-cut by revolution might have a chance to
gain adherents. But today there are no such conditions. The country is not in despair; the people know
Soviet Communism; the doctrine of Soviet revolution is exposed in all of its ugliness and the American
people want none of it.
How it can be said that there is a clear and present danger that this advocacy will succeed is,
therefore, a mystery. Some nations less resilient than the United States, where illiteracy is high and where
democratic traditions are only budding, might have to take drastic steps and jail these men for merely
speaking their creed. But in America they are miserable merchants of unwanted ideas; their wares remain
unsold. The fact that their ideas are abhorrent does not make them powerful.”).
132
Sacher v. United States, 343 U.S. 1 (1952).
133
In re Isserman (Isserman I), 345 U.S. 286 (1953).
134
Id. at 290 (Vinson, J.) (“It may be noted, however, that the files in the office of our Clerk
show that the respondent did not disclose this conviction and suspension from practice in his application
for admission to our bar, so that we did not sanction that conduct in granting him admission. The order
of the Court placed the burden upon respondent to show good cause why he should not be disbarred. In
our judgment, he has failed to meet this test.”).
131
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deterrence.135 The rule would be amended and when the case would come
back for review a year later, after Jackson’s death, the Court would again tie
but, due to the amended text, the result would be the opposite.136
Next, in Tenney, Frankfurter writes for the Court in favor of legislative
immunity from liability for the political consequences of a state unAmerican activities committee.137 Because Tenney is about liability, rather
than sanctions for un-Americanism, it is not included in the primary cases
about un-Americanism, as is not its sister case, Collins.138
In Updegraff, the Court is unanimous in striking down state imposition
of loyalty oaths on university professors. The Court’s two erstwhile law
professors, Frankfurter joined by Douglas, concur, underscoring the
importance of academic freedom.139 Black, joined by Douglas, also concurs
for free speech, lest it only exist for the “cringing and the craven.”140
135
Id. at 294 (Jackson, J.) (“If the purpose of disciplinary proceedings be correction of the
delinquent, the courts defeat the purpose by ruining him whom they would reform. If the purpose be to
deter others, disbarment is belated and superfluous, for what lawyer would not find deterrent enough in
the jail sentence, the two-year suspension from the bar of the United States District Court, and the
disapproval of his profession? If the disbarment rests, not on these specific proven offenses, but on
atmospheric considerations of general undesirability and Communistic leanings or affiliation, these have
not been charged and he has had no chance to meet them. We cannot take judicial notice of them. On
the occasions when Isserman has been before this Court, or before an individual Justice, his conduct has
been unexceptionable and his professional ability considerable.”).
136
In re Isserman (Isserman II), 348 U.S. 1 (1954) (3–3 tie with Justices Warren and Clark not
participating).
137
Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951).
138
Collins v. Hardyman, 341 U.S. 651 (1951).
139
Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 196–97 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (“To regard
teachers—in our entire educational system, from the primary grades to the university—as the priests of
our democracy is therefore not to indulge in hyperbole. It is the special task of teachers to foster those
habits of open-mindedness and critical inquiry which alone make for responsible citizens, who, in turn,
make possible an enlightened and effective public opinion. Teachers must fulfill their function by precept
and practice, by the very atmosphere which they generate; they must be exemplars of open-mindedness
and free inquiry. They cannot carry out their noble task if the conditions for the practice of a responsible
and critical mind are denied to them. They must have the freedom of responsible inquiry, by thought and
action, into the meaning of social and economic ideas, into the checkered history of social and economic
dogma. They must be free to sift evanescent doctrine, qualified by time and circumstance, from that
restless, enduring process of extending the bounds of understanding and wisdom, to assure which the
freedoms of thought, of speech, of inquiry, of worship are guaranteed by the Constitution of the United
States against infraction by national or State government.”).
140
Updegraff, 344 U.S. at 192–93 (Black, J., concurring) (“History indicates that individual
liberty is intermittently subjected to extraordinary perils. Even countries dedicated to government by the
people are not free from such cyclical dangers. The first years of our Republic marked such a period.
Enforcement of the Alien and Sedition Laws by zealous patriots who feared ideas made it highly
dangerous for people to think, speak, or write critically about government, its agents, or its policies,
either foreign or domestic. Our constitutional liberties survived the ordeal of this regrettable period
because there were influential men and powerful organized groups bold enough to champion the
undiluted right of individuals to publish and argue for their beliefs however unorthodox or loathsome.
Today however, few individuals and organizations of power and influence argue that unpopular
advocacy has this same wholly unqualified immunity from governmental interference. For this and other
reasons the present period of fear seems more ominously dangerous to speech and press than was that of
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At the same time, in Adler,141 the Court upholds 6–3 state laws that
enable the dismissal of communist sympathizers from public service. Black,
Frankfurter, and Douglas dissent.
The same year, 1952, also brings some cases that are more vaguely
related to the struggle against communism. However, these cases are not
necessarily related to un-Americanism prosecutions and, therefore, do not
belong in the primary un-Americanism opinions.142
The propriety of the deportation of long-resident aliens for past membership in the Communist Party arose in Harisiades.143 The aliens retained
their communist beliefs despite expulsion from the party. The Court splits
6–2 in favor of the government with Clark not participating. Three were the
challenges to the deportations, that they violated Due Process, the First
Amendment, and were ex post facto punishment. Jackson writes for the
majority that national defense precludes a due process attack on deportations.144 For the proposition that the deportations are not improper reactions
to protected First Amendment rights because advocacy of violent overthrow
of the government is not protected speech, Jackson points to Dennis II.145
Finally, Jackson underlines that the prohibition against joining
organizations that advocate the violent overthrow of the government was
long in existence; and that punishing past membership was an appropriate

the Alien and Sedition Laws. Suppressive laws and practices are the fashion. . . . Governments need and
have ample power to punish treasonable acts. But it does not follow that they must have a further power
to punish thought and speech as distinguished from acts. Our own free society should never forget that
laws which stigmatize and penalize thought and speech of the unorthodox have a way of reaching,
ensnaring and silencing many more people than at first intended. We must have freedom of speech for
all or we will in the long run have it for none but the cringing and the craven.”).
141
Adler v. Bd of Educ., 342 U.S. 485 (1952).
142
The nearby opinions that are not discussed because they more likely are about espionage than
un-Americanism are United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537 (1950) (exclusion of
spouse); Heikkila v. Barber, 345 U.S. 229 (1953) (deportation challenge procedure); and Shaughnessy
v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953) (indefinite detention for deportation of alien about
whom the attorney general will not say why the alien is not admissible even in camera).
143
Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580 (1952).
144
Id. at 591 (“[T]he Due Process Clause does not shield the citizen from conscription and the
consequent calamity of being separated from family, friends, home and business while he is transported
to foreign lands to stem the tide of Communism. If Communist aggression creates such hardships for
loyal citizens, it is hard to find justification for holding that the Constitution requires that its hardships
must be spared the Communist alien.”).
145
Id. at 592 (“True, it often is difficult to determine whether ambiguous speech is advocacy of
political methods or subtly shades into a methodical but prudent incitement to violence. Communist
Governments avoid the inquiry by suppressing everything distasteful. Some would have us avoid the
difficulty by going to the opposite extreme of permitting incitement to violent overthrow at least unless
it seems certain to succeed immediately. We apprehend that the Constitution enjoins upon us the duty,
however difficult, of distinguishing between the two. Different formulae have been applied in different
situations and the test applicable to the Communist Party has been stated too recently to make further
discussion at this time profitable.”).
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reaction to the Communist Party’s expulsion of all its alien members en
masse to protect them from deportation.146
Frankfurter’s concurrence expresses his judicial restraint, regretting
that “immigration laws have been crude and cruel, . . . may have reflected
xenophobia in general or anti-Semitism or anti-Catholicism.” Nevertheless,
they are not reviewable.147 Douglas’s dissent, joined by Black, argues that
the United States either forever banished ex-Communists or punished them
for their erstwhile beliefs, and either
is foreign to our philosophy. We repudiate our traditions of
tolerance and our articles of faith based upon the Bill of Rights
when we bow to them by sustaining an Act of Congress which
has them as a foundation.148
Carlson v. Landon149 regarded the right to bail of aliens under
deportation. Bail had been denied because they were members of the
Communist Party with the argument that their expected indoctrination
activities were against the public interest. The Court, in an opinion by Reed,
upheld the denial of bail 5–4, with Black, Frankfurter, Douglas, and Burton
writing separate dissents.
The application of immigration laws in an un-Americanism setting also
arose in Spector, where the Court favored the government 5–3.150 Clark did
not participate. Spector is also unusual in featuring Douglas as the author of
an opinion favoring the state in an un-Americanism setting. An alien under
a deportation order for advocating to overthrow the government failed to
depart within six months, a felony. The District Court dismissed,
considering the statute vague. The Court reversed, not finding vagueness.
Black dissented because the alien could not know what documents would
be needed to gain admission to travel to his country of choice. Jackson also
146
Id. at 593–94 (“During all the years since 1920 Congress has maintained a standing
admonition to aliens, on pain of deportation, not to become members of any organization that advocates
overthrow . . . by force and violence. . . . There can be no contention that [these aliens] were not
adequately forewarned. . . . [Granted, in Kessler t]he Court concluded that . . . only contemporaneous
membership would authorize deportation. The reaction of the Communist Party was to drop aliens from
membership, at least in form, in order to immunize them from the consequences of their party
membership. The reaction of Congress was that the Court had misunderstood its legislation. In the Act
here before us it supplied unmistakable language that past violators of its prohibitions continued to be
deportable in spite of resignation or expulsion from the party. It regarded the fact that an alien defied our
laws to join the Communist Party as an indication that he had developed little comprehension of the
principles or practice of representative government or else was unwilling to abide by them.”).
147
Id. at 597–98 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (“In recognizing this power and this responsibility
of Congress, one does not in the remotest degree align oneself with fears unworthy of the American
spirit or with hostility to the bracing air of the free spirit. One merely recognizes that the place to resist
unwise or cruel legislation touching aliens is the Congress, not this Court.”).
148
Id. at 598 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
149
342 U.S. 524 (1952).
150
United States v. Spector, 343 U.S. 169 (1952).
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dissented, with Frankfurter, arguing that the inability of the alien to
challenge in court the deportation order was improper, and that the world
struggle against communism frustrated deportation, creating an unfair
burden on the alien.151 Jackson’s concern about the international expansion
of communism, which usually led Jackson to favor the government, here
makes Jackson favor the individual.
The summer of 1953 brought to the Court the notorious case of the
Rosenbergs’ death penalty for giving nuclear secrets to the Soviet Union.
After Douglas granted a stay of execution, the Court summarily reviewed
and affirmed the original judgement 6–3.152 Because this was a prosecution
for espionage, not un-Americanism, it does not belong in this dataset.
Moreover, notable is the outcry against Douglas for granting the stay, which
led to a movement to impeach him.153
This period closed with Orloff154 and Bridges.155 In Orloff, a medical
doctor was drafted into the army and given the rank of Captain due to
education and occupation—he was above the age of being drafted
otherwise. When he refused a loyalty oath and would not answer questions
about membership in the Communist Party, he was demoted and assigned
to lesser duties. The Court, in an opinion by Jackson, upheld the military’s
exercise of discretion. Black, Frankfurter, and Douglas dissented, in
opinions by Black and Frankfurter arguing that the drafting of doctors above
the general draft age rested on their being commissioned officers and
exercising medical duties.
Bridges was about fraud in the procurement of naturalization by a
conspiracy to lie about no membership in the Communist Party. While Clark
and Jackson do not participate, the Court decided 4–3 and favored the
individuals by holding that the statute of limitations had lapsed. The dissent
of Reed with Vinson and Minton argued that, according to the statutory
language, the wartime suspension of the limitations period applied, and the
prosecution was still timely.

151
Id. at 179–80 (Jackson, J., dissenting) (“A deportation policy can be successful only to the
extent that some other state is willing to receive those we expel. But, except selected individuals who
can do us more harm abroad than here, what Communist power will cooperate with our deportation
policy by receiving our expelled Communist aliens? And what non-Communist power feels such
confidence in its own domestic security that it can risk taking in persons this stable and powerful
Republic finds dangerous to its security? World conditions seem to frustrate the policy of deportation of
subversives. Once they gain admission here, they are our problem and one that cannot be shipped off to
some other part of the world.”).
152
Rosenberg v. United States, 346 U.S. 273 (1953).
153
The House proposed impeachment of Douglas within hours of his action, eliciting cheering
in the chamber. The impeachment was referred to committee and, the sentence against the Rosenbergs
having been carried out, faded. LICHTMAN, supra note 21, at 62–63.
154
Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83 (1953).
155
Bridges v. United States, 346 U.S. 209 (1953).
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While un-Americanism prosecutions were facing this reaction in the
Supreme Court, the Presidency changed parties. President Eisenhower took
office and made the first appointment to the Court by a Republican President
since F.D. Roosevelt took office, the appointment of Earl Warren as Chief
Justice in October of 1953.156 Warren replaced Chief Justice Vinson, who
had mostly voted in favor of the prosecution in un-Americanism disputes.
Warren arrived at the Court with an anti-Communist past. Warren had
prosecuted the conviction of Communists for crimes committed in an effort
to infiltrate unions.157 Indeed, Warren did cast his first votes in unAmericanism cases for the prosecution, but he soon changed.
In Barsky, the issue was the validity of a six-month revocation of the
license to practice medicine due to a contempt conviction for failing to
comply with a subpoena of the House Committee on Un-American
Activities.158 The majority opinion, by Justice Burton, accepted that the state
had the discretion to determine licensing conditions and was reasonable in
its review and decisions. Black and Douglas dissented, writing separate
opinions joining each other. Black’s premise was that all this activity sprang
from an illegal bill of attainder.159 Perhaps Black should have stressed more
the precedent of Lovett,160 which also rested on the reasoning that the
legislative firing of employees for their political beliefs was a bill of attainder. In hindsight, the reasoning that rests on the prohibition against bills of
attainder has the appeal that it will also be one of the final utterances of the

156

While this was the first appointment by a Republican President, it was not the first
appointment of a Republican. Justice Burton, appointed by Truman in September 1945, was a member
of the Republican Party and often sided with the prosecution in un-Americanism disputes. See supra
Table 1.
157
James F. Simon reports that Warren’s most publicized case from Warren’s years as a
prosecutor was the trial for the 1936 murder of the chief engineer of the freighter Los Lobos, a plot linked
in Warren’s mind with communist influence in West Coast maritime unions, for which Warren, who
otherwise supported labor, faced labor protests and picketing. When three of the four murderers were
paroled by the Democratic Governor and likely electoral opponent of Warren, Warren lashed out that
their parole was a political move due to their being “powerful communistic radicals.” JAMES F. SIMON,
EISENHOWER V. WARREN: THE BATTLE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES, 10–11 (2018).
158
Barsky v. Bd. of Regents, 347 U.S. 442 (1954). This prosecution springs from the same
prosecution of the Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee as Bryan and Fleischman. See supra note 89
and accompanying text.
159
Id. at 460 (Black, J., dissenting) (“The Grievance Committee made a formal finding of fact
that the Refugee Committee had been listed as subversive. This Court, however, has held that the
Attorney General’s list was unlawful, Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123,
71 S. Ct. 624. My view was and is that the list was the equivalent of a bill of attainder which the
Constitution expressly forbids. The Regents’ own reviewing Committee on Discipline recognized the
illegality of the list and advised the Regents that no weight should be given to it. This reviewing
committee also recommended that the Regents not accept the Grievance Committee’s recommendation
of a six months’ suspension but instead give no suspension at all.”).
160
See supra notes 67–68 and accompanying text. Also, on attainder rested Black’s reasoning in
the dissents in Douds and McGrath. See supra note 98 and accompanying text (Douds); supra note 90
and accompanying text (McGrath).
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Court on un-Americanism prosecutions, in US v. Brown in 1965, see note
385 and accompanying text, below.
Moreover, Black believed (as did Frankfurter) that, even if New York
were to hold that people who associated with communists should have their
medical licenses suspended, that would be an improper deprivation.161
Douglas’s dissent stressed the importance of work and the primacy of the
Bill of Rights.162 Douglas closed by mourning the national “neurosis.”163
Frankfurter dissented for similar reasons. Frankfurter would find error in the
process that New York followed.164 He also considered the decision to
revoke a medical license for events entirely unrelated to the practice of
medicine violative of due process.165
The Court revisits the propriety of alien deportation for membership in
the Communist Party in Galvan.166 The Court’s 7–2 majority, under
Frankfurter’s pen, reluctantly adheres to the Congressional mandate that
mere past membership is sufficient for deportation.167 Black and Douglas
dissent.
Barsky, 347 U.S. at 463 (Black, J., dissenting) (“Of course it may be possible that the Regents
thought that every doctor who refuses to testify before a congressional committee should be suspended
from practice. But so far as we know the suspension may rest on the Board’s unproven suspicions that
Dr. Barsky had associated with Communists. This latter ground, if the basis of the Regents’ action, would
indicate that in New York a doctor’s right to practice rests on no more than the will of the Regents.”)
(internal citations omitted).
162
Id. at 473 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (“If, for the same reason, New York had attempted to put
Dr. Barsky to death or to put him in jail or to take his property, there would be a flagrant violation of
due process. I do not understand the reasoning which holds that the State may not do these things, but
may nevertheless suspend Dr. Barsky’s power to practice his profession. I repeat, it does a man little
good to stay alive and free and propertied, if he cannot work.”).
163
Id. at 474 (“When a doctor cannot save lives in America because he is opposed to Franco in
Spain, it is time to call a halt and look critically at the neurosis that has possessed us.”).
164
Id. at 469 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (“[T]he highest court of the State of New York tells us,
in effect, ‘Yes, it may be that the Regents arbitrarily deprived a doctor of his license to practice medicine,
but the courts of New York can do nothing about it.’ Such a rule of law, by denying all relief from
arbitrary action, implicitly sanctions it; and deprivation of interests that are part of a man’s liberty and
property, when based on such arbitrary grounds, contravenes the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.”).
165
Id. at 470 (“It is one thing thus to recognize the freedom which the Constitution wisely leaves
to the States in regulating the professions. It is quite another thing, however, to sanction a State’s
deprivation or partial destruction of a man’s professional life on grounds having no possible relation to
fitness, intellectual or moral, to pursue his profession. Implicit in the grant of discretion to a State’s
medical board is the qualification that it must not exercise its supervisory powers on arbitrary, whimsical
or irrational considerations. A license cannot be revoked because a man is red-headed or because he was
divorced, except for a calling, if such there be, for which red-headedness or an unbroken marriage may
have some rational bearing. If a State licensing agency lays bare its arbitrary action, or if the State law
explicitly allows it to act arbitrarily, that is precisely the kind of State action which the Due Process
Clause forbids.”).
166
Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522 (1954).
167
Id. at 532 (“[We] must therefore under our constitutional system recognize congressional
power in dealing with aliens, on the basis of which we are unable to find the Act of 1950
unconstitutional.”).
161
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Noteworthy is that the newly appointed Warren sided with the
prosecution in both Barsky and Galvan. After siding with the government
one more time but only in conference in Emspak before the Court decided
to order a rehearing, Warren would have a change of heart.168 In the reargued
Emspak and all subsequent un-Americanism cases, Warren would side with
the individuals. Add the replacement of Jackson with the initially prodefendant Harlan, and the future arrival of strongly pro-defendant Brennan,
and the balance on the Court changes. The era that saw the Court siding with
the prosecution the most often was ending. An era of idealism was about to
begin.
B. Premature Idealism: To Red Monday
A bail issue produced a one-member opinion from Douglas, sitting as
Circuit Justice, in Yanish v. Barber.169 An alien was subject to summary
deportation for being a member of the Communist Party. As a condition of
being re-released on bail, the alien was required to not associate with
Communists. Justice Douglas finds the resulting consequences unrelated to
ensuring the defendant’s appearance at trial,170 and grants bail. Because this
is a one-member bail case, it is not included in the primary un-Americanism
opinions.
After Eisenhower makes one more appointment, John Marshall Harlan
II to replace Robert H. Jackson, the Court issues three opinions related to
un-Americanism prosecutions on May 23, 1955: Emspak,171 Quinn,172 and
Bart.173 In all three, witnesses refused to answer questions by the Committee
168
See ROBERT M. LICHTMAN, THE SUPREME COURT AND MCCARTHY-ERA REPRESSION 68,
n.17 (2012) (from conference notes the vote appears 6–3 with Black, Frankfurter, and Douglas
dissenting; Warren assigned the opinion to Reed whose draft opinion exceeded the Fifth Amendment
issue, entering First Amendment; Black moved for reargument; only Reed and Minton opposed it); see
infra note 171 (discussing Emspak); see also supra note 39 (the reargument of Emspak contributes to
the gradual nature of the transition to the next era, the Premature Idealism Era).
169
See Yanish v. Barber, 73 S. Ct. 1105, 1106 (1953).
170
Id. at 1108 (“The function of bail in situations such as the instant one is to provide security
for the appearance of the prisoner on the one hand and to protect his right to appeal, on the other. . . . It
is not apparent how at least some of the conditions attached to the bond serve those ends. Specifically,
it is not obvious how the requirement that the alien given up his job with the Communist paper provides
security for his appearance in case the Immigration and Naturalization Service can effect his deportation
to Russia. . . . Condition (e), which would prevent the applicant ‘from associating with any person,
knowing or having reasonable ground to believe’ that such person is a Communist, would, taken literally,
prevent him from living with his Communist wife or going to a movie with his Communist son or seeing
his Communist legal adviser or being treated by his Communist doctor. How that prohibition would do
service in the tradition of Anglo-Saxon bail or how it would further the program of deportation which
Congress has designed is not apparent.”).
171
Emspak v. United States, 349 U.S. 190 (1955).
172
Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 155 (1955).
173
Bart v. United States, 349 U.S. 219 (1955).
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on Un-American Activities of the House of Representatives or its onemember subcommittee (presumably designed to avoid the problems with
quorum that Fleischman, Bryan, and Christoffel had raised174). The
defendants vaguely invoked their First and Fifth Amendment rights. The
Court held those objections sufficient to defeat the subsequent convictions
of the defendants for refusing to answer.
In all three, Warren writes for the Court exonerating the refusal to
answer questions of a Congressional committee. The two first Eisenhower
appointees, Warren and Harlan, took opposite sides in these unAmericanism prosecutions. Harlan partially concurs in one (Quinn) and
dissents in two (Emspak and Bart). Harlan’s concurrence in Quinn refers to
his dissent in Emspak. Harlan disagrees with the Court when the majority
finds that the refusal to answer did not have the requisite criminal intent,
because the defendant relied on counsel’s advice about the defendant’s
rights.175 Harlan clearly states in his dissent in Emspak that the
subcommittee had sufficiently demonstrated that the defendant’s objections
were not accepted and his answers were expected.176 The dissenters—in
Emspak and Bart—are Reed, Minton, and Harlan, and—in Quinn—Reed
alone.
A week later, on June 6, 1955, the Court, again in an opinion by Warren
for a split Court, found against practices of the Loyalty Review Boards in
Peters v. Hobby.177 A Yale Medical School professor had occasional
employment reviewing grants for the Department of Health, Education, and
Welfare. The work did not touch confidential or classified matters. The
Executive Order on Loyalty Review Boards had been amended in 1951 to
lead to dismissal, not on a finding of reasonable grounds for disloyalty, but
if mere “reasonable doubt as to” an employee’s loyalty existed.178 The
professor succeeded in a loyalty review using the old standard. Upon the
amendment of the standard, however, the board reviewed the professor’s
case on its own initiative and remanded it for a hearing. The board notified
the professor of certain charges which the professor answered under oath,
including a denial that he had ever been a member of the Communist Party.
A hearing followed in New Haven, during which the professor was the only
one presenting information and was not allowed to cross-examine the

174

See supra notes 71, 89 and accompanying text.
Quinn, 349 U.S. at 166 (“In short, unless the witness is clearly apprised that the committee
demands his answer notwithstanding his objections, there can be no conviction under [Section] 192 for
refusal to answer that question.”).
176
Emspak, 349 U.S. at 214–15 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“[T]he record shows that Emspak was
clearly apprised that, despite his objections, the Committee wanted answers . . . .”).
177
See Peters v. Hobby, 349 U.S. 331 (1955).
178
Id. at 334 (referring to the amended standard per Executive Order 10241, which replaced E.O.
9835); see supra text accompanying note 104.
175
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sources of the board’s information. The professor was subsequently notified
that the board had found no reasonable doubt about his loyalty.
A year later, the board notified the professor that it would conduct a
‘post-audit’ of the determination and held a new hearing. Again, only the
professor presented evidence, and could not cross-examine the five
informants against him, only one of whose identities was known to the
board, and whose statements were not all under oath. This time, the board
concluded that a reasonable doubt about the professor’s loyalty did exist,
and notified the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare as well as the
professor, informing him that he had been barred from government service
for three years.
The Court split 7–2, with a dissent by Reed with Burton. Warren’s
majority opinion recognized that constitutional issues may exist in this
process but decided in the professor’s favor based on the board’s violations
of the Executive Order, which did not authorize sua sponte reviews.179
Black’s concurrence would have the Court reach the constitutional issues
and doubts the validity of the scheme of loyalty review.180 Reed’s dissent,
joined by Burton, would have found that the Executive Order was followed
properly without reaching the constitutional issues. Douglas’s concurrence
conceded Reed’s point that the board followed established practice and had
proper authority. Therefore, Douglas would reach the constitutional issues

179
Peters, 349 U.S. at 339–40 (“The authority thus conferred on the Loyalty Review Board was
limited to ‘cases involving persons recommended for dismissal on grounds relating to loyalty by the
loyalty board of any department or agency . . .’ And, even as to these cases, the Loyalty Review Board
was denied any power to undertake review on its own motion; only the employee recommended for
dismissal, or his department or agency, could refer such a case to the Loyalty Review Board. In
petitioner's case, the Board failed to respect either of these limitations. Petitioner had been twice cleared
by the Agency Board and hence did not fall in the category of ‘persons recommended for dismissal on
grounds relating to loyalty by the loyalty board of any department or agency.’ Moreover, petitioner’s
case was never referred to the Loyalty Review Board by petitioner or the Agency. Instead, the Loyalty
Review Board, acting solely on its own motion, undertook to ‘hold a hearing and reach its own
decision.’”).
180
Id. at 350 (Black, J., concurring) (“But I wish it distinctly understood that I have grave doubt
as to whether the Presidential Order has been authorized by any Act of Congress. That order and others
associated with it embody a broad, far-reaching espionage program over government employees. These
orders look more like legislation to me than properly authorized regulations to carry out a clear and
explicit command of Congress. I also doubt that the Congress could delegate power to do what the
President has attempted to do in the Executive Order under consideration here.”).
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and find the process inadequate.181 Douglas rebutted the idea that the fear of
subversive activities trumped due process.182
A year later, the same composition of the Court decided Nelson.183 A
state prosecution using anti-sedition legislation led to a twenty-year
sentence of a member of the Communist Party. Both the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court and the United States Supreme Court held the state
prohibition to be superseded by the federal Smith Act, exonerating the
defendant. Reed with Burton and Minton dissented, writing that the federal
anti-sedition legislation was not intended to supersede state legislation and
prosecutions.184 Nelson’s would be one of the holdings that, in the backlash
against the Supreme Court’s resisting un-Americanism prosecutions,
several legislative initiatives would seek to overturn in the summer of
1957.185
The same year brought to the Court Communist Party of the United
States v. Subversive Activities Control Board.186 A 1950 statute, likely
reacting to the concerns that led to Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v.
McGrath,187 proceeded to solidify the process for designating organizations
as communist-action and established an administrative agency that would
make the determination. The Communist Party of the United States was
promptly designated a communist-action organization, which it challenged.
As the challenge reached the Supreme Court, it had two grounds. First, it
was an attack on the entire propriety of the scheme of designating an entity
as a communist-action one, with the consequences this entailed. Second, the
Communist Party alleged that three of the many witnesses used against it in
the administrative agency’s proceeding had later perjury convictions
making their testimony suspect. The majority based the decision on narrow
181
Id. at 350–51 (Douglas, J., concurring) (The professor “was condemned by faceless informers,
some of whom were not known even to the Board that condemned him. Some of these informers were
not even under oath. None of them had to submit to cross-examination. None had to face Dr. Peters. So
far as we or the Board know, they may be psychopaths or venal people, like Titus Oates, who revel in
being informers. They may bear old grudges. Under cross-examination their stories might disappear like
bubbles.”).
182
Id. at 352 (“Those who see the force of this position counter by saying that the Government’s
sources of information must be protected, if the campaign against subversives is to be successful. The
answer is plain. If the sources of information need protection, they should be kept secret. But once they
are used to destroy a man’s reputation and deprive him of his ‘liberty,’ they must be put to the test of
due process of law. The use of faceless informers is wholly at war with that concept. When we relax our
standards to accommodate the faceless informer, we violate our basic constitutional guarantees and ape
the tactics of those whom we despise.”).
183
Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497 (1956).
184
Id. at 515 (“We cannot agree that the federal criminal sanctions against sedition directed at
the United States are of such a pervasive character as to indicate an intention to void state action.”).
185
See infra text accompanying notes 232–237.
186
Communist Party of the United States v. Subversive Activities Control Bd. (Communist Party
I), 351 U.S. 115 (1956) (on the tables and graphs, “CPUSA I”).
187
See supra text accompanying note 90.
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grounds, avoided the constitutional issues, and remanded for reconsideration without the tainted witnesses. The dissent of Clark, with Reed and
Minton, considered remand pointless because the primary issues were not
even challenged and the tainted witnesses were uncontroverted and secondary, decried the avoidance of the important issues, which preserved
uncertainty six years after the passage of the statute.188
Douglas issued one more opinion reducing bail on an un-Americanism
prosecution in 1956, Steinberg.189 The search incident to the arrest should
have been done pursuant to a warrant; Douglas, therefore, made a large
reduction of bail. Being a single-justice opinion, this is not included in the
primary un-Americanism opinions that form the database for the
quantitative analysis of Part III.
Under the same composition, in Slochower, the Court reaffirmed its
Updegraff position in finding that the rule of New York City, which
produced the automatic dismissal of a college professor who invoked the
Fifth Amendment was improper.190 The court split 5–4 in favor of the
professor, holding that a section of the Charter of the City of New York that
mandated the termination of employees who invoked the privilege against
self-incrimination was unconstitutional as applied. Clark with Black,
Douglas, Frankfurter, and Warren were in the majority. Two dissenting
opinions came from Reed, with Burton and Minton,191 and Harlan.192
The Court also upheld the dismissal of a denaturalization in Zucca.193
The government alleged that Zucca obtained citizenship by lying that he had
Communist Party I, 351 U.S. at 130 (Clark, J., dissenting) (“The Communist Party makes no
claim that the Government knowingly used false testimony, and it is far too realistic to contend that the
Board’s action will be any different on remand. The only purpose of this procedural maneuver is to gain
additional time. . . . This proceeding has dragged out for many years now, and the function of the Board
remains suspended and the congressional purpose frustrated to a most critical time in world history.
Ironically enough, we are returning the case to a Board whose very existence is challenged on
constitutional grounds. We are asking the Board to pass on the credibility of witnesses after we have
refused to say whether it has the power to do so. The constitutional questions are fairly presented here
for our decision. If all or any part of the Act is unconstitutional, it should be declared so on the record
before us. If not, the Nation is entitled to effective operation of the statute deemed to be of vital
importance to its well-being at the time it was passed by the Congress.”).
189
Steinberg v. United States, 76 S. Ct. 822 (1956).
190
See Slochower v. Bd. of Higher Ed., 350 U.S. 551, 558 (1956) (the professor was questioned
by the Internal Security subcommittee of the Judiciary Committee of the United States Senate).
191
Id. at 561 (Reed, J., dissenting) (“We assert the contrary—the city does have reasonable
ground to require its employees either to give evidence regarding facts of official conduct within their
knowledge or to give up the positions they hold.”).
192
Id. at 566 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“In effect, what New York has done is to say that it will not
employ teachers who refuse to cooperate with public authorities when asked questions relating to official
conduct. Does such a statute bear a reasonable relation to New York’s interest in ensuring the
qualifications of its teachers? The majority seems to decide that it does not. This Court has already held,
however, that a State may properly make knowing membership in an organization dedicated to the
overthrow of the Government by force a ground for disqualification from public school teaching.”).
193
United States v. Zucca, 351 U.S. 91, 100 (1956).
188
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not been a member of the Communist Party. The Court by a 5–3 majority
upheld the District Court’s reading of the statute that required the United
States Attorney to file an affidavit of good cause. Clark, joined by Minton
and Reed, dissented.194 Harlan did not participate.
In Black v. Cutter Labs,195 an employee who was elected to union
officership had falsified her employment record, was a member of the
Communist Party, and was dismissed from employment. The arbitration
board held that her dismissal was improper. The justifications for it were
stale for having been known for two years and the true motive was her union
activity. The Supreme Court of California reversed, considering her
dismissal proper. Clark’s majority opinion for a 6–3 Court found that the
California Supreme Court had stated adequate state grounds that her
dismissal was for just cause under state law and avoided the constitutional
claims. The dissent of Douglas, joined by Warren and Black, found no
adequate state grounds, but a violation of the First and Fourteenth
Amendments. Because Black is between private parties, it is not included as
a primary un-Americanism opinion. If it were, it would have been the only
decision during this era against the individual accused of communist
sympathies.
The Court invalidated the employment termination of a federal
employee in a non-sensitive position for disloyalty and association with
communists in Cole v. Young.196 Harlan wrote for the 6–3 majority. As in
Zucca, Clark, joined by Minton and Reed, dissented.197
In late 1956, Eisenhower appointed Democrat William Brennan to
replace Minton. This appointment replaced Minton’s occasional vote in
favor of un-Americanism prosecutions with a reliable vote against them. On
the world stage, however, Soviet Communism faced two significant adverse
developments. The new leader of the Soviet Union, Nikita Khrushchev,
made a speech critical of Stalin’s purges in February.198 But that did not
194
Id. at 100–01 (Clark, J., dissenting) (“The Court’s ruling today seriously obstructs the
Government in filing denaturalization proceedings in this type of case. It reverses a long line of cases in
the lower federal courts and disregards a consistent administrative practice of over thirty years standing,
a period which includes two recodifications of the immigration laws. Furthermore, the identical point on
which the case today is decided was present in two earlier cases where it apparently was not considered
important enough to be presented to this Court.”).
195
Black v. Cutter Labs., 351 U.S. 292, 293 (1956).
196
Cole v. Young, 351 U.S. 536 (1956).
197
Id. at 879–80 (“[T]he Court’s order has stricken down the most effective weapon against
subversive activity available to the Government. It is not realistic to say that the Government can be
protected merely by applying the Act to sensitive jobs. One never knows just which job is sensitive. The
janitor might prove to be in as important a spot security-wise as the top employee in the building.”).
198
See generally, Kruschev’s Secret Speech, ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA (2019),
https://www.britannica.com/event/Khrushchevs-secret-speech [perma.cc/4D7C-UW2N], transcript
available
at
https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/115995.pdf?v=3c22b71b65bcbbe9fdfadead9419c995 [perma.cc/E8WS-L88F].
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mean an end to violence. The same Fall, the Soviet Union would invade
Hungary to suppress its uprising.199 The oppressive nature of Soviet
communism was becoming difficult to deny, slightly weakening its support
in the West. (The Berlin Wall would not be built until 1961 and the creation
of non-Soviet-aligned Eurocommunism would only come after the Prague
Spring of 1968.)200
Without Brennan’s participation, the Court split 5–3 in Mesarosh.201
The Solicitor General acknowledged that Mazzei, a witness used in the
conviction for violating the Smith Act, had repeatedly perjured himself in
subsequent trials but assured the Court that he had no reason to doubt
Mazzei’s testimony in this one. The Court granted a new trial. The dissent
of Harlan with Frankfurter and Burton would have remanded the question
and allowed the District Court to decide whether a new trial was necessary.
The Court unanimously opposed the government’s attempt to render
unions noncompliant for false affidavits of non-communist affiliation in
Leedom and Amalgamated Meat Cutters.202 The employers sought to use the
false affidavits as a means of avoiding their collective bargaining
obligations. This private motivation makes these cases somewhat atypical.
The support of the NLRB in Leedom renders it sufficiently governmental to
include in the primary un-Americanism cases. Amalgamated Meat Cutters
remains exclusively privately motivated and, therefore, is not in the
database.
The last un-Americanism case before the appointment of Whittaker
was Gold.203 The Court, with a short per curiam opinion, orders the retrial
of a labor leader accused of filing a false affidavit of no affiliation with the
Communist Party. Reed, Burton, and Clark dissented. Reed’s joint dissent
would find that the presumption of influence upon the jurors was rebutted.
Clark rued that the Court refused to address important issues.
President Eisenhower nominated Whittaker to replace Reed. Whittaker
was appointed in March of 1957. This change in the Court’s composition
had little effect on its stance on un-Americanism prosecutions. Reed and
Whittaker would have similar pro-government attitudes, voting in favor of
the government in, respectively, 87% and 70% of the primary opinions.204
199
See generally, Malcolm Byrne, Hungarian Revolution, in INT’L ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE
SOCIAL SCIENCES 523 (William A. Darity, Jr., ed., 2d ed. 2008); Hungarian Revolution (1956),
ENCYCLOPAEDIA
BRITANNICA
https://www.britannica.com/event/Hungarian-Revolution-1956
[perma.cc/ZV88-7495] (last visited Mar. 2, 2020).
200
See also infra notes 402–403 and accompanying text.
201
Mesarosh v. United States, 352 U.S. 1 (1956). The dissent of Harlan with Frankfurter and
Burton appears at 352 U.S. 15.
202
Leedom v. N.L.R.B., 352 U.S. 145 (1956); Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen
v. NLRB, 352 U.S. 153 (1956).
203
Gold v. United States, 352 U.S. 985 (1957).
204
See infra Table 1.
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However, Whittaker’s record may have only changed to favor the
prosecution after the legislative backlash of the summer of 1957.
On May 6, 1957, the Court reached a decision about two states that
denied admission to the practice of law for two applicants who were
previously associated with the Communist Party. The states lost with
Whittaker not participating.
Konigsberg I205 brought to this composition of the Supreme Court the
question of the propriety of the denial to admit to the Bar an applicant who
had refused to answer questions about membership in the Communist Party.
The Committee of Bar Examiners refused admission to the Bar because the
applicant had not demonstrated good moral character and he failed to show
that he did not advocate the overthrow of the government by violent
methods. The California Supreme Court had affirmed the refusal of
admission to the bar 4–3. The Supreme Court, in an opinion by Black,
without addressing the constitutional issues,206 found a lack of reasonable
basis for the findings.207 Frankfurter wrote a dissent, as did Harlan, joined
by Clark. Frankfurter’s dissent focused on the jurisdiction of the Court; he
would have remanded for the California Supreme Court to state if it passed
on a federal due process claim. Harlan’s dissent agreed that the Court did
not have jurisdiction and argued that the Court’s rational basis review made
no sense.208

205

Konisberg I, 353 U.S. 252 (1957).
Id. at 261–62 (“If it were possible for us to say that the Board had barred Konigsberg solely
because of his refusal to respond to its inquiries into his political associations and his opinions about
matters of public interest, then we would be compelled to decide far-reaching and complex questions
relating to freedom of speech, press[,] and assembly. There is no justification for our straining to reach
these difficult problems when the Board itself has not seen fit, at any time, to base its exclusion of
Konigsberg on his failure to answer. If and when a State makes failure to answer a question an
independent ground for exclusion from the Bar, then this Court, as the cases arise, will have to determine
whether the exclusion is constitutionally permissible. We do not mean to intimate any view on that
problem here. . . .”).
207
Id. at 273 (“[W]e are compelled to conclude that there is no evidence in the record which
rationally justifies a finding that Konigsberg failed to establish his good moral character or failed to show
that he did not advocate forceful overthrow of the Government.”).
208
Id. at 311–12 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“For me it would at least be more understandable if the
Court were to hold that the Committee’s questions called for matter privileged under the First and
Fourteenth Amendments. But the Court carefully avoids doing so. . . . [W]e, on the basis of a bare printed
record and with no opportunity to hear and observe the applicant, are in no such position as the State Bar
Committee was to determine whether in fact the applicant was sincere and has a good moral character.
Even were we not so disadvantaged, to make such a determination is not our function in reviewing state
judgments under the Constitution. Moreover, resolution of this factual question is wholly irrelevant to
the case before us, since it seems to me altogether beyond question that a State may refuse admission to
its Bar to an applicant, no matter how sincere, who refuses to answer questions which are reasonably
relevant to his qualifications and which do not invade a constitutionally privileged area. The opinion of
the Court does not really question this; it solves the problem by denying that it exists. But what the Court
has really done, I think, is simply to impose on California its own notions of public policy and judgment.
For me, today’s decision represents an unacceptable intrusion into a matter of state concern.”).
206

3 - GEORGEKOPOULOS (ONLINE VERSION) (DO NOT DELETE)

2021]

8/17/2021 6:13 PM

The Supreme Court’s Un-Americanism Pendulum

311

Unlike the individual judgment that California gave to its applicant,
New Mexico was more absolute to a similarly placed applicant in
Schware.209 The same majority in an opinion again written by Black found
that the evidence of membership in the Communist Party fifteen years
before could not support the finding that the applicant did not have a good
moral character. Frankfurter’s concurrence, joined by Clark and Harlan,
envisioned a more limited role for the Supreme Court in intervening on the
states’ determination of eligibility for the bar.210 However, in absence of an
individualized weighing of this applicant’s past, this applicant’s due process
rights were violated.211
Two weeks later came a little-noticed per curiam opinion, Sentner.212
The Court followed its recent precedent of Witcovich,213 but Burton and
Clark dissented, finding that the Court was expanding Witcovich in a way
that hampered the deportation of subversives. Because Witcovich does not
necessarily involve un-Americanism nor mentions it, Witcovich is not
included in the primary un-Americanism opinions, but Sentner is.
On June 3rd, 1957, the Court again sided with the individual in
Jencks.214 The president of a labor union had been convicted of filing a false
affidavit of non-membership in the Communist Party. FBI informants
testified at trial but their written reports were not made available to the
defense for possible impeachment. The Court’s plurality opinion of four
justices by Brennan (Whittaker did not participate) held this violative of due
process. Clark’s lone dissent bristles at the idea that confidential FBI reports
had to be made available to the defense, when even the defense did not
ask.215 The concurrence of Burton with Harlan also took the position that
Schware v. Bd. of Bar Exam’rs of N.M., 353 U.S. 232 (1957).
Id. at 249 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (“We cannot fail to accord such confidence to the state
process, and we must attribute to its courts the exercise of a fair and not a biased judgment in passing
upon the applications of those seeking entry into the profession.”).
211
Id. at 251 (“This brings me to the inference that the court drew from petitioner’s early, pre1940 affiliations. To hold, as the court did, that Communist affiliation for six to seven years up to 1940,
fifteen years prior to the court’s assessment of it, in and of itself made the petitioner ‘a person of
questionable character’ is so dogmatic an inference as to be wholly unwarranted. History
overwhelmingly establishes that many youths like the petitioner were drawn by the mirage of
communism during the depression era, only to have their eyes later opened to reality. Such experiences
no doubt may disclose a woolly mind or naive notions regarding the problems of society. But facts of
history that we would be arbitrary in rejecting bar the presumption, let alone an irrebuttable presumption,
that response to foolish, baseless hopes regarding the betterment of society made those who had
entertained them but who later undoubtedly came to their senses and their sense of responsibility
‘questionable characters.’ Since the Supreme Court of New Mexico as a matter of law took a contrary
view of such a situation in denying petitioner’s application, it denied him due process of law.”).
212
Barton v. Sentner, 353 U.S. 963 (1957).
213
United States v. Wittcovich, 353 U.S. 194 (1957).
214
Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657 (1957).
215
Id. at 681–82 (Clark, J., dissenting) (“Unless the Congress changes the rule announced by the
Court today, those intelligence agencies of our Government engaged in law enforcement may as well
209

210
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the main opinion went too far in requiring access to the reports by the
defense. Jencks was one of the Court’s liberal holdings that Congress sought
to reverse and the only one where Congress was successful.216
Next, the Court would issue four exonerating opinions on the same day,
June 17, 1957. The anti-Communist press called it “Red Monday.”217
A New Hampshire un-Americanism prosecution arose in Sweezy.218
The Court failed to produce a majority coalition and resolved the dispute by
plurality. Chief Justice Warren’s opinion, joined by Black, Douglas, and
Brennan, held paramount the academic freedom and the freedom of
association of the college professor who refused to answer questions and
found inappropriate the delegation of legislative power to the Attorney
General of NH. The concurrence of Frankfurter, joined by Harlan, balanced
the investigative interests of the legislature against academic freedom and
found in favor of academic freedom in those circumstances.219 Clark
dissented, joined by Burton. The dissenters, as did Frankfurter, did not think
the Supreme Court could intervene in how a state legislature chose to
delegate its power and considered that the Court’s decision prevented New
Hampshire from enforcing its own laws.220 Again, Whittaker did not
participate.
The second opinion of the same day was Watkins.221 In Watkins the
refusal to answer questions was directed to a subcommittee of the federal
House Un-American Activities Committee. The witness answered questions
about his own activities and about current members of the Communist Party
but refused to identify persons who, the witness believed, were no longer

close up shop, for the Court has opened their files to the criminal and thus afforded him a Roman holiday
for rummaging through confidential information as well as vital national secrets.”).
216
See infra note 232 and accompanying text; ROBERT M. LICHTMAN, THE SUPREME COURT
AND MCCARTHY ERA REPRESSION 105–08, 107, n.75 (2012); 103 Cong. Rec. 10984-85; Pub. L. 85–
269, 71 Stat. 595 (Sept. 2, 1957); 18 U.S.C. § 3500.
217
Elizabeth J. Elias, Red Monday and Its Aftermath: The Supreme Court’s Flip-Flop on
Communism in the Late 1950s, 43 HOFSTRA L. REV. 207, 209–210 (2014); “Red Monday”: Supreme
Court Limits Anti-Communist Measures, TODAY IN CIVIL LIBERTIES HISTORY,
https://todayinclh.com/?event=red-monday-supreme-court-limits-anti-communist-measures [perma.cc/
E667-DT8J] (last visited Oct. 5, 2019).
218
Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957).
219
Id. at 261 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (“When weighed against the grave harm resulting from
governmental intrusion into the intellectual life of a university, such justification for compelling a
witness to discuss the contents of his lecture appears grossly inadequate. Particularly is this so where the
witness has sworn that neither in the lecture nor at any other time did he ever advocate overthrowing the
Government by force and violence.”).
220
Id. at 269 (Clark, J., dissenting) (“The short of it is that the Court blocks New Hampshire’s
effort to enforce its law. I had thought that in Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Nelson we had left open
for legitimate state control any subversive activity leveled against the interest of the State.”) (internal
citations omitted).
221
Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178 (1957). Justices Burton and Whittaker did not
participate.
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associated with the Communist Party. His refusal to answer led to his
conviction for contempt of Congress. The opinion by Chief Justice Warren
discussed the English tradition of the unlimited supremacy of the
parliament, contrasted it to the domestic variation of subjecting the
legislature to the courts, and stressed the precedent recognizing the privilege
against self-incrimination. The opinion turned to the difficulties of first
amendment limits on congressional power and ended by finding the
questions about association that far back in time outside the powers of the
subcommittee and reversed. Frankfurter’s concurrence clarified that
acquiescence of Congress to the committee’s exceeding its authority did not
expand the committee’s authority. Clark dissented with a broad attack on
the majority’s reasoning, arguing that the scope and exercise of the
committee’s powers were reasonable.
Third was the termination of a foreign service employee pursuant to a
loyalty review, Service.222 The employee had been accused of a leak, but the
grand jury refused to indict him, and the employee had subsequently
overcome several loyalty investigations until, in December 1951, upon a sua
sponte appeal, the Loyalty Review Board expressed reasonable doubt about
his loyalty and, without independent review by his ultimate superior, the
Secretary of State, his employment was terminated. The Court, without
Clark’s participation, in an opinion by Harlan, unanimously held the
dismissal wrongful, referring to Peters.223
The fourth and last Red Monday opinion may have been the most
striking, Yates I.224 Fourteen organizers of the Communist Party in
California had been convicted in a jury trial of violating the Smith Act,
conspiring (1) to advocate and teach the duty and necessity of
overthrowing the Government of the United States by force
and violence, and (2) to organize, as the Communist Party of
the United States, a society of persons who so advocate and
teach, all with the intent of causing the overthrow of the
Government by force and violence as speedily as
circumstances would permit.225
Brennan and Whittaker did not participate in the decision. Harlan wrote
for the Court, acquitting five of the defendants and ordering the retrial of
nine on the basis of a narrow reading of the statute’s term “organizing”226
222

Service v. Dulles, 354 U.S. 363, 365 (1957).
See supra text accompanying note 177.
224
Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957).
225
Id. at 300.
226
Id. at 308 (“While it is understandable that Congress should have wished to supplement the
general provisions of the Smith Act by a special provision directed at the activities of those responsible
for creating a new organization of the proscribed type, such as was the situation involved in the Dennis
case, we find nothing which suggests that the ‘organizing’ provision was intended to reach beyond this,
223
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and on the necessity that the jury instructions include incitement.227 Burton’s
concurrence disagreed with the Court’s treatment of “organizing.” Black
concurred in part, joined by Douglas, arguing that all defendants should
have been acquitted and the Court’s interpretation allowed the Smith Act to
trump freedom of speech,228 closing with a flourish for free speech.229 Clark
dissented alone, arguing against the positions that the majority took.230
These four opinions—Sweezy, Watkins, Service, and Yates I—represent the high-water mark of opposition to un-Americanism prosecutions by
the Supreme Court during this Red Scare era. Even after 1962, the PostFrankfurter Era, when individuals win all the cases, the Court is more split
than this.
C. Backlash: Anti-Jencks Legislation and the Jenner Bill
Congress was strongly opposed to the Court’s refusal to have the fear
of Communism trump the Bill of Rights. Southern legislators had the
additional and pernicious reason to oppose the Court because of its efforts
at racial integration.231 When the FBI joined the anti-Court chorus by stating
that Jencks would lead it to not prosecute (rather than having its confidential
sources revealed per Jencks), the reaction was swift. Within just short of one
month, both houses of Congress had passed legislation (the House by 351–

that is, to embrace the activities of those concerned with carrying on the affairs of an already existing
organization. Such activities were already amply covered by other provisions of the Act. . . . ”).
227
Id. at 321–22 (“The essence of the Dennis holding was that indoctrination of a group in
preparation for future violent action, as well as exhortation to immediate action, by advocacy found to
be directed to ‘action for the accomplishment’ of forcible overthrow, to violence as ‘a rule or principle
of action,’ and employing ‘language of incitement,’ is not constitutionally protected when the group is
of sufficient size and cohesiveness, is sufficiently oriented towards action, and other circumstances are
such as reasonably to justify apprehension that action will occur. This is quite a different thing from the
view of the District Court here that mere doctrinal justification of forcible overthrow, if engaged in with
the intent to accomplish overthrow, is punishable per se under the Smith Act. That sort of advocacy,
even though uttered with the hope that it may ultimately lead to violent revolution, is too remote from
concrete action to be regarded as the kind of indoctrination preparatory to action which was condemned
in Dennis.”) (internal citations omitted).
228
Id. at 340 (Black, J., dissenting) (“Under the Court’s approach, defendants could still be
convicted simply for agreeing to talk as distinguished from agreeing to act. I believe that the First
Amendment forbids Congress to punish people for talking about public affairs, whether or not such
discussion incites to action, legal or illegal.”).
229
Id. at 344 (“The First Amendment provides the only kind of security system that can preserve
a free government—one that leaves the way wide open for people to favor, discuss, advocate, or incite
causes and doctrines however obnoxious and antagonistic such views may be to the rest of us.”).
230
Id. at 346 (Clark, J., dissenting) (“I agree with the Court of Appeals, the District Court, and
the jury that the evidence showed guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. It paralleled that in Dennis and Flynn
and was equally as strong. In any event, this Court should not acquit anyone here.”) (citations omitted).
231
The Court had already started issuing desegregation opinions. Generally speaking, ROBERT
M. LICHTMAN, THE SUPREME COURT AND MCCARTHY ERA REPRESSION 105–08, 122–26 (2012),
provides an extremely detailed discussion of the cases and the legislative reaction.
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17) restricting the disclosure of confidential information. President
Eisenhower signed it into law on September 2, 1957.232
The reaction of Congress to other opinions did not have similar
Administration support but was almost as strong. Even from the prior year,
Nelson’s overruling of state prosecutions due to federal preemption led to
an anti-preemption bill, H.R. 3. The overruling of a public employee’s firing
in Cole,233 led both houses to pass legislation facilitating terminations for
subversion.234 The strongest reaction came in the form of the Jenner Bill,
which would remove jurisdiction from the Court over five anti-Communism
matters.235 Legislation was also proposed to restore an easy-to-meet
definition of “organizing” (reversing Yates236) and facilitating the withholding of passports.237
In contrast to the swift passage of the anti-Jencks legislation, the other
bills were delayed for a year and watered down. Still, they passed the House
by overwhelmingly wide margins.238 Some were also poised to pass the
Senate—a motion to table the anti-Nelson H.R. 3 failed 46–39.239 Lastminute, masterful maneuvering and persuading by Lyndon B. Johnson as
Senate Majority Leader in August 1958 prevented its passage by one vote.
The others stalled in different parliamentary twists. The 1958 election
produced a more liberal Senate that did not resurrect them.240
The Court was not at all oblivious to the legislative reaction.
Frankfurter, who was particularly mindful of the Court’s authority,
expressed his concern to Brennan in a letter.241 Indeed, others have argued
that the reaction to Red Monday induced the Court, and especially

232

Id. at 107 n.75; 103 CONG. REC. 10984-85 (1957); Act of Sept. 2, 1957, Pub. L. 85-269, 71
Stat. 595 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3500).
233
See supra note 296 and accompanying text.
234
See LICHTMAN, supra note 231, at 107 n.80.
235
The Jenner Bill, S. 2646, 85th Cong. (1957), would strip the Court of jurisdiction over
litigation stemming from (1) Congressional investigations and contempt; (2) terminations from
governmental employment; (3) state subversive activity prosecutions; (4) terminations and disciplining
of teachers; and (5) bar admissions. See also Jenner Attacks Court, N. Y. TIMES, July 29, 1957, at 6
(reporting Jenner’s comments and submission of bill on July 26).
236
See supra text accompanying note 224 (discussing Yates).
237
See LICHTMAN, supra note 231, at 125 n.80.
238
The anti-Nelson H.R. 3 received a 241–155 vote. The one reversing Cole v. Young received
298–46. The one reversing Yates did not even get a roll-call vote, as did not the passport-withholding
bill. See id. at 123–24.
239
See id. at 124.
240
See id. at 127; see also Mid- Term Revolution, supra note 56.
241
Frankfurter rued to Brennan, who authored Jencks, that Frankfurter should have written a
concurrence demonstrating how narrow the holding was, as he had done in Watkins and Sweezy. See
LICHTMAN, supra note 231, at 107 (quoting an Aug. 29, 1957, letter from the Brennan papers, Box I:3,
Jencks file 3 of 3).
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Frankfurter, to a more conservative stance.242 Whereas Frankfurter does
seem to have changed, he was not alone. Burton, Clark, Whittaker, and
Harlan also changed.243 Warren, Black, Douglas, and Brennan would
continue to insist on the primacy of the Bill of Rights but they would often
be in the minority.
Wilson v. Loew’s, Inc.244 is atypical in being about civil liability (and,
therefore, not included in the primary cases about un-Americanism). The
Court favored un-Americanism prosecutions. Wilson sprung from motion
picture artists—writers, actors, and others—invoking their privilege against
self-incrimination or refusing to appear before the House Un-American
Activities Committee. Producers and distributors agreed not to employ
them. Twenty-three artists sought damages and an injunction against this
“blacklisting” in the California courts. Their complaint was dismissed, the
dismissal was affirmed on appeal, and the United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari. However, after the Court heard argument, the Court
dismissed the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted without an
opinion, with a single sentence explaining that “the judgment rest[ed] on an
adequate state ground.” Douglas dissented alone.245
The Court still resisted the government in a deportation habeas corpus
setting in Rowoldt.246 Frankfurter wrote for a 5–4 Court allowing the alien
to remain but on essentially the same facts as Galvan.247 Harlan’s dissent
found Galvan indistinguishable.
In a per curiam opinion, over Clark’s dissent, the Court favored
individual soldiers who received less than honorable discharges in
Harmon.248 The Court held that the Secretary of the Army exceeded his
statutory authority when he took into account activities of the soldiers before
their induction into the army. Clark’s dissent argued that just as civilians
employed by the government received employment decisions for conduct
before their employment, so could soldiers.
242
Elizabeth J. Elias, Red Monday and Its Aftermath: The Supreme Court’s Flip-Flop on
Communism in Late 1950s, 43 HOFSTRA L. REV. 207, 227 (2014) (“Justice Frankfurter’s desertion of
the position taken by the Supreme Court’s liberal Justices was the main reason for the Court’s ‘flip-flop’
from Red Monday to Barenblatt and Uphaus. An advocate of judicial restraint, Justice Frankfurter reined
in the expansion of civil liberties protections, and showed deference to the power of Congress in order
to dodge legislation introduced by anti-Communist legislators that would have stripped the Court of its
appellate jurisdiction.”).
243
See Table 1 supra and accompanying text.
244
See generally Wilson v. Loew’s, Inc., 355 U.S. 597 (1958).
245
Id. at 599 (“I can see no difference where the ‘right to work’ is denied because of race and
where, as here, because the citizen has exercised Fifth Amendment rights. To draw such a line is to
discriminate against the assertion of a particular federal constitutional right. That a State may not do
consistently with the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”).
246
See generally Rowoldt v. Perfetto, 355 U.S. 115 (1957).
247
See supra note 166 and accompanying text.
248
See generally Harmon v. Brucker, 355 U.S. 579 (1958).

3 - GEORGEKOPOULOS (ONLINE VERSION) (DO NOT DELETE)

2021]

8/17/2021 6:13 PM

The Supreme Court’s Un-Americanism Pendulum

317

The Court’s new severity against un-Americanism defendants before
the appointment of Stewart was revealed in Brown-1958249 and Green,250
each decided 5–4 on March 31, 1958.
In a denaturalization proceeding, the defendant chose to testify in
Brown-1958. After she had testified on direct examination that she had not
been a member of the Communist Party, she invoked the privilege against
self-incrimination against similar questions on cross-examination. The trial
court required the defendant to answer as a consequence of the defendant’s
position in direct examination. The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction
5–4 with two dissenting opinions, Black’s, joined by Warren and Douglas,
and Brennan’s. Black saw the Court improperly extending to a civil
proceeding a rule that applies to a criminal one. Brennan agreed and also
considered the punishment excessive.
In Green, two of the convicted defendants of Dennis failed to appear
for their incarceration for four and a half years. The district court imposed a
contempt conviction of three years, which the Supreme Court upheld.
Warren, Black, Douglas, and Brennan dissented.
Whereas Wilson, Brown-1958, and Green had the Court support unAmericanism prosecutions, the criminal contempt conviction of defendants
of Yates I gave rise to Yates II.251 The Court by a 6–3 majority reduced their
sentence to time served. Clark, with Burton and Whittaker, dissented.
On May 19, 1958, the Court issued a per curiam opinion on a certiorari
petition, without oral argument, Sacher II.252 The Court split 6–2 against an
un-Americanism prosecution that drew a concurrence and a dissent. The
defendant, a lawyer for defendants associated with the Communist Party,
did not answer questions of a Senate subcommittee. The Court reversed and
instructed the dismissal of the charges because the questions were not
pertinent to the subcommittee’s inquiry. Clark with Whittaker dissented,
arguing that the questions were pertinent and the Court should hear oral
argument, especially in view of the defendant’s legal sophistication.253
Harlan’s concurrence pointed out that pertinency turned on the record and
was vague as evinced from the various interpretations received: oral
argument would be pointless.254 Burton did not participate.
249

See generally Brown v. United States, 356 U.S. 148 (1958).
See generally Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165 (1958).
251
See generally Yates v. United States, 356 U.S. 363 (1958).
252
See generally Sacher v. United States, 356 U.S. 576 (1958).
253
Id. at 580 (Clark, J., dissenting) (“Petitioner is a seasoned lawyer with trial experience. Both
questions and answers may go afield in the examination of a witness—a truism to every trial
practitioner—but that fact cannot license a witness’[s] refusal to answer questions which are relevant.”).
254
Id. at 578 (Harlan, J., concurring) (“For my part, it is abundantly evident that the pertinency
of none of the three questions involved can be regarded as undisputably clear, as indeed is evidenced by
the different interpretations of the record advanced by the members of this Court and of the Court of
Appeals who have considered this issue.”).
250
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Still in 1958, the Court resisted un-Americanism prosecutions in
Nowak, Bonetti, Kent, Dayton, and Speiser and their companion cases.
Denaturalization due to Communist Party membership was the issue in
Nowak (and a sister case, Maisenberg).255 Harlan wrote for a 6–3 Court
reversing the lower courts’ denaturalizations. The allegedly fraudulent
answers were to a question whether the applicants were members of an
organization that believed in anarchy or the violent overthrow of the
government. Their denial, while being members of the Communist Party
and while the government’s burden in the denaturalization setting was very
high, was seen by the majority as potentially innocent.256 Burton with Clark
and Whittaker dissented, finding the question proper.
The Court reversed the deportation of an alien 6–3 in Bonetti.257 The
alien had entered the United States in 1923, was a member of the
Communist Party from 1932 to 1936 and went to fight in the Spanish Civil
War in 1937. In 1938, he returned as a quota immigrant. In 1951, the United
States sought to deport him for past communist affiliation. Whittaker wrote
for the majority that the date of the alien’s admission was 1938. Because the
alien had not been a member of the Communist Party since then, he was not
deportable. Clark’s dissent, with Frankfurter and Harlan, found the holding
contrary to precedent.
In Kent the Court would split 5–4 for individuals who had been denied
passports due to communist sympathies and who intended to travel to communist conferences.258 Clark dissented with Burton, Harlan, and
Whittaker.259 Douglas wrote for the majority that included Warren, Black,
Brennan, and Frankfurter, finding an implied freedom to travel, which could
only be restricted expressly in times of peace.260 This would be one of the
255

See generally Nowak v. United States, 356 U.S. 660 (1958). With the same reasoning, the
court also disposed of Maisenberg v. United States, 356 U.S. 670 (1958).
256
Nowak, 356 U.S. at 664 (“We think that Nowak could reasonably have interpreted Question
28 as a two-pronged inquiry relating simply to anarchy. Its first part refers solely to anarchy. Its second
part, which is in direct series with the first, begins with ‘anarchy,’ and then refers to ‘overthrow.’ It is
true that the two terms are used in the disjunctive, but, having regard to the maxim ejusdem generis, we
do not think that the Government’s burden can be satisfied simply by parsing the second sentence of the
question according to strict rules of syntax. For the two references to ‘anarchy’ make it not implausible
to read the question in its totality as inquiring solely about anarchy.”).
257
See generally Bonetti v. Rogers, 356 U.S. 691 (1958).
258
See generally Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958).
259
Id. at 143 (Clark, J., dissenting) (“[W]hile distinguishing away the Secretary’s passport
denials in wartime, the majority makes no attempt to distinguish the Secretary’s practice during periods
when there has been no official state of war but when nevertheless a presidential proclamation of national
emergency has been in effect, the very situation which has prevailed since the end of World War II.
Throughout that time, as I have pointed out, the Secretary refused passports to those ‘whose purpose in
traveling abroad was believed to be to subvert the interest of the United States.’”).
260
Id. at 129 (majority opinion) (“[T]he right of exit [from the country] is a personal right
included within the word ‘liberty’ as used in the Fifth Amendment. If that ‘liberty’ is to be regulated, it
must be pursuant to the lawmaking functions of the Congress . . . Where activities or enjoyment, natural
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Court’s holdings that Congress would seek to undo in the coming legislative
backlash.
The issue was similar in Dayton.261 A physicist was refused a passport
despite disclaiming any communist sympathies or affiliations. According to
the Secretary of State, Dulles, he had connections to the Rosenberg
espionage ring and his contrary testimony was not credible. Dulles also took
the position that the physicist’s proposed work at a research institute in India
with a physicist who had renounced his US citizenship would be disadvantageous to the United States. The Supreme Court followed Kent with the
same 5–4 vote. As a footnote with the benefit of hindsight, India did not
develop its nuclear weapon capacity until much later, the late seventies.262
Speiser v. Randall263 and its companion, First Unitarian,264 were,
unusually, about taxation. Both disputes turned on California’s conditioning
tax exemptions on loyalty oaths. In Speiser:
[t]he appellants [we]re honorably discharged veterans of
World War II who claimed [a] veterans’ property-tax
exemption provided by . . . the California Constitution. . . .
The form [which the applicants had to file annually] was
revised in 1954 to add an oath by the applicant: ‘I do not
advocate the overthrow of the Government of the United States
or of the State of California by force or violence or other
unlawful means, nor advocate the support of a foreign
Government against the United States in event of hostilities.’
Each refused to subscribe the oath and struck it from the form
which he executed and filed for the tax year 1954–1955. Each
contended that the exaction of the oath as a condition of
obtaining a tax exemption was forbidden by the Federal
Constitution.265
The United States Supreme Court sided with the taxpayers with Clark
dissenting. Warren did not participate. Douglas with Black wrote an
additional concurrence in First Unitarian underscoring its religious belief
denying the state the power to compel any oath about belief. Clark’s dissent

and often necessary to the well-being of an American citizen, such as travel, are involved, we will
construe narrowly all delegated powers that curtail or dilute them.”) (citations omitted).
261
Dayton v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 144, 145 (1958).
262
See generally The Spread of Nuclear Weapons, ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA (2019),
https://www.britannica.com/technology/nuclear-weapon/The-spread-of-nuclear-weapons
[perma.cc/UR26-HWSF] (moreover, India’s advances in the 1950s and 1960s primarily took advantage
of Eisenhower’s Atoms for Peace program).
263
Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 514 (1958).
264
First Unitarian Church of L.A. v. Cnty. of L.A., 357 U.S. 545, 546 (1958).
265
Speiser, 357 U.S. at 514–15.
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pointed out the lower courts found no such tenet and that, even if held, it
would not be religious in nature.
The Court would support firing state and local employees for not
answering un-Americanism questions in Beilan and Lerner.266 Pennsylvania
had a provision about teacher competency in its Public School Code and one
about loyalty of its employees in the Pennsylvania Loyalty Act. Beilan, who
had been a teacher for 22 years, refused to answer questions in 1952 about
being active in a communist association in 1944 and was discharged. A 5–
4 majority sided with the Pennsylvania authorities.267 Frankfurter concurred
while hedging that the Fourteenth Amendment did not require a review of
the wisdom of state decisions.268 Warren, Black, Douglas, and Brennan
dissented. Lerner, with same votes and opinions, was about a New York
City rule and a subway conductor who was fired for refusing to answer
questions.
When Eisenhower appointed Stewart in 1958 to replace Burton, the
Court’s majority became Republican appointed. Upon the appointment of
White in April 1962, the majority would again become Democrat appointed.
Upon the appointment of Blackmun in June 1970, the majority would revert
to Republican appointed and remain so to the date of this writing. Warren,
Black, Douglas, and Brennan, continued to be the persistent dissenters. The
impact of Stewart’s appointment, however, was not central to the change in
the outcomes.269
Indeed, the first opinion of the Stewart composition, Vitarelli,270
favored the individual. An educator holding a doctor’s degree from
Columbia University, who was appointed in 1952 by the Department of the
Interior as an Education and Training Specialist the Trust Territory of the
Pacific Islands, was dismissed for sympathetic association with individuals
with sympathetic association with the Communist Party—a two-step link.
Since he was not in a sensitive position, Cole precluded this dismissal.271
The Secretary of Education, however, sent a second dismissal notice with
no explanation. The 5–4 majority by Harlan, with Black, Douglas, Brennan,
266

Beilan v. Bd. of Pub. Educ. of Phila., 357 U.S. 399, 400 (1958). The Court with the same
reasoning also disposed of Lerner v. Casey, 357 U.S. 468, 470 (1958), involving the dismissal of a New
York subway conductor under similar circumstances.
267
Beilan, 357 U.S. at 408 (“[T]he Pennsylvania Supreme Court has held that ‘incompetency’
includes petitioner’s ‘deliberate and insubordinate refusal to answer the questions of his administrative
superior in a vitally important matter pertaining to his fitness.’ 386 Pa. at page 91, 125 A.2d at page 331.
This interpretation is not inconsistent with the Federal Constitution.”).
268
Id. at 411 (“I am not charged with administering . . . the school system of Pennsylvania. The
Fourteenth Amendment does not check foolishness or unwisdom in such administration. The good sense
and right standards of public administration in those States must be relied upon for that, and ultimately
the electorate.”).
269
See supra text accompanying notes 44–47.
270
Vitarelli v. Seaton, 359 U.S. 535, 536 (1959).
271
See supra note 196 and accompanying text.
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and Warren, reinstated Vitarelli, treating the second dismissal as a repackaging of the first, illegal one. Frankfurter wrote, joined by Clark, Whittaker,
and Stewart, that the second dismissal was proper. To Frankfurter, the
majority’s disregard of the second notice “attributes to governmental action
the empty meaning of confetti throwing.”272
After nodding in the direction of the individual in Vitarelli, the Stewart
composition starts reversing the precedent of the idealist period that
preceded it. The Court used Barenblatt273 to revise its interpretation of
Watkins,274 as it would revise its treatment of Nelson and Sweezy in
Uphaus.275 Whereas Watkins excused refusing to testify before the House
Un-American Activities Committee, Barenblatt upheld a conviction for
refusing to testify despite that it was related to higher education.276
Academic freedom retreated before the fear of communist activities. Black
dissented, joined by Warren and Douglas, on the primacy of free association
and the prohibition of any bill of attainder. Brennan’s dissent attacked
exposure for exposure’s sake.
The New Hampshire issues of Sweezey277 return in Uphaus v.
Wyman.278 The plurality of Sweezy considered that academic freedom
allowed a college professor not to answer the loyalty questions of the
attorney general, acting as a legislative committee. The plurality also
considered inappropriate the delegation to the attorney general of powers of
the legislature. However, the concurrence and the dissent disagreed and
deferred to the state’s legislature. The target of the probe in Uphaus resisted
a subpoena by relying on Nelson’s holding279 to argue that the federal Smith
Act superseded similar efforts by the state of New Hampshire and that the
subpoenas violated free association. Justice Clark wrote for the new
composition of the Court pointing out that, contrary to Sweezy, no issue of
academic freedom arose. The majority interpreted Nelson narrowly,

272

Vitarelli, 359 U.S. at 549 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
Barenblatt v. United States, 354 U.S. 930, 931 (1959).
274
See supra note 221 and accompanying text.
275
See infra note 278 and accompanying text.
276
Near the end of the Jackson Era, academic freedom had been on the winning side in
Updegraff. See supra note 139 and accompanying text (invalidating the imposition of loyalty oaths on
university professors).
277
See supra note 218 and accompanying text.
278
Uphaus v. Wyman, 360 U.S. 72, 73 (1959).
279
See supra notes 183–184 and accompanying text.
273
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vindicating state prosecutions.280 Rather, Clark stressed that New
Hampshire had valid grounds for its investigation of disloyalty.281
Uphaus joined Barenblatt, decided on the same day, to show the
Court’s pivot on un-Americanism. Brennan authored the strongly worded
and long dissent, joined by Warren, Black, and Douglas. Brennan saw the
investigation as motivated merely by a desire to expose.282 Black and
Douglas underlined the primacy of free association and that the laws against
subversives are prohibited bills of attainder.
In Raley,283 the Court split evenly with Stewart not participating. At
issue were the contempt convictions of four defendants who invoked the
privilege against self-incrimination before an Ohio legislative committee
charged with investigating un-American activities. The Court had
previously summarily vacated their convictions and remanded for the state
courts to follow Sweezy and Watkins. This time, the Court reversed the
conviction of three who had invoked the privilege against self-incrimination
only to substantive questions but, by an equally divided Court, affirmed the
conviction of the fourth, who invoked the privilege in refusing to state his
home address. The Court was still allowing the refusal to answer questions
but in a more limited way even when Stewart was not participating.

Uphaus, 360 U.S. at 76 (“All [Nelson] proscribed was a race between federal and state
prosecutors to the courthouse door. The opinion made clear that a State could proceed with prosecutions
for sedition against the State itself; that it can legitimately investigate in this area follows a fortiori.”).
281
Uphaus, 360 U.S. at 79 (“Certainly the investigatory power of the State need not be
constricted until sufficient evidence of subversion is gathered to justify the institution of criminal
proceedings.”); id. at 79–80 (“The Attorney General sought to learn if subversive persons were in the
State because of the legislative determination that such persons, statutorily defined with a view toward
the Communist Party, posed a serious threat to the security of the State. The investigation was, therefore,
undertaken in the interest of self-preservation, ‘the ultimate value of any society,’” (citing Dennis v.
United States, 341 U.S. 494, 509 (1951))); id. at 81 (“And the governmental interest in self-preservation
is sufficiently compelling to subordinate the interest in associational privacy of persons who, at least to
the extent of the guest registration statute, made public at the inception the association they now wish to
keep private.”).
282
Uphaus, 360 U.S. at 82 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“The Court holds today that the
constitutionally protected rights of speech and assembly of appellant and those whom he may represent
are to be subordinated to New Hampshire’s legislative investigation because, as applied in the demands
made on him, the investigation is rationally connected with a discernible legislative purpose. With due
respect for my Brothers’ views, I do not agree that a showing of any requisite legislative purpose or other
state interest that constitutionally can subordinate appellant’s rights is to be found in this record.
Exposure purely for the sake of exposure is not such a valid subordinating purpose.”); id. at 105–06
(“The Attorney General had World Fellowship’s speaker list and had already made publication of it. . .
He had considerable other data about World Fellowship, Inc., which he had already published. What
reason has been demonstrated, in terms of a legislative inquiry, for going into the matter in further depth?
Outside of the fact that it might afford some further evidence as to the existence of ‘subversive persons’
within the State, which I have endeavored to show was not in itself a matter related to any legislative
function except self-contained investigation and exposure themselves, the relevance of further detail is
not demonstrated. But its damaging effect on the persons to be named in the guest list is obvious.”).
283
Raley v. Ohio 360 U.S. 423, 424 (1959).
280
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In Greene,284 the Court sided with a senior aeronautical engineer of a
defense contractor. The contractor was notified that it would lose its
government contracts because this senior manager would lose his security
clearance. The majority remanded with the reasoning that the process of the
removal of the security clearance was inadequate. Clark dissented, almost
mockingly.285
In In re Sawyer, the Court reviewed a one-year suspension of a defense
counsel in a Smith Act trial.286 Brennan wrote for a three-judge plurality that
the attorney’s free speech rights to criticize the state of the law and trial
practice defeated the prosecution. Black concurred. Frankfurter dissented
with Clark, Harlan, and Whittaker. Frankfurter argued that Brennan’s
interpretation of the violations was unreasonably narrow; the attorney
actually accused the judge of conducting an unfair trial, several rounds of
review had agreed, and the punishment was fair. Stewart, the swing vote on
un-Americanism issues at this time, agreed with Frankfurter that counsel’s
free speech rights are limited.287 However, Stewart concurred with Brennan
because the lawyer’s speech did not interfere with the conduct of the trial.
The Court returned to favoring the prosecution in Nelson v. County of
Los Angeles (“Nelson-LA”).288 Two employees of the county refused to
answer questions before a subcommittee of the House Un-American Activities Committee. One was a long-term employee and one a temporary
employee. Both were dismissed and their dismissal was sustained by the
California courts, including a 4–3 split over denial of review by the
California Supreme Court. The United States Supreme Court affirmed the
dismissal of the long-term employee by an equally divided Court, without
issuing an opinion (Warren did not participate). The dismissal of the temporary employee split the Court 5–3, with Black, Douglas, and Brennan
dissenting. Clark, who until 1957 often dissented alone, now wrote the

284

Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 475 (1959).
Id. at 511 (Clark, J., dissenting) (“Surely one does not have a constitutional right to have
access to the Government’s military secrets. But the Court says that because of the refusal to grant
Greene further access, he has lost his position as vice president and general manager, a chief executive
officer, of ERCO, whose business was devoted wholly to defense contracts with the United States, and
that his training in aeronautical engineering, together with the facts that ERCO engages solely in
government work and that the Government is the country’s largest airplane customer, has in some
unaccountable fashion parlayed his employment with ERCO into ‘a constitutional right.’ What for
anyone else would be considered a privilege at best has for Greene been enshrouded in constitutional
protection. This sleight of hand is too much for me.” (Omitted is a footnote where Clark answers Harlan’s
characterization in Harlan’s concurrence of Clark’s language as colorful)).
286
In Re Sawyer, 360 U.S. 622, 623 (1959).
287
Id. at 646–47 (Stewart, J., concurring) (“Obedience to ethical precepts may require abstention
from what in other circumstances might be constitutionally protected speech. For example, I doubt that
a physician who broadcast the confidential disclosures of his patients could rely on the constitutional
right of free speech to protect him from professional discipline.”).
288
Nelson v. Cnty. of L.A. (Nelson-LA), 362 U.S. 1 (1960).
285
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majority opinion and distinguished Slochower.289 There, the statute
penalized the privilege against self-incrimination, whereas this was a case
of mere insubordination.290 The dissent of Brennan argued the distinction
was nonexistent and Slochower should have been followed.291 Black’s
dissent stressed the primacy of the Bill of Rights.
Four more cases were decided in 1960.292 In the 5–4 per curiam
opinion of Niukkanen, the Court upheld a deportation for membership in the
Communist Party over a dissent by Douglas with Warren, Black, and
Brennan.293 Kimm v. Rosenberg294 was also a 5–4 per curiam opinion with
the same alignment. The issue was the deportation process of an alien. The
statute provided that discretion existed to allow the alien to self-deport only
if the alien could show his good moral character and show he was not a
communist. The alien refused to answer questions about his membership in
the Communist Party, invoking the privilege against self-incrimination. He
was considered to have failed to show his good moral character. Douglas’s
dissent against penalizing the use of a constitutional right was joined by
Warren and Black.295 Brennan’s dissent, joined by Warren and Douglas,
argued that the result of the statutory scheme in this instance became
improper. If the government sought to remove an alien because of
Communist Party membership, then the government would bear the burden
of that proof. Here, where the removal was for a different reason, it was

289

See supra note 190 and accompanying text.
Nelson-LA, 361 U.S. at 7 (“But the test here, rather than being the invocation of any
constitutional privilege, is the failure of the employee to answer. California has not predicated discharge
on any ‘built-in’ inference of guilt in its statute, but solely on employee insubordination for failure to
give information which we have held that the State has a legitimate interest in securing.”).
291
Id. at 16 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“[T]his Court did not reverse the judgment of New York’s
highest court because it had disrespected Slochower’s state tenure rights, but because it had sanctioned
administrative action taken expressly on an unconstitutionally arbitrary basis. So here California could
have summarily discharged Globe, and that would have been an end to the matter; without more
appearing, its action would be taken to rest on a permissible judgment by his superiors as to his fitness.
But if it chooses expressly to bottom his discharge on a basis—like that of an automatic, unparticularized
reaction to a plea of self-incrimination—which cannot by itself be sustained constitutionally, it cannot
escape its constitutional obligations . . . .”).
292
Not included for not focusing on subversive activities, is Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479
(1960). Unlike Adler, supra note 141 and accompanying text, where the state required teachers and
professors to list the subversive organizations to which they belonged, the state in Shelton required
teachers and professors to list all the organizations to which they belonged, paid dues or made gifts in
the last five years. A tightly split Court vindicated the teachers with an opinion by Stewart. Frankfurter,
Clark, Harlan, and Whittaker wrote two dissenting opinions.
293
Niukkanen v. McAlexander, 362 U.S. 390 (1960).
294
Kimm v. Rosenberg, 363 U.S. 405 (1960).
295
Id. at 411 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (“The Court in terms does not, and cannot, rest its decision
on the ground that by invoking the Fifth Amendment the petitioner gave evidence of bad moral character.
Yet the effect of its decision is precisely the same.”).
290
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improper that the burden shifted to the alien to prove that he was not a
communist.296
Continuing the favoring of the government, Flemming upholds the
termination of social security benefits of a deported alien for membership in
the Communist Party.297 The Court splits in the same 5–4 way, with Black,
Douglas, Warren, and Brennan dissenting.
McPhaul298 upholds a conviction. The secretary of an organization
designated as communist was subpoenaed to produce the organization’s
documents to the House Un-American Activities Committee and refused,
invoking the privilege against self-incrimination. Douglas’s dissent, joined
by Warren, Black, and Brennan, argues that a predicate for the conviction
should be a showing that the witness could produce the documents.299 The
majority had allowed the inference from the accused’s silence; if he did not
have access to the documents, he could have said so either to the committee
or at trial.300
The year 1960 closes with an upholding of a denaturalization in
Polites.301 However, the Court did not quite reverse Nowak and Maisenberg.302 Rather, the procedural posture was that the alien sought to use them
to void his waiver of his appeal. The Court, in an opinion by Stewart, did
not allow it. The usual dissenters, under Brennan’s authorship, would have
allowed the courts to effectuate Nowak and Maisenberg to prevent court
rulings from becoming “instruments of wrong.”303
In early 1961, in Travis, the Court would allow a question of venue to
reverse a Colorado conviction of a labor leader filing a false affidavit of not
being a communist.304 Harlan’s dissent, with Clark and Frankfurter, argued
that the government had a choice of venues; Colorado venue was approId. at 414 (“I would think it perfectly plain that such a regulation, as applied in this case,
would be contrary to the statutory scheme, properly and responsibly construed. In the first place, as I
have noted, it turns around the ordinary rules as to the burden of proof as to which party shall show
‘deportability.’ It requires the alien to prove a negative—that he never was a Communist since he entered
the country—when no one has said or intimated that he was.”) (footnotes omitted).
297
Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603 (1960).
298
McPhaul v. United States, 364 U.S. 372 (1960).
299
Id. at 387 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (“If Congress desires to have the judiciary adjudge a man
guilty for failure to produce documents, the prosecution should be required to prove that the man whom
we send to prison had the power to produce them.”).
300
Id. at 380 (majority opinion) (“Inasmuch as petitioner neither advised the Subcommittee that
he was unable to produce the records nor attempted to introduce any evidence at his contempt trial of his
inability to produce them, we hold that the trial court was justified in concluding and in charging the jury
that the records called for by the subpoena were in existence and under petitioner’s control at the time
of the subpoena was served upon him.”).
301
Polites v. United States, 364 U.S. 426 (1960).
302
See supra notes 255–256 and accompanying text.
303
Polites, 364 U.S. at 440.
304
Travis v. United States, 364 U.S. 631 (1961).
296
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priate despite that the crime was not completed until the affidavit reached
Washington, D.C.
The Court would return to a streak of decisions favoring the
government. Two opinions arrived on February 27, 1961. Both were about
convictions following refusals to answer questions of the House UnAmerican Activities Committee. Both affirmed the sentences 5–4. Both
were written by Stewart.
In Wilkinson305 the defense argued that the lower courts’ adherence to
Barenblatt was error, the Committee lacked power, the questions were not
pertinent to its legislative activity, and they violated Defendant’s right of
free association. Stewart’s majority opinion adhered to Barenblatt, finding
that the Committee’s power was appropriate, the questions pertinent, and
the danger that communist activities posed justified the incursion into the
Bill of Rights.306 Warren, Black, Douglas, and Brennan wrote three vocal
dissenting opinions.
The second opinion of the same day was Braden.307 The opinion
referred to Wilkinson, but the distinguishing feature of the facts of Braden
was that the defendant, Carl Braden, had been active in racial integration
efforts in the South, which in other instances overcame un-Americanism
concerns.308 The Court noted that his efforts and speech with respect to
integration activities were not an issue. Despite the legitimate nature of
those activities, before the House Un-American Activities Committee his
membership in the Communist Party justified his questioning and his
prosecution upon refusing to answer.309 Black and Douglas wrote two
dissenting opinions, joined by each other.
305

Wilkinson v. United States, 365 U.S. 399 (1961).
Id. at 414–15 (“As the Barenblatt opinion makes clear, it is the nature of the Communist
activity involved, whether the momentary conduct is legitimate or illegitimate politically, that establishes
the Government’s overbalancing interest. ‘To suggest that because the Communist Party may also
sponsor peaceable political reforms the constitutional issues before us should now be judged as if that
Party were just an ordinary political party from the standpoint of national security, is to ask this Court to
blind itself to world affairs which have determined the whole course of our national policy since the
close of World War II . . . .’ [Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 28–129 (1959)] . . . . The
subcommittee’s legitimate legislative interest was not the activity in which the petitioner might have
happened at the time to be engaged, but in the manipulation and infiltration of activities and
organizations by persons advocating overthrow of the Government. ‘The strict requirements of a
prosecution under the Smith Act . . . are not the measure of the permissible scope of a congressional
investigation into ‘overthrow,’ for of necessity the investigatory process must proceed step by step.’
[Barenblatt, 360 U.S. at 130.]”).
307
Braden v. United States, 365 U.S. 431 (1961).
308
See, e.g., infra note 316 and accompanying text (discussing Louisiana ex rel. Gremillion v.
NAACP, 366 U.S. 293 (1961); infra note 382 and accompanying text (discussing Dombrowski v. Pfister,
380 U.S. 479 (1965)).
309
Braden, 365 U.S. at 435 (“But Barenblatt did not confine congressional committee
investigation to overt criminal activity . . . . Rather, the decision upheld an investigation of Communist
activity in education. Education, too, is legitimate and protected activity. Communist infiltration and
propaganda in [the South], which were the subjects of the subcommittee investigation here, are surely
306
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On April 24, the Court would issue two more 5–4 opinions against
candidates for the bar who refused to answer questions about membership
in the Communist Party. Konigsberg II310 undid Konigsberg I.311 Harlan,
Clark, and Frankfurter had dissented, siding with the state originally. This
time they were joined by Stewart and Whittaker to make a majority against
the usual dissenters. The same majority also affirmed a denial of an Ohio
bar admission in In re Anastaplo.312
In essence, Wilkinson, Braden, Konigsberg II, and Anastaplo solidified
the message of Barenblatt and Uphaus. The treatment of un-Americanism
prosecutions had changed. Likely due to the legislative backlash of the
summer of 1957, the justices who occasionally favored un-Americanism
prosecutions became much firmer in that stance. Clark, who earlier would
often dissent alone in favor of the state, would now often be in the majority.
Warren, Black, Douglas, and Brennan did not change, but the Court moved
away from the primacy that these justices placed on the Bill of Rights and
toward a pragmatism of fear of Communism. Granted, these majorities did
not refer to Jackson’s dissent in Terminiello.313 Reading between the lines,
however, one can see a paraphrasing of Jackson’s warning:
This Court has gone far toward accepting the doctrine that
civil liberty means the [investigations of communist activity]
are impairments of the liberty of the citizen. . . . There is
danger that, if the Court does not temper its doctrinaire logic
with a little practical wisdom, it will convert the constitutional
Bill of Rights into a suicide pact.314
This majority accepted Jackson’s 1949 warning against a “doctrinaire”
idealism. The Bill of Rights retreated, allowing more investigations into
communist activity.
The new attitude in favor of un-Americanism prosecutions knew
exceptions. In Slagle v. Ohio,315 the defendants, who had refused to answer
questions of an Ohio Un-American Activities committee, argued that their
as much within its pervasive authority as Communist activity in educational institutions. The
subcommittee had reason to believe that the petitioner was a member of the Communist Party, and that
he had been actively engaged in propaganda efforts. It was making a legislative inquiry into Communist
Party propaganda activities in the southern States. Information as to the extent to which the Communist
Party was utilizing legitimate organizations and causes in its propaganda efforts in that region was surely
not constitutionally beyond the reach of the subcommittee’s inquiry.”).
310
Konigsberg v. State Bar of Cal., 366 U.S. 36 (1961).
311
See supra note 205 and accompanying text.
312
In re Anastaplo, 366 U.S. 82 (1961).
313
Terminiello v. City of Chi., 337 U.S. 1 (1949).
314
Id. at 37 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
315
Slagle v. Ohio, 366 U.S. 259 (1961). The absence of a dissent here, as in Noto, infra note 322
and accompanying text, can be considered an expression of a more pliant nature that conservatism
seemed to have on the Court until the mid-seventies.
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due process rights were violated because the committee did not expressly
reject their objections. The Court sided with the individuals, producing a
unanimous opinion against the prosecution. Frankfurter did not participate.
Un-Americanism prosecutions gave way to racial integration efforts in
Louisiana v. NAACP.316 Two Louisiana statutes created the issue. One
required all non-trading organizations to provide an annual affidavit that no
officer or member of their board or of any of their affiliates nationally was
a member of any subversive organization. The second required each
organization to submit annually a list of its members. NAACP’s listed
members had experienced “economic reprisals.”317 The Court, under
Douglas’s pen, unanimously sided with the NAACP.318
On June 5, 1961, the Court issued its three long-pending opinions on
the application of anti-communist legislation to the Communist Party and
some of its members.319 The Court split 5–4 in favor of the prosecution in
two, Scales320 and Communist Party II.321 In the third, Noto,322 the Court
unanimously sided with the defendant. A week later would come
Catherwood, and Deutch.323 In Catherwood, the Court sided unanimously
against a negative tax consequence imposed on the Communist Party. In
Deutch, Stewart would side with Warren, Black, Douglas, and Brennan and
produce a tightly split exoneration for an un-Americanism defendant.
Communist Party II resulted from the efforts of Congress to treat
organizations as subversive, while meeting the standard that the Court
established in Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath.324 The
Court had previously remanded the same dispute without reaching the
substance.325 The dispute was clearly important for the Court. It heard two
days of oral argument, and the opinion is a very detailed one, from the pen

316

Louisiana ex rel. Gremillion v. NAACP, 366 U.S. 293 (1961).
Id. at 296.
318
Id. at 297 (“At one extreme is criminal conduct which cannot have shelter in the First
Amendment. At the other extreme are regulatory measures which, no matter how sophisticated, cannot
be employed in purpose or in effect to stifle, penalize, or curb the exercise of First Amendment rights.
These lines mark the area in which the present controversy lies, as the District Court rightly observed.”).
319
The length of the pendency is apparent from a bail issue of Noto that arose in November 1955.
Noto v. United States, 76 S. Ct. 225, 255 (1955). The initial grant of certiorari in Scales v. United States
dated from March 1956. On February 5, 1960, the Court sets argument for October 10, 1960, with Clark
dissenting against the delay.
320
Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 203 (1961).
321
Communist Party of the United States v. Subversive Activities Ctrl. Bd. (Communist Party
II), 367 U.S. 1, 1 (1961).
322
Noto, 367 U.S. at 290.
323
Communist Party v. Catherwood, 367 U.S. 389, 389 (1961); Deutch v. United States, 367
U.S. 456, 456 (1961).
324
See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
325
See supra note 186 and accompanying text.
317
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of Frankfurter, spanning 111 pages in the U.S. Reporter. Including the four
dissents, the opinion occupies 198 pages.
The majority opinion disposes of some procedural objections and
several constitutional claims. The registration required of the Communist
Party was not a bill of attainder because the statute merely imposed a
registration obligation on entities engaged in the described type of
conduct.326 The registration, as a regulation of freedom of association and
speech, was justified by the danger of communism as an international
revolutionary movement.327
Warren’s dissent also covered a broad array of topics: The procedural
imperfections should have led to a remand. The statute should have been
held unconstitutional because it punished speech that did not incite action.328
Black’s dissent argued that the statute was unconstitutional as a bill of
attainder and antithetical to the freedoms that are central to the American
ideals and the efforts to spread them.329
Douglas accepted the dangers of communism and that the procedural
imperfections did not justify a remand. Nevertheless, he dissented because
registration was an impermissible interference with freedom of association
and because it constituted self-incrimination of the officers of the
Communist Party.330
Brennan’s dissent, joined by Warren, conceded that registration may
be appropriately demanded from the party but said the same registration
violated the privilege against self-incrimination of its officers.331

326
Communist Party II, 367 U.S. at 86 (“The Act is not a bill of attainder. It attaches not to
specified organizations but to described activities in which an organization may or may not engage.”).
327
Id. at 88–89 (“The Communist Party would have us hold that the First Amendment prohibits
Congress from requiring the registration and filing of information, including membership lists, by
organizations substantially dominated or controlled by the foreign powers controlling the world
Communist movement and which operate primarily to advance the objectives of that movement: the
overthrow of existing government by any means necessary and the establishment in its place of a
Communist totalitarian dictatorship. We cannot find such a prohibition in the First Amendment. So to
find would make a travesty of that Amendment and the great ends for the well-being of our democracy
that it serves.”) (citations omitted).
328
Id. at 132 (Warren, C.J., dissenting) (“[T]he Court should hold that the Board cannot require
a group to register as a Communist-action organization unless it first finds that the organization is
engaged in advocacy aimed at inciting action.”).
329
Id. at 148 (Black, J., dissenting) (“Now, when this country is trying to spread the high ideals
of democracy all over the world—ideals that are revolutionary in many countries—seems to be a
particularly inappropriate time to stifle First Amendment freedoms in this Country. The same arguments
that are used to justify the outlawry of Communist ideas here could be used to justify an outlawry of the
ideas of democracy in other countries.”).
330
Id. at 190 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Fifth Amendment bars Congress from requiring
full disclosure by one Act and by another Act making the facts admitted or disclosed under compulsion
the ingredients of a crime.”).
331
Id. at 201 (Brennan, J., dissenting in part) (“If the admission both of officership status and
knowledge of Party activities cannot be compelled in oral testimony in a criminal proceeding, I do not
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The juxtaposition of Scales332 and Noto333 shows where exactly this
majority placed the line for proper prosecutions against advocating the
overthrow of the government. The defendant in Scales played an active
organizing role in the party. The evidence showed training about specific
revolutionary tactics of attack and retreat,334 pledges to fight and kill,335 and
plans for arming the population and disarming it afterward to preserve the
victory of the revolution.336 The Court rejected the defense’s First Amendment arguments.337 Black’s and Douglas’s dissents stressed the First
Amendment. Brennan’s dissent, joined by Warren and Douglas, made a
statutory argument.
In Noto,338 the unanimous exoneration for membership in the
Communist Party turned on the distinction between advocacy of action to
overthrow the government compared to conspiring to organize future action
to then advocate overthrow. Witnesses testified that the defendant intended
to recruit and organize among labor in basic industries in order for the Party
to later be able to organize strikes that would paralyze the economy.
Harlan’s majority opinion considered this to be insufficient to find present
advocacy.339 Black’s concurrence bemoans the implicit message of the
see how compulsion in writing in a registration statement makes a difference for constitutional
purposes.”).
332
Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 203 (1961).
333
Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290, 290 (1961).
334
Scales, 367 U.S. at 242 (“‘In the ebbing we were to see that we ebb before the enemy wiped
everybody out. Ebbing to the central point that had been barricaded, reorganization, and then at the
correct time start flowing forward in the revolution.’”).
335
Id. at 243 (“[T]he students were required by the instructor to take a pledge: ‘The pledge was
each of us are Communists or members of the Party and each of us have a responsibility and we must
carry out our responsibility and work for the interests of the Party and its recipients and carry out the full
will of the Party even though it meant to fight and to kill, we must carry out the demands of the Party
and all of them.’”).
336
Id. at 240 (“‘Q. Do I understand, Mr. Moreau (sic) that during this period of revolution the
people, that is, the masses of the people, would be carrying guns? A. Yes, sir. ‘Q. And after the revolution
do I understand that the Party would go around and collect these guns and take them away from the
people? A. Yes, sir; take them away from those that helped them overthrow the capitalist system in order
to assure the revolution itself.’”).
337
Id. at 228–29 (“It was settled in Dennis that the advocacy with which we are here concerned
is not constitutionally protected speech, and it was further established that a combination to promote
such advocacy, albeit under the aegis of what purports to be a political party, is not such association as
is protected by the First Amendment. We can discern no reason why membership, when it constitutes a
purposeful form of complicity in a group engaging in this same forbidden advocacy, should receive any
greater degree of protection from the guarantees of that Amendment.”).
338
Noto, 367 U.S. at 290.
339
Id. at 298 (“The ‘industrial concentration’ program, as to which the witness Regan testified
in some detail, does indeed come closer to the kind of concrete and particular program on which a
criminal conviction in this sort of case must be based. But in examining that evidence it appears to us
that, in the context of this record, this too fails to establish that the Communist Party was an organization
which presently advocated violent overthrow of the Government now or in the future, for that is what
must be proven. The most that can be said is that the evidence as to that program might justify an
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majority that the government must redouble its domestic spying and would
rather stand on the First Amendment, as would Douglas.340
In Catherwood, the issue arose over the tax interpretation of a federal
statute stripping all benefits from the Communist Party.341 The argument
was that the Communist Party lost a tax benefit, raising one of the taxes that
it paid as an employer from 1 percent to 3 percent. The Court unanimously
restored the normal employer tax treatment.
With Deutch,342 the Court returned to the issue of refusing to answer
questions before Congress and sided with the individual. Stewart’s opinion
turns on the pertinency of the questions without subscribing to the primacy
of the Bill of Rights.343 Harlan’s dissent, joined by Frankfurter, would
consider that the pertinency issue had been answered adequately by the government. Whittaker’s dissent, joined by Clark, finds the questions “clearly
pertinent.”344
C&RW Union would let the Court favor the government once again,
albeit with the usual 5–4 split.345 The Naval Gun Factory’s cafeteria was
operated by a unionized business. The contract with the government
prohibited the employment of communists in this facility where highly
classified weapons were produced. An employee’s identification badge was
summarily seized by the commander of the facility for communist sympathies, prohibiting entry into the facility. The union and the employee tried
to rely on the inadequate process found for stripping security clearance in
inference that the leadership of the Party was preparing the way for a situation in which future acts of
sabotage might be facilitated, but there is no evidence that such acts of sabotage were presently
advocated; and it is present advocacy, and not an intent to advocate in the future or a conspiracy to
advocate in the future once a groundwork has been laid, which is an element of the crime under the
membership clause.”).
340
Id. at 302 (Black, J., concurring) (“I cannot join an opinion which implies that the existence
of liberty is dependent upon the efficiency of the Government’s informers. I prefer to rest my
concurrence in the judgment reversing petitioner's conviction on what I regard as the more solid ground
that the First Amendment forbids the Government to abridge the rights of freedom of speech, press[,]
and assembly.”) The unanimity of the Court in Noto, as in Slagle, supra note 315 and accompanying
text, may be an example of the pliant conservatism that appeared to be the practice of the conservative
wing of the Court before 1975.
341
Communist Party v. Catherwood, 367 U.S. 389, 390 (1961) (the provision at issue of the
Communist Control Act of 1954 read “The Communist Party of the United States, or any successors . . .,
whose object or purpose is to overthrow the Government . . . by force and violence, are not entitled to
any of the rights, privileges, and immunities attendant upon legal bodies created under the jurisdiction
of the laws of the United States.”).
342
Deutch v. United States, 367 U.S. 456, 456 (1961).
343
Id. at 470 (“Yet the questions which the petitioner was convicted of refusing to answer
obviously had nothing to do with the Albany area or with Communist infiltration into labor unions.”).
344
Id. at 475 (Whittaker, J., dissenting) (“[N]ot only did petitioner fail to complain of any
uncertainty about the subject under inquiry, or object that the questions put to him were not pertinent to
the inquiry, but, moreover, at least three of the questions he refused to answer were, on their face, clearly
pertinent to the inquiry as a matter of law.”).
345
Cafeteria & Rest. Workers Union v. McElroy (C&RW Union), 367 U.S. 886, 886 (1961).
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Greene.346 The Court held that the commander had appropriate authority and
no additional process was due. Brennan’s dissent would have required more
process.
The last two opinions issued in 1961, Killian347 and Cramp,348 come
from the next term, swiftly decided. In Killian, the issue was the conviction
of a member of the Communist Party for supplying a false affidavit in his
role as a senior member of a labor union.349 The Court remanded, in an opinion by Whittaker, considering that the conviction could be made properly
and the First Amendment was not implicated because membership was not
made into a crime.350 The four dissenters disagreed with the premise that
this setting was less deserving of First Amendment protection than a
criminal prosecution for membership in the Communist party. Black,351
Douglas,352 and Brennan353 wrote separately; Warren and Black joined
Douglas’s dissent.
Cramp featured a unanimously victorious public school teacher who
refused a loyalty oath mandated by Florida law. Stewart wrote for the Court.
The propriety of the requirement of an oath followed from Adler.354
However, this oath failed for vagueness.355
346

See supra note 284 and accompanying text.
See generally Killian v. United States, 368 U.S. 231 (1961).
348
See generally Cramp v. Bd. of Pub. Instruction, 368 U.S. 278 (1961).
349
Cf. supra note 98 and accompanying text (discussing Douds); infra note 385 and
accompanying text (discussing Brown).
350
Killian, 368 U.S. at 254 (“[P]etitioner was not charged with criminality for being a member
of or affiliated with the Communist Party, nor with participating in any criminal activities of or for the
Communist Party, but only, with having made and submitted to the Government an affidavit falsely
swearing that he was not a member of or affiliated with the Communist Party in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 1001, 18 U.S.C.A. § 1001. It would be strange doctrine, indeed, to say that membership in the
Communist Party—when, as here, a lawful status—cannot be proved by evidence of lawful acts and
statements, but only by evidence of unlawful acts and statements.”).
351
Id. at 260 (Black, J., dissenting) (“I would overrule the decision in Douds and order this
prosecution dismissed. As I said there, ‘Whether religious, political, or both, test oaths are implacable
foes of free thought. By approving their imposition, this Court has injected compromise into a field
where the First Amendment forbids compromise.’”) (citations omitted).
352
Id. at 266 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (“In light of the Scales decision and the prior decision in
Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957), it is difficult to see why, if membership is to be punished, a
different standard should be applied here from that applied in the Smith Act. The constitutional overtones
are as pronounced here as they were in Yates and Scales.”).
353
Brennan recognized that Douds meant that political strikes were a legitimate concern of
Congress. Id. at 268 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“Congress could validly impute to the Communist Party
an institutional predilection for political strikes, and could reasonably act on the assumption that
members of the Party or its affiliates would partake of that predisposition.”). Nevertheless, Brennan
concludes that more than mere membership was necessary.
354
See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
355
Cramp v. Bd. of Pub. Instruction, 368 U.S. 278, 286 (1961) (“The provision of the oath here
in question, it is to be noted, says nothing of advocacy of violent overthrow of state or federal
government. It says nothing of membership or affiliation with the Communist Party, past or present. The
provision is completely lacking in these or any other terms susceptible of objective measurement. Those
347
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After having taken office in January of 1961, President Kennedy
appointed White to replace Whittaker in April 1962. Their voting on unAmericanism prosecutions was similar. The year 1961 would also bring the
construction of the Berlin Wall, a tangible testament to the illiberal nature
of the Soviet Bloc, likely weakening Soviet Communism in the war of ideas.
Soon thereafter, the Court issued a defeat for un-Americanism
prosecutions in Russell,356 which involved six prosecutions of journalists for
refusing to answer questions of congressional subcommittees.357 The indictments stated that the questions were pertinent to the inquiry but did not
identify the subject under inquiry.358 Stewart’s majority opinion recounted
that the subject had been identified differently and in contradicting ways at
different steps in the process.359 The Court reversed and ordered the
dismissal of the indictments because of their inadequacy. Clark and Harlan
dissented separately, with Clark also joining Harlan. Both argued that the
Court departed from a century of practice and established precedent and
Clark underscored that the Court could have so decided in Sacher, rather
than deciding that case on the much weaker issue of pertinency.360
who take this oath must swear, rather, that they have not in the unending past ever knowingly lent their
‘aid,’ or ‘support,’ or ‘advice,’ or ‘counsel’ or ‘influence’ to the Communist Party. What do these phrases
mean? In the not too distant past Communist Party candidates appeared regularly and legally on the
ballot in many state and local elections. Elsewhere the Communist Party has on occasion endorsed or
supported candidates nominated by others. Could one who had ever cast his vote for such a candidate
safely subscribe to this legislative oath? Could a lawyer who had ever represented the Communist Party
or its members swear with either confidence or honesty that he had never knowingly lent his ‘counsel’
to the Party?”).
356
See generally Russell v. United States, 369 U.S. 749 (1962).
357
See id. (Two defendants refused to answer questions of the House Un-American Activities
Committee. Four defendants refused before the Internal Security Subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary
Committee.).
358
Id. at 768 (“At every stage in the ensuing criminal proceeding [defendant] Price was met with
a different theory, or by no theory at all, as to what the topic had been. Far from informing Price of the
nature of the accusation against him, the indictment instead left the prosecution free to roam at large—
to shift its theory of criminality so as to take advantage of each passing vicissitude of the trial and
appeal.”).
359
Id. at 767 (“It was said that the hearings were ‘not . . . an attack upon the free press,’ that the
investigation was of ‘such attempt as may be disclosed on the part of the Communist Party . . . to
influence or to subvert the American press.’ It was also said that ‘We are simply investigating
communism wherever we find it.’ In dealing with a witness who testified shortly before Price, counsel
for the subcommittee emphatically denied that it was the subcommittee’s purpose ‘to investigate
Communist infiltration of the press and other forms of communication.’ But when Price was called to
testify before the subcommittee no one offered even to attempt to inform him of what subject the
subcommittee did have under inquiry. At the trial the Government took the position that the subject under
inquiry had been Communist activities generally. The district judge before whom the case was tried
found that ‘the questions put were pertinent to the matter under inquiry’ without indicating what he
thought the subject under inquiry was. The Court of Appeals, in affirming the conviction, likewise
omitted to state what it thought the subject under inquiry had been. In this Court the Government
contends that the subject under inquiry at the time the petitioner was called to testify was ‘Communist
activity in news media.’”) (emphasis added).
360
See supra note 252 and accompanying text.
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Frankfurter and White did not participate in all six and Brennan did not
participate in one. Thus, the four votes of Warren, Black, Douglas, and
Brennan, would have been sufficient for five exonerations without Stewart’s
vote, whereas the sixth, in which Brennan did not participate, would be a tie
if Stewart voted with Clark and Harlan, upholding the conviction below. We
will not know how strongly Stewart was influenced, if at all, by the fact that
the defendants were journalists, raising a First Amendment issue that was
indirect and involved the freedom of the press. The issue was indirect in the
sense that it did not involve freedom of association threatened by the
questioning from the subcommittees. Freedom of the press was threatened
by journalists’ fear of un-Americanism prosecutions. Following the
precedent of Russell, the Court also ordered summary dismissal of Silber,361
with the same dissenters and the same composition, i.e., White and Frankfurter not participating.
D. After Frankfurter: The End of Un-Americanism Prosecutions
President Kennedy next appointed Arthur Goldberg, who in October of
1962 replaced Frankfurter. A reliable vote against un-Americanism
prosecutions replaced an occasional vote for them, leaving the Court
strongly against them. The government would win no more unAmericanism cases.
The new Justices, White and Goldberg, displayed their attitudes about
un-Americanism prosecutions in 1963, in Gibson.362 Goldberg wrote for the
majority in a 5–4 split. Harlan was joined by Clark, Stewart, and White in a
dissent, with White also writing separately an emphatic dissent. A Florida
congressional committee sought from the president of the Miami chapter of
the NAACP to answer whether 14 names of suspected communists were on
its membership list.363 Goldberg’s majority opinion stressed the weakness
of the claim that despite its manifest efforts to avoid subversive influence,
the NAACP presented a valid target for such an investigation.364 Black’s
361

See generally Silber v. United States, 370 U.S. 717 (1962).
See generally Gibson v. Fla. Legis. Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539 (1963).
363
By not seeking the entire list, the committee avoided being governed by established contrary
precedent. Cf. supra note 316 and accompanying text (discussing Louisiana v. NAACP).
364
Gibson, 372 U.S. at 555–56 (“Without any indication of present subversive infiltration in, or
influence on, the Miami branch of the N.A.A.C.P., and without any reasonable, demonstrated factual
basis to believe that such infiltration or influence existed in the past, or was actively attempted or sought
in the present—in short without any showing of a meaningful relationship between the N.A.A.C.P.,
Miami branch, and subversives or subversive or other illegal activities—we are asked to find the
compelling and subordinating state interest which must exist if essential freedoms are to be curtailed or
inhibited. This we cannot do. The respondent Committee has laid no adequate foundation for its direct
demands upon the officers and records of a wholly legitimate organization for disclosure of its
membership; the Committee has neither demonstrated nor pointed out any threat to the State by virtue
of the existence of the N.A.A.C.P. or the pursuit of its activities or the minimal associational ties of the
362
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concurrence would have found a direct violation of freedom of
association,365 as would Douglas’s.366 Harlan’s dissent argued that the
majority’s refusal to allow investigation due to lack of proof of nexus to fear
of communist infiltration was self-contradictory.367 The very concern of the
NAACP over communist infiltration laid it to rest.368 The limited use of the
list as a memory aid to the witness was proper.369 White’s dissent stressed
the fear of communist infiltration.370 Using anti-communist language, White
argued that the majority left the government powerless.371

14 asserted Communists. The strong associational interest in maintaining the privacy of membership
lists of groups engaged in the constitutionally protected free trade in ideas and beliefs may not be
substantially infringed upon such a slender showing as here made by the respondent.”).
365
Id. at 559 (Black, J., concurring) (“In my view the constitutional right of association includes
the privilege of any person to associate with Communists or anti-Communists, Socialists or antiSocialists, or, for that matter, with people of all kinds of beliefs, popular or unpopular. I have expressed
these views in many other cases[,] and I adhere to them now. Since, as I believe, the National Association
for the Advancement of Colored People and its members have a constitutional right to choose their own
associates, I cannot understand by what constitutional authority Florida can compel answers to questions
which abridge that right. Accordingly, I would reverse here on the ground that there has been a direct
abridgment of the right of association of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored
People and its members.”) (citations omitted).
366
Id. at 565 (Douglas, J., concurring) (“In my view, government is not only powerless to
legislate with respect to membership in a lawful organization; it is also precluded from probing the
intimacies of spiritual and intellectual relationships in the myriad of such societies and groups that exist
in this country, regardless of the legislative purpose sought to be served.”).
367
Id. at 580 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“For unless ‘nexus’ requires an investigating agency to
prove in advance the very things it is trying to find out, I do not understand how it can be said that the
information preliminarily developed by the Committee’s investigator was not sufficient to satisfy, under
any reasonable test, the requirement of ‘nexus.’”).
368
Id. at 581 (“It hardly meets the point at issue to suggest, as the Court does, that the resolution
only serves to show that the Miami Branch was in fact free of any Communist influences—unless selfinvestigation is deemed constitutionally to block official inquiry.”) (citations omitted).
369
Id. at 582 (“Given the willingness of the petitioner to testify from recollection as to individual
memberships in the local branch of the N.A.A.C.P., the germaneness of the membership records to the
subject matter of the Committee’s investigation, and the limited purpose for which their use was
sought—as an aid to refreshing the witness’[s] recollection, . . .—this case of course bears no
resemblance whatever to [the precedent barring production of entire membership lists].”).
370
Id. at 583 (“Although one of the classic and recurring activities of the Communist Party is the
infiltration and subversion of other organizations, either openly or in a clandestine manner, the Court
holds that even where a legislature has evidence that a legitimate organization is under assault[,] and
even though that organization is itself sounding open and public alarm, an investigating committee is
nevertheless forbidden to compel the organization or its members to reveal the fact, or not, of
membership in that organization of named Communists assigned to the infiltrating task.”).
371
Id. at 585 (White, J., dissenting) (“The net effect of the Court’s decision is, of course, to
insulate from effective legislative inquiry and preventive legislation the time-proven skills of the
Communist Party in subverting and eventually controlling legitimate organizations. Until such a group,
chosen as an object of Communist Party action, has been effectively reduced to vassalage, legislative
bodies may seek no information from the organization under attack by dutybound Communists. When
the job has been done and the legislative committee can prove it, it then has the hollow privilege of
recording another victory for the Communist Party, which both Congress and this Court have found to
be an organization under the direction of a foreign power, dedicated to the overthrow of the Government
if necessary by force and violence.”).
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Still, in 1963, the Court engaged a damages action against an
investigator for the House Un-American Activities Committee in Wheeldin
v. Wheeler.372 The plaintiff alleged that the investigator was given signed
blank subpoenas on one of which the investigator maliciously filled in
plaintiff’s name, causing him harm. The Court split 6–3. Douglas wrote for
the majority against liability.373 Brennan’s dissent, joined by Warren and
Black, would remand, arguing that the lower court’s opinion did not rest on
an implied right of action but found immunity, yet immunity would not
cover actions clearly beyond the employee’s authority.374 Because Wheeldin
is about liability, it is not included in the database of primary unAmericanism opinions.
Later in the same year, the Court split 5–4 against an un-Americanism
prosecution in Yellin.375 The defendant was convicted of contempt of
Congress for refusing to answer questions of the House Un-American
Activities Committee. Warren’s majority opinion practiced constitutional
avoidance and exonerated because the Committee did not properly follow
its own rules about granting a request for testimony in a closed session.376
The dissent of White, with Clark, Harlan, and Stewart, started by describing
the testimony about communist infiltration of unions by educated youth who
would hide their background,377 and that the defendant refused to answer
questions about his college attendance before he sought employment in the
steel industry.378 The dissent argued that, during his testimony, the
defendant did not seek to testify in a closed session and the Committee did
not violate its rules by not granting one.

372
See generally Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647 (1963). Because the issue is private liability,
the opinion in not included in the database of primary opinions.
373
Id. at 651 (“[I]t is difficult for us to see how the present statute, which only grants power to
issue subpoenas, implies a cause of action for abuse of that power.”).
374
Id. at 653 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“In this Court, the Solicitor General of the United States,
appearing as counsel for the respondent, candidly admits that the Court of Appeals misapplied Barr v.
Matteo. In that case we upheld the governmental-officer immunity in respect of ‘action . . . taken . . .
within the outer perimeter of petitioner’s line of duty.’ It has never been suggested that the immunity
reaches beyond that perimeter, so as to shield a federal officer acting wholly on his own. A federal officer
remains liable for acts committed ‘manifestly or palpably beyond his authority.’”) (citation omitted).
375
Yellin v. United States, 374 U.S. 109, 109 (1963).
376
Id. at 111 (“However, because of the view we take of the Committee’s action, which was at
variance with its rules, we do not reach the constitutional questions raised.”) (citation omitted).
377
Id. at 126–27 (White, J., dissenting) (“The first witness, an organizer and high official in the
Communist Party from 1930 to 1950, testified that the Party had begun a policy of infiltrating into basic
industry, that Party ‘colonizers’ were sent to coordinate Party work in these industries, including the
steel industry, and that these colonizers were mainly young men from colleges and universities. These
colonizers, he continued, would misrepresent their backgrounds in applying for jobs and would conceal
their educational qualifications so as to gain jobs alongside other less-educated workers without casting
suspicion on their motives.”).
378
Id. at 128 (“[The defendant] was then asked to state his formal education and whether he was
a student at the College of the City of New York, which he refused to do. . . .”).

3 - GEORGEKOPOULOS (ONLINE VERSION) (DO NOT DELETE)

2021]

8/17/2021 6:13 PM

The Supreme Court’s Un-Americanism Pendulum

337

The Court issued two opinions against the prosecution in 1964. In
Baggett v. Bullitt,379 the Court revisited oaths of loyalty by university
professors and ruled against the oaths 8–2 in an opinion by White that would
find that statute improperly vague. Clark dissented, joined by Harlan.
Aptheker380 brought to the Court one of the consequences of being a
member of a communist-action organization, the revocation of the passports
of the senior members of the Communist Party. The Court decided 6–3 for
the unconstitutionality of the statutory provision revoking the passports. The
dissent of Clark, with Harlan and White, found the limitation reasonably
related to national security.
In 1965 the Court vacated the order to register as a communist-front
organization directed to the Abraham Lincoln Brigade,381 formed to fight in
the Spanish Civil War. The Court dismissed with a per curiam opinion on
the stale record. A dissent by Douglas, joined by Black and Harlan, would
have reached the merits. We may guess that the three would not have taken
the same side if the merits had been reached.
Still in 1965, the Court encountered one more interaction of a black
organization with an un-Americanism prosecution in the South.
Dombrowski v. Pfister382 involved Louisiana’s allegation that a civil rights
organization was a subversive one. The Court split 5–2, Black and Stewart
not participating. In an opinion by Brennan, the majority considered the
statute void for vagueness referring to Baggett,383 and ordered the grant to
the defendants of an injunction against state prosecution. Harlan’s dissent,
with Clark, argued for restraint of the federal judiciary’s involvement in
state processes and would remand for monitoring and protection by the
federal district court.384
After the two void-for-vagueness holdings in Baggett and
Dombrowski, the five-member majority of the Court would further hamper
un-Americanism prosecutions with US v. Brown,385 still in 1965. Chief
Justice Warren writes for the Court, holding that the prohibition against
communists holding officer positions in labor unions is a bill of attainder,
thus vindicating Black’s persistent theme that had first been expressed in the

379

Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 360 (1964).
Aptheker v. Sec’y of State, 378 U.S. 500, 500 (1964).
381
Veterans of Abraham Lincoln Brigade v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 380 U.S. 513,
514 (1965).
382
Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 482 (1965).
383
See supra note 379 and accompanying text.
384
Dombrowski, 380 U.S. at 502 (“While I consider that abstention was called for, I think the
District Court erred in dismissing the action. It should have retained jurisdiction for the purpose of
affording appellants appropriate relief in the event that the state prosecution did not go forward in a
prompt and bona fide manner.”).
385
United States v. Brown (US v. Brown), 381 U.S. 437, 437 (1965).
380
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very first un-Americanism opinion reviewed here, Lovett.386 The dissent is
by White, with Clark, Harlan, and Stewart.
After the appointment of Justice Abe Fortas to replace Goldberg in
October 1965, the Court issued a unanimous rejection of the registration
obligation of members of the Communist Party in Albertson v. Subversive
Activities Control Bd.387 The obligation to register violated the privilege
against self-incrimination. Clark’s concurrence pointed out that this was
known from the time that he so advised in 1948 as Attorney General.388
The age of un-Americanism prosecutions was coming to an end. The
Court still had to address occasional issues as they would arise. In Elfbrandt
v. Russell,389 the Court invalidated an Arizona loyalty oath, albeit still
divided 5–4. The Court would be unanimous, however, in Gojack,390 in
rejecting the renewed contempt prosecution of one of the defendants of
Russell.391 Black would have used the opportunity to reverse Barenblatt.392
Two years later, the Court’s five member majority would invalidate New
York’s laws against the public employment of subversives in Keyishian v.
Bd. of Regents of Univ. of State of NY.393 Clark authored a frustrated dissent,
which Harlan, Stewart, and White joined. According to Clark, the majority
sweepingly overruled precedent394 and undermined the nation’s selfpreservation.395
386

See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
Albertson v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 382 U.S. 70, 72–73 (1965).
388
Id. at 85 (Clark, J., concurring) (“[I]t was then pointed out that the ‘measure might be held
. . . even to compel self-incrimination.’ This view was expressed in a letter over my signature as Attorney
General. . .”) (citations omitted).
389
Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U.S. 11, 19 (1966).
390
Gojack v. United States, 384 U.S. 702, 702 (1965).
391
See supra note 356 and accompanying text.
392
See supra note 273 and accompanying text.
393
Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of State of N.Y., 385 U.S. 589, 609 (1967).
394
Id. at 622 (Clark, J., dissenting) (“It is clear that the Feinberg Law, in which this Court found
‘no constitutional infirmity’ in 1952, has been given its death blow today. Just as the majority here finds
that there ‘can be no doubt of the legitimacy of New York’s interest in protecting its education system
from subversion’ there can also be no doubt that ‘the be-all and end-all’ of New York’s effort is here.
And, regardless of its correctness, neither New York nor the several States that have followed the
teaching of Adler v. Board of Education, 342 U.S. 485, 72 S. Ct. 380, 96 L. Ed. 517, for some 15 years,
can ever put the pieces together again. No court has ever reached out so far to destroy so much with so
little.”).
395
Id. at 628–29 (“I regret to say—and I do so with deference—that the majority has by its
broadside swept away one of our most precious rights, namely, the right of self-preservation. Our public
educational system is the genius of our democracy. The minds of our youth are developed there[,] and
the character of that development will determine the future of our land. Indeed, our very existence
depends upon it. The issue here is a very narrow one. It is not freedom of speech, freedom of thought,
freedom of press, freedom of assembly, or of association, even in the Communist Party. It is simply this:
May the State provide that one who, after a hearing with full judicial review, is found to have willfully
and deliberately advocated, advised, or taught that our Government should be overthrown by force or
violence or other unlawful means; or to have willfully and deliberately printed, published, etc., any book
387
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President Johnson would appoint Thurgood Marshall to replace Clark
in August of 1967. Without Marshall’s participation, the Court would split
6–2 in deciding Robel.396 An employee was a member of the Communist
Party in a facility of a defense contractor. By virtue of the prohibition against
a member of the Communist Party working in the defense industry, he was
criminally prosecuted. The district court exonerated him on the basis that he
was a passive member. The Supreme Court expanded the reasoning and
exonerated him because the prohibition violated freedom of association.397
Harlan joined White’s dissent.398 No more un-Americanism prosecutions
would reach the Supreme Court.
The next year the Soviet Union would forcibly suppress a reformist
uprising in Czechoslovakia, in what history has come to call the Prague
Spring of 1968.399 This joined Khrushchev’s 1956 recognition of Stalin’s
crimes,400 the violent suppression of the Hungarian revolution of 1956,401
and the building of the Berlin Wall in 1961.402 The result was a fading of the
allure of Soviet Communism. From the spring of 1968, the pro-Soviet unity
of communist parties broke. In some Western democracies, communist
parties split into Soviet and Eurocommunist parties. In others (including the
United States) they maintained the soviet orthodoxy, while often (but not in
the United States) in a few more years a Eurocommunist offshoot would

or paper that so advocated and to have personally advocated such doctrine himself; or to have willfully
and deliberately become a member of an organization that advocates such doctrine, is prima facie
disqualified from teaching in its university? My answer, in keeping with all of our cases up until today,
is ‘Yes!’”).
396
United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 258 (1967).
397
Id. at 262 (“We cannot agree with the District Court that [Section] 5(a)(1)(D) can be saved
from constitutional infirmity by limiting its application to active members of Communist-action
organizations who have the specific intent of furthering the unlawful goals of such organizations. . . . It
is precisely because that statute sweeps indiscriminately across all types of association with Communistaction groups, without regard to the quality and degree of membership, that it runs afoul of the First
Amendment.”).
398
Id. at 282–83 (White, J., dissenting) (“The constitutional right found to override the public
interest in national security defined by Congress is the right of association, here the right of appellee
Robel to remain a member of the Communist Party after being notified of its adjudication as a
Communist-action organization. Nothing in the Constitution requires this result. The right of association
is not mentioned in the Constitution. It is a judicial construct appended to the First Amendment rights to
speak freely, to assemble, and to petition for redress of grievances.”).
399
See
Prague
Spring,
ENCYCLOPAEDIA
BRITANNICA,
https://www.britannica.com/event/Prague-Spring [perma.cc/PC4K-T6MQ] (last visited Apr. 7, 2021);
Prague Spring, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Prague_Spring [perma.cc/4RSA-JT53] (last
visited Apr. 7, 2021).
400
See supra note 198 and accompanying text.
401
See supra note 199 and accompanying text.
402
See generally Thomas Lindenberger, Berlin Wall, in 1 EUROPE SINCE 1914: ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF THE AGE OF WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION 354 (John Merriman & Jay Winter eds., 2006); Berlin Wall,
ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA (July 10, 2020), https://www.britannica.com/topic/Berlin-Wall
[perma.cc/CLN8-HHJ3].
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arise.403 In a sense, while the United States was losing the hot war against
communism in Vietnam as well as injuring itself in the ideological war as
the advocate for freedom by supporting right-leaning dictatorships, perhaps
the Prague Spring lost the ideological war for the Soviet Union. Still far in
the future was the end of the cold war.

403

See
generally
Eurocommunism,
ENCYCLOPAEDIA
BRITANNICA,
https://www.britannica.com/topic/Eurocommunism [perma.cc/5CHM-ZX4H] (last visited Apr. 7,
2021);
Gus
Hall,
THE
GUARDIAN
(Oct.
17,
2000),
https://www.theguardian.com/news/2000/oct/18/guardianobituaries3 [perma.cc/B33T-2BR7] (on the
soviet orthodoxy of the Communist Party of the United States).
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APPENDIX B: THE VOTING RECORD BY CASE AND JUSTICE
Table A1 produces in each case the justices voting for the government,
those voting for the individual and those not participating. The first column
has the one-party abbreviation of the name of the case, the second has the
citation to the United States Reporter, the third the date that the decision was
issued. The justices voting for the individuals and against the prosecution
are in the fourth column and those voting for the prosecution are in the fifth.
Those not participating are in the sixth column. The opinions are ordered
chronologically by date of issuance and citation to the US reporter. Text
about the appointment and replacement of justices occupies entire rows.
Case name abrv’n, note
reference.
Lovett, n. 67

Table A1, The primary un-Americanism cases
US cite

Date

Against un-Americanism
prosecution
328 U.S. 303
3-Jun-46
Black, Reed, Frankfurter, Douglas,
Murphy, Rutledge, Burton
Christoffel, n. 71
338 U.S. 84
27-Jun-49
Douglas, Frankfurter, Black,
Rutledge, Murphy
Clark (8/49) and Minton (10/49) replace Murphy and Rutledge (change in favor of prosecutions)

For un-Americanism
prosecution

Not
participating
no Jackson

Dennis I, n. 75

339 U.S. 162

27-Mar-50

Black, Frankfurter

Minton, Burton,
Jackson, Reed, Vinson

Morford, n. 79

339 U.S. 258

10-Apr-50

Bryan, n. 89

339 U.S. 323

8-May-50

Minton, Burton, Jackson, Douglas,
Frankfurter, Reed, Black, Vinson
Black, Frankfurter

no Douglas or
Clark
no Clark

Fleischman, n. 89

339 U.S. 349

8-May-50

Douds, n. 98

339 U.S. 382

8-May-50

Blau, n. 80

340 U.S. 159

11-Dec-50

no Douglas or
Clark
no Douglas or
Clark
no Minton,
Clark,
Douglas
no Clark

Rogers, n. 81

340 U.S. 367

26-Feb-51

Gerende, n. 88

341 U.S. 56

12-Apr-51

JAFRC I, n. 90

341 U.S. 123

30-Apr-51

Dennis II, n. 118

341 U.S. 494

4-Jun-51

Garner, n. 82

341 U.S. 716

4-Jun-51

Minton, Burton,
Jackson, Reed, Vinson
Black, Frankfurter
Minton, Burton,
Jackson, Reed, Vinson
Black
Burton, Jackson,
Frankfurter, Reed,
Vinson
Minton, Burton, Jackson, Douglas, Frankfurter, Reed, Black,
Vinson
Black, Frankfurter, Douglas
Minton, Burton,
Jackson, Reed, Vinson
Minton, Clark, Burton,
Jackson, Douglas,
Frankfurter, Reed,
Black, Vinson
Burton, Black, Frankfurter, Douglas, Minton, Reed, Vinson
Jackson
Black, Douglas
Vinson, Reed, Burton,
Minton, Frankfurter,
Jackson
Burton, Douglas, Frankfurter, Black
Minton, Clark,
Jackson, Reed, Vinson

Burton, Jackson, Reed,
Vinson

no Clark

no Clark
no Clark
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Bailey, n. 106

341 U.S. 918

30-Apr-51

Adler, n. 141

342 U.S. 485

3-Mar-52

Carlson, n. 149

342 U.S. 524

10-Mar-52

Harisiades, n. 143

342 U.S. 580

10-Mar-52

Sacher I, n. 132

343 U.S. 1

10-Mar-52

Spector, n. 150

343 U.S. 169

7-Apr-52

Updegraff, n. 139

344 U.S. 183

15-Dec-52

Orloff, n. 154

345 U.S. 83

9-Mar-53

Isserman I, n. 133

345 U.S. 286

6-Apr-53

Bridges, n. 155

346 U.S. 209

15-Jun-53

Black, Frankfurter, Douglas,
Jackson
Black, Frankfurter, Douglas

Minton, Burton, Reed, no Clark
Vinson
Vinson, Reed, Burton, Minton, Jackson,
Clark
Black, Frankfurter, Douglas, Burton
Vinson, Reed, Minton,
Jackson, Clark
Douglas, Black
Minton, Burton,
No Clark
Jackson, Frankfurter,
Reed, Vinson
Black, Frankfurter, Douglas
Minton, Burton,
no Clark
Jackson, Reed, Vinson
Jackson, Frankfurter, Black
Minton, Burton,
No Clark
Douglas, Reed, Vinson
Minton, Clark, Burton, Douglas, Frankfurter, Reed, Black,
no Jackson
Vinson
Douglas, Frankfurter, Black
Minton, Clark, Burton, Jackson, Reed,
Vinson
Jackson, Douglas, Frankfurter,
Minton, Burton, Reed, No Clark
Black
Vinson
Burton, Douglas, Frankfurter, Black
Minton, Reed, Vinson
No Clark,
Jackson

Warren replaces Vinson (change against prosecutions)
Barsky, n. 158

347 U.S. 442

26-Apr-54

Black, Frankfurter, Douglas

Warren, Clark, Burton,
Reed, Minton, Jackson
Warren, Clark,
Frankfurter, Burton,
Reed, Minton, Jackson
Burton, Reed, Minton

Galvan, n. 166

347 U.S. 522

24-May-54

Black, Douglas

Isserman II, n. 136

348 U.S. 1

14-Oct-54

Black, Douglas, Frankfurter

Quinn, n. 172

349 U.S. 155

23-May-55

Reed

Emspak, n. 171

349 U.S. 190

23-May-55

Bart, n. 173

349 U.S. 219

23-May-55

Peters, n. 177

349 U.S. 331

6-Jun-55

Nelson, n. 183

350 U.S. 497

2-Apr-56

Slochower, n. 190

350 U.S. 551

9-Apr-56

Zucca, n. 193

351 U.S. 91

30-Apr-56

CPUSA I, n. 186

351 U.S. 115

30-Apr-56

Cole, n. 196

351 U.S. 536

11-Jun-56

Minton, Harlan, Black, Douglas,
Warren, Clark, Frankfurter, Burton,
Minton
Black, Douglas, Warren, Clark,
Frankfurter, Burton
Black, Douglas, Warren, Clark,
Frankfurter, Burton
Harlan, Black, Douglas, Warren,
Clark, Frankfurter, Minton
Harlan, Black, Douglas, Warren,
Clark, Frankfurter
Black, Douglas, Warren, Clark,
Frankfurter
Black, Douglas, Warren,
Frankfurter, Burton
Harlan, Black, Douglas, Warren,
Frankfurter, Burton
Harlan, Black, Douglas, Warren,
Frankfurter, Burton
Black, Douglas, Warren, Clark,
Reed

Frankfurter, Harlan,
Burton

No Warren,
Clark

Harlan replaces Jackson

Reed, Minton, Harlan
Harlan, Reed, Minton
Burton, Reed
Burton, Reed, Minton
Harlan, Burton, Reed,
Minton
Clark, Reed, Minton

No Harlan

Clark, Reed, Minton
Clark, Reed, Minton

Brennan replaces Minton (change against prosecutions)
Mesarosh, n. 201

352 U.S. 1

5-Nov-56

No Brennan
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Leedom, n. 202

352 U.S. 145

10-Dec-56

Harlan, Black, Douglas, Brennan,
Warren, Clark, Frankfurter, Burton,
Reed
Harlan, Black, Douglas, Brennan,
Warren, Frankfurter

Gold, n. 203

352 U.S. 985

28-Jan-57

Schware, n. 209

353 U.S. 232

6-May-57

Konigsberg I, n. 205

353 U.S. 252

6-May-57

Jencks, n. 214

353 U.S. 657

3-Jun-57

Sentner, n. 212

353 U.S. 963

20-May-57

Watkins, n. 221

354 U.S. 178

17-Jun-57

Sweezy, n. 218

354 U.S. 234

17-Jun-57

Yates I, n. 224

354 U.S. 298

17-Jun-57

Service, n. 222

354 U.S. 363

17-Jun-57

Rowoldt, n. 246

355 U.S. 115

9-Dec-57

Harmon, n. 248

355 U.S. 579

3-Mar-58

Brown, n. 249

356 U.S. 148

31-Mar-58

Burton, Black, Douglas, Brennan,
Warren
Burton, Black, Douglas, Brennan,
Warren
Harlan, Black, Douglas,
WJBrennan, Warren, Frankfurter,
Burton
Harlan, Black, Douglas, Brennan,
Warren, Frankfurter, Whittaker
Harlan, Black, Douglas, Brennan,
Warren, Frankfurter
Harlan, Black, Douglas, Brennan,
Warren, Frankfurter
Harlan, Black, Douglas, Warren,
Frankfurter, Burton
Harlan, Black, Douglas, Brennan,
Warren, Frankfurter, Whittaker,
Burton
Black, Douglas, Brennan, Warren,
Frankfurter
Harlan, Black, Douglas, Brennan,
Warren, Frankfurter, Whittaker,
Burton
Black, Douglas, Brennan, Warren

Green, n. 250

356 U.S. 165

31-Mar-58

Black, Douglas, Brennan, Warren

Yates II, n. 251

356 U.S. 363

5-May-58

Sacher II, n. 252

356 U.S. 576

19-May-58

Nowak, n. 255

356 U.S. 660

26-May-58

Maisenberg, n. 255

356 U.S. 670

26-May-58

Bonetti, n. 257

356 U.S. 691

2-Jun-58

Kent, n. 258

357 U.S. 116

16-Jun-58

Dayton, n. 261

357 U.S. 144

16-Jun-58

Beilan, n. 266

357 U.S. 399

30-Jun-58

Black, Douglas, Brennan, Warren,
Frankfurter, Harlan
Harlan, Black, Douglas, Brennan,
Warren, Frankfurter
Harlan, Black, Douglas, Brennan,
Warren, Frankfurter
Harlan, Black, Douglas, Brennan,
Warren, Frankfurter
Black, Douglas, Brennan, Warren,
Whittaker, Burton
Black, Douglas, Brennan, Warren,
Frankfurter
Black, Douglas, Brennan, Warren,
Frankfurter
Black, Douglas, Brennan, Warren

Lerner, n. 266

357 U.S. 468

30-Jun-58

Black, Douglas, Brennan, Warren

343

Clark, Burton, Reed

Whittaker replaces Reed
Harlan, Clark,
Frankfurter
Harlan, Clark,
Frankfurter
Clark

No Whittaker
No Whittaker
No Whittaker

Clark, Burton
Clark
Clark, Burton
Clark

No Whittaker
or Burton
No Whittaker
No Whittaker
or Brennan
No Clark

Harlan, Clark,
Whittaker, Burton
Clark

Harlan, Clark,
Frankfurter,
Whittaker, Burton
Harlan, Clark,
Frankfurter,
Whittaker, Burton
Clark, Burton,
Whittaker
Clark, Whittaker
Clark, Whittaker,
Burton
Clark, Whittaker,
Burton
Harlan, Clark,
Frankfurter
Harlan, Clark,
Whittaker, Burton
Harlan, Clark,
Whittaker, Burton
Harlan, Clark,
Frankfurter,
Whittaker, Burton
Harlan, Clark,
Frankfurter,
Whittaker, Burton

No Burton
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Speiser, n. 263

357 U.S. 513

30-Jun-58

Harlan, Black, Douglas, Brennan,
Frankfurter, Whittaker, Burton
Harlan, Black, Douglas, Brennan,
Frankfurter, Whittaker, Burton

Clark

No Warren

First Unitarian, n. 264

357 U.S. 545

30-Jun-58

Clark

No Warren

Vitarelli, n. 270

359 U.S. 535

1-Jun-59
8-Jun-59

Harlan, Black, Douglas, Brennan,
Warren
Black, Douglas, Brennan, Warren

360 U.S. 109

8-Jun-59

Black, Douglas, Brennan, Warren

Raley, n. 283

360 U.S. 423

22-Jun-59

Black, Douglas, Brennan, Warren

Greene, n. 284

360 U.S. 474

29-Jun-59

Sawyer, n. 286

360 U.S. 622

29-Jun-59

Nelson-LA, n. 288

362 U.S. 1

29-Feb-60

Harlan, Black, Douglas, Stewart,
Brennan, Warren, Frankfurter,
Whittaker
Black, Douglas, Stewart, Brennan,
Warren
Black, Douglas, Brennan

Stewart, Clark,
Frankfurter, Whittaker
Harlan, Stewart, Clark,
Frankfurter, Whittaker
Harlan, Stewart, Clark,
Frankfurter, Whittaker
Harlan, Clark,
Frankfurter, Whittaker
Clark

Uphaus, n. 278

360 U.S. 72

Barenblatt, n. 273

Niukkanen, n. 293

362 U.S. 390

18-Apr-60

Black, Douglas, Brennan, Warren

Kimm, n. 294

363 U.S. 405

13-Jun-60

Black, Douglas, Brennan, Warren

Flemming, n. 297

363 U.S. 603

20-Jun-60

Black, Douglas, Brennan, Warren

McPhaul, n. 298

364 U.S. 372

14-Nov-60

Black, Douglas, Brennan, Warren

Polites, n. 301

364 U.S. 426

21-Nov-60

Black, Douglas, Brennan, Warren

Travis, n. 304

364 U.S. 631

16-Jan-61

Wilkinson, n. 305

365 U.S. 399

27-Feb-61

Black, Douglas, Stewart, Brennan,
Warren, Whittaker
Black, Douglas, Brennan, Warren

Braden, n. 307

365 U.S. 431

27-Feb-61

Warren, Black, Douglas, Brennan

Konigsberg II, n. 310

366 U.S. 36

24-Apr-61

Black, Douglas, Brennan, Warren

Anastaplo, n. 312

366 U.S. 82

24-Apr-61

Black, Douglas, Brennan, Warren

Slagle, n. 315

366 U.S. 259

15-May-61

L v NAACP, n. 316

366 U.S. 293

22-May-61

CPUSA II, n. 321

367 U.S. 1

5-Jun-61

Harlan, Black, Douglas, Stewart,
Brennan, Warren, Clark, Whittaker
Harlan, Black, Douglas, Stewart,
Brennan, Warren, Clark,
Frankfurter, Whittaker
Black, Douglas, Brennan, Warren

Scales, n. 320

367 U.S. 203

5-Jun-61

Black, Douglas, Brennan, Warren

Noto, n. 322

367 U.S. 290

5-Jun-61

Harlan, Black, Douglas, Stewart,
Brennan, Warren, Clark,
Frankfurter, Whittaker

Stewart replaces Burton

Harlan, Clark,
Frankfurter, Whittaker
Harlan, Stewart, Clark,
Frankfurter, Whittaker
Harlan, Stewart, Clark,
Frankfurter, Whittaker
Harlan, Stewart, Clark,
Frankfurter, Whittaker
Harlan, Stewart, Clark,
Frankfurter, Whittaker
Harlan, Stewart, Clark,
Frankfurter, Whittaker
Harlan, Stewart, Clark,
Frankfurter, Whittaker
Harlan, Clark,
Frankfurter
Harlan, Stewart, Clark,
Frankfurter, Whittaker
Frankfurter, Clark,
Harlan, Whittaker,
Stewart
Harlan, Stewart, Clark,
Frankfurter, Whittaker
Harlan, Stewart, Clark,
Frankfurter, Whittaker

No Stewart

No Warren

No
Frankfurter

Harlan, Stewart, Clark,
Frankfurter, Whittaker
Harlan, Stewart, Clark,
Frankfurter, Whittaker
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CP v Catherwood, n. 323

367 U.S. 389

12-Jun-61

Deutch, n. 323

367 U.S. 456

12-Jun-61

Caf. & Rest. , n. 345

367 U.S. 886

19-Jun-61

Harlan, Black, Douglas, Stewart,
Brennan, Warren, Clark,
Frankfurter, Whittaker
Black, Douglas, Stewart, Brennan,
Warren
Black, Douglas, Brennan, Warren

Killian, n. 347

368 U.S. 231

11-Dec-61

Black, Douglas, Brennan, Warren

Cramp, n. 348

368 U.S. 278

11-Dec-61

Harlan, Black, Douglas, Stewart,
Brennan, Warren, Clark,
Frankfurter, Whittaker

Russell, n. 356

369 U.S. 749

21-May-62

Harlan, Clark

Silber, n. 361

370 U.S. 717

25-Jun-62

Black, Douglas, Stewart, Brennan,
Warren
Black, Douglas, Stewart, Brennan,
Warren
Black, Douglas, Brennan, Warren,
Goldberg
Black, Douglas, Brennan, Warren,
Goldberg
Black, Douglas, Stewart, Brennan,
White, Warren, Goldberg
Black, Douglas, Stewart, Brennan,
Warren, Goldberg
Douglas, Brennan, White, Warren,
Goldberg
Black, Douglas, Brennan, Warren,
Goldberg

Harlan, Stewart,
White, Clark
Harlan, Stewart,
White, Clark
Harlan, Clark

Harlan, Clark,
Frankfurter, Whittaker
Harlan, Stewart, Clark,
Frankfurter, Whittaker
Harlan, Stewart, Clark,
Frankfurter, Whittaker

White replaces Whittaker

Harlan, Clark

No White,
Frankfurter
No White,
Frankfurter

Goldberg replaces Frankfurter (change against prosecutions)
Gibson, n. 362

372 U.S. 539

25-Mar-63

Yellin, n. 375

374 U.S. 109

17-Jun-63

Baggett, n. 379

377 U.S. 360

1-Jun-64

Aptheker, n. 380

378 U.S. 500

22-Jun-64

Dombrowski, n. 382

380 U.S. 479

26-Apr-65

Brown, n. 385

381 U.S. 437

7-Jun-65

Harlan, White, Clark
Harlan, Clark

No Black,
Stewart

Harlan, Stewart,
White, Clark

Fortas replaces Goldberg
Albertson, n. 387

382 U.S. 70

15-Nov-65

Elfbrandt, n. 389

384 U.S. 11

18-Apr-66

Gojack, n. 390

384 U.S. 702

13-Jun-66

Keyishian, n. 393

385 U.S. 589

23-Jan-67

Harlan, Black, Douglas, Stewart,
Brennan, Warren, Clark, Fortas
Black, Douglas, Brennan, Warren,
Fortas
Harlan, Black, Douglas, Stewart,
Brennan, White, Warren, Clark,
Fortas
Black, Douglas, Brennan, Warren,
Fortas

No White
Harlan, Stewart,
White, Clark

Harlan, Stewart,
White, Clark

Marshall replaces Clark (change against prosecutions)
Robel, n. 396

389 U.S. 258

11-Dec-67

Black, Douglas, Stewart, Brennan,
Warren, Fortas

Harlan, White

No Marshall
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APPENDIX C: REGRESSION DETAILS
The linear regression used dummies corresponding to the first two cases
(variable “firsttwo”), the Jackson Era (variable “Jackson”), the idealist era
(set as the constant), the Backlash Era (variable “Backlash”), and the PostFrankfurter Era (“Post-Fr”) produced the statistics of Table C1. The
independent variables were the dummy variables.
Table C1. The statistics of the linear regression with era dummies.
Variable
Estimate St. Error t-Statistic P-Value
constant
0.258
0.045
5.692
1.37E-07
firsttwo
-0.036
0.150
-0.238
0.812
Jackson
0.306
0.061
4.990
2.69E-06
Backlash
0.135
0.055
2.475
0.015
Post-Fr
0.043
0.076
0.568
0.572
Deg Fr
SS
MS
F-Stat
P-Value
firsttwo
1
0.060
0.060
1.461
0.230
Jackson
1
0.885
0.885
21.518
1.11E-05
Backlash
1
0.262
0.262
6.370
0.013
Post-Fr
1
0.013
0.013
0.322
0.572
Error
96
3.946
0.041
Total
100
5.166
The non-linear regression uses the model of the pendulum motion. The
only independent variable is the date of the decision. The model is a0 + a1 t
Sin(a2 +a3 t) Exp(a4 t). Table C2 holds its statistics.
Table C2. The statistics of the nonlinear regression.
Variable
Estimate St. Error t-Statistic P-Value
a0
0.378
0.024
15.469
8.141E-28
a1
-0.027
0.009
-2.860
0.005
a2
5.217
0.350
14.913
9.844E-27
a3
0.489
0.044
11.017
9.886E-19
a4
-0.010
0.045
-0.213
0.832
Deg. Fr.
SS
MS
Model
5
16.797
3.359
Error
96
4.029
0.042
Uncorr’d T’l 101
20.826
Corr’d T’l
100
5.166
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